

April 27, 2022

Siobhan S. Bradley  
U.S. Office of Special Counsel  
1730 M Street, N.W.  
Suite 218  
Washington, D.C. 20036-4505

Dear Siobhan,

An employee investigated the March 8<sup>th</sup> use of the Y localizer. The straight-in localizer was out to maintenance and one of the reasons they initially advertised the Y localizer. The weather was excellent so visual approaches were conducted.

I am not sure what the confusion was on that day, but it seemed to swirl around a Detroit Approach Control (D21) supervisor. During the shift, a supervisor contacted the tower and asked to advertise the RNAV (GPS) offset approaches instead of the Y localizer. RNAV denotes Area Navigation while GPS represents Global Positioning System.

One of the early sticking points to not utilizing the RNAV (GPS) approaches was the CRJ2 aircraft. The aircraft and crew were not capable of executing RNAV (GPS) approaches. Almost all those aircraft have been phased out of DTW and one of the other apparent reasons for the advertised use of the RNAV (GPS) approach that day in March.

As previously discussed, the Agency has another option other than moving the Y offset localizer. They can conduct RNAV (GPS) Y Offset approaches. The approaches are satellite based with no critical area. The approaches are already published for use at DTW. (A1) A playback will be offered later.

Last year I was told, through Congresswoman Brenda Lawrence's office, that the Agency does not want to use RNAV (GPS) approaches due to interference from geomagnetic storms/solar flares or intentional interference.

An SME (Subject Matter Expert) and I were discussing a new Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) system. ADS-B is a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) GPS-based system that will replace the multilateration system (Multi-Lat) around the nation due to maintenance and operating costs.

GNSS is a broad term encompassing different types of satellite-based positioning navigation, and timing (PNT) systems used globally. GPS is one such type of GNSS.

[REDACTED] llance technology in which an aircraft determines its position via satellite sensors and periodically broadcasts it, enabling it to be tracked. The [REDACTED] received by air traffic control ground stations as a replacement for secondary surveillance radar, as no interrogation signal is needed from the ground.

A Multi-Lat system, on the other hand, uses multiple land-based sensors to triangulate aircraft positions based on transponder signals (aircraft-based equipment) to provide a one-second update rate for positive identification in all weather conditions. This system is currently used to conduct Precision Radar Monitor (PRM) approaches to closely spaced parallel runways at DTW.

An Agency engineer told the SME that they conducted tests on the ADS-B system during geomagnetic storm/solar flare activity and there were no issues of interference. This contradicts my discussion with Congressman Lawrence.

DTW conducted a flight check in March of 2022 of the entire RWY Y ILS system. The glideslope portion failed due to a faulty or damaged cable. So, in addition to just moving the Y localizer to avoid interference, these cabling and other land-based issues would go away if they utilized satellite-based equipment.

Remember, there are two other options as well. Utilize straight-in trip approaches simultaneously without the Y offset localizer to closely spaced runways. To accomplish this, the facility would have to request a waiver. I understand this option was pursued, but for unknown reasons was abandoned.

The other is a combination of staggered approaches and simultaneous approaches that I will cover later in my response.

In my previous response I stated, “During further review of a different playback, I noticed a pop-up message alert the D21 Quality Assurance (QA) specialist received while creating the recording for the FOIA request...The chances that the EDV mentioned in the message and EDV4996 are two separate flights is unlikely, so I will move forward as if they are the same. But you never know.”

For clarity, there were two FOIA requests: September 29, 2021, and February 11, 2022. Any video attachments will be excerpts of playbacks provided by the Agency. The entire playbacks can be provided.

A2 is an MOR (Mandatory Occurrence Report) and emails for an issue with the RWY 3R Glide Slope (GS). This issue occurred during dual approaches earlier on the same day as the triple approaches covered in my prior feedback. So, my “unlikely” comment was not accurate.

A3 is an MOR and emails involving the Y offset localizer aircraft, EDV4996, I discussed in my first response. I will refer to this as just “fly-through” from this point forward. The MOR was filed as a pilot deviation, not a fly-through of the localizer. This is crucial.

[REDACTED] received from the February 2022 FOIA request. Both MORs, on page 2 of each [REDACTED] in yellow, contain wind from 13 to 16 knots and gusting to 27 to 28 knots with [REDACTED] r wind and weather encountered in previous issues utilizing the Y offset localizer.

Although my previous comment was not spot on, there are some abnormalities, peculiarities, and oddities between the handling of the two issues.

In A2, page 2, in the QC summary, the Agency states, “After talking to D21 AT, they stated they had no issues reported...” After the MOR in A2 are pages of heavily redacted emails. On page 6 of A2, the Agency exchanges the following, “...no previous aircraft had reported any anomalies...LNE stated that the monitoring equipment was in the green and asked the next aircraft on final...if they were experiencing any issues...that aircraft reported no issues”. Also, on page 6 is, “There was no entry in the facility log regarding the report of nav-aid malfunction and second aircraft report.”

The exchanged continued on page 7 into page 8 with, “...this was passed to Tech-ops, it was determined that the GS was functioning properly and there were no other aircraft who reported issues...”

On page 9 is the verbiage from the pop-up alert message from my previous response. Again, this supports that my previous statement was not accurate.

Page 11 contains the statement, “...DTW had a public inquiry from the lead mechanic at Endeavor.” My point is, does the Agency consider a FOIA request from the media a “public inquiry”? (A4) By all accounts, the in-depth exchanges over the RWY 3R GS that were conducted are pale in comparison to the issue of the fly-through. Both were equipment issues.

The Agency retained a considerable amount of information in reference to the RWY 3R GS from the public inquiry.

A3, as stated above, is the MOR that covers a pilot deviation. In the MOR on pages 1 and 2, the Agency states, “Found during a facility review” under the Pilot Deviation Information heading. On page 2, under the Pilot Deviation heading and subheading question, “Was this a possible pilot deviation?”, the Agency selected “Yes”.

Later, on page 2, they again mention that this was discovered upon a QC review. They also state that the event is over two weeks old. I believe the two-week time frame applies to pilot deviation investigations. They also state, “Will forward to FSDO for informational purposes.” FSDO (Flight Standards District Offices) is the entity that would investigate pilot deviation issues.

“Informational purposes” is a strange selection of words. Informational for whom and what?

[REDACTED] in A3, page 2 under the Summary and QA Summary, only addresses the fact [REDACTED] the RWY 4L Y approach without being cleared for said approach by the [REDACTED] aspects are noted in the MOR.

The Agency hints at another issue on pages 9 and 10 of A3. On page 9 the Agency states, “EDV4996 was issued a 055 heading from the west to join the localizer however the aircraft flew through the RWY4L-Y localizer and appeared to align on the straight in final, the trainee asked EDV4996 to verify intercept the localizer, the pilot responded intercepting now waiting to capture.”

They continued with, “The screenshot is after the pilot responds “it is”, neither the trainee or OJTI issued corrective headings for the aircraft to join the Y localizer, the aircraft did eventually correct to the left and join the Y final...”

In my opinion, their points are very telling. The Agency only offers a screenshot to support the “appeared to align on the straight in final” comment. If you play the video I sent of the fly-through from my previous response, it appears to me that the aircraft was in a constant slow turn to join the Y offset localizer and not aligned with the straight-in final. Therefore, the Agency only offers a screenshot and not a video in support.

The Agency has the entire captured video and audio of the fly-through. Why not supply the capture? They played it up to that point to take a screenshot, so why not?

The Agency continues, “...neither the trainee or OJTI issued corrective headings for the aircraft to join the Y localizer...” and offers the pilot’s “it is” response from the approach controller’s inquiry. There was no need for the controller to issue a heading to join the final. I believe they observed what I did and did not see a need. Plus, the pilot confirmed the Y localizer when asked.

On page 10, the Agency goes on to admit the turn was appropriate when stating, “One aircraft EDV4996 did not capture the Y localizer initially, although the location, speed and heading given to join seemed appropriate.”

Back to A4 for a moment. On page 1, paragraph 3, the Agency states, “The retention period for data is 45 days...” So, since the data was requested in February 2022 and the data is from September 2021, the 45-day retention period applies?

Page 3 of A3 begins an email string that oddly enough discusses the fly-through issue. It is heavily redacted as well.

Page 5 has the earliest sent date, October 1, 2021, of this email string. Every part of that email is redacted except for the sent, subject, and sensitive signature information. Remember, this information was received from the February 2022 FOIA, but discusses information from the September 22, 2021, dual and trip operations. The February 2022 FOIA was for clarity over information received from the September 2021 request.

[REDACTED] retired QC specialist, they would review and fulfill all requests from FOIA [REDACTED] met all deadlines. Given the dates of the captures, this seems to be the case

The videos received from the September 2021 FOIA all have one of three capture dates: September 30, 2021 (6), October 1, 2021 (5), and October 4, 2021 (1). None have a date of October 6, 2021, the date of the fly-through MOR. The October 4<sup>th</sup> date is a capture of dual operations from a tower position. A5 contains examples.

The videos received from the February 2022 FOIA have capture dates of October 4, 2021 (2) and October 6, 2021 (1) (Date stamps included in A5). The two dated October 4<sup>th</sup> are in reference to the RWY 3R GS issue. The one dated October 6<sup>th</sup> covers the fly-through. This is the only video capture with an October 6<sup>th</sup> date from either FOIA. Why was the October 6<sup>th</sup> video not given with the September 2021 FOIA?

For reference, all D21 September 29<sup>th</sup> FOIA captures are date stamped September 30, 2021. The only D21 capture stamped with other than a September 30<sup>th</sup> date is the October 6<sup>th</sup> check in and the RWY 3R GS issue captured October 4<sup>th</sup> supplied in the February 2022 FOIA.

The October 6<sup>th</sup> capture from the February 2022 FOIA only covers the initial contact with EDV4996, the fly-through aircraft, and the only video offering of this flight in the February 2022 FOIA. The audio portion clearly states the pilot was told which runway to expect and the pilot stated he had ATIS Information E. (A6 Video)

On page 3 of A3, the Agency provides, “Controller Broadcasted ILS PRM Y in use now” and EDV4996 checks in with E. Controller assigns 04L. (ATIS E is in effect).” ATIS is the Automatic Terminal Information Service. This is a recorded loop broadcasted via frequency to inform pilots of what approaches are being conducted, airport weather, as well as other pertinent airfield information. The pilot had all the information when they checked in with “E” which is the identifier for the current broadcasted information. He was then told what runway to expect.

The 45-day retention date from September 22, 2021, is November 6<sup>th</sup> and the 45-day retention date from September 29, 2021, is November 13<sup>th</sup>. Both November dates are well after October 6, 2021, the MOR date of the fly-through.

The Agency requested the ATIS for that arrival bank to ensure the proper approach was advertised. It was. They reviewed the initial contact to ensure the pilot checked in with the proper ATIS. He did. The Agency reviewed the initial contact to ensure the pilot was assigned the proper runway. He was. They established that the location, speed, and heading given to join seemed appropriate. When the pilot was asked to confirm the Y offset localizer after he flew through it, he responded with “it is”.

The emails provided over the fly through have dates of October 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, and 6<sup>th</sup> of 2021. Not one piece of the information above was included in the October 6 MOR. Not one. There was not an MOR filed over the aircraft flying through the Y offset localizer. Why compile information that appears to be investigating a Y offset localizer issue and then file an MOR over

[REDACTED] aring an aircraft for an approach and a pilot executing an ILS without [REDACTED]

After compiling all the information, finding every aspect in order, and the pilot still flew through the Y offset localizer, why cease that investigation prior to finding out why? Instead, the Agency concentrated on a pilot deviation/controller mistake. These are two separate and distinct issues and should have warranted different MORs.

Both MOR email strings have similar dates and subject line verbiage, but one warranted an MOR, and the other did not. That makes no sense.

So, after finding that everything leading up to the fly through was in order, the Agency should have reviewed ground radar playbacks to see if there were any aircraft or vehicles in the critical area. They did not. To me it is clear the Agency knew, on September 30<sup>th</sup> or October 1<sup>st</sup>, what happened with the fly-through aircraft and had plenty of time to review any additional data and conduct interviews as they did with the RWY 3R GS MOR issue. They did not.

The individuals involved with the email string in A3 are responsible for reviewing and investigating findings. On page 10 of A3, the Agency states, "Other than the Trainee/OJTI asking EDV4849 if they intercepted the localizer and verifying it was ILS PRM Y 4L, we could not locate any discussion with the pilot on what may have occurred." I am not sure where they got the callsign EDV4849 from. EDV4996 is the aircraft in question. Wow, they really sleuthed this one up, huh.

Maybe they should be asking why no one requested the pilot to contact D21 after landing to open a dialog. This is a common practice. Or better yet, ask why no one reported the incident or if they did, who did they report it to?

They knew on September 30<sup>th</sup> or October 1<sup>st</sup> what took place, so they had more than enough time to continue to move forward with a proper investigation. Using their "two-week" offering and September 30<sup>th</sup> or October 1<sup>st</sup> as the start date, you come up with October 14-15, 2021. So, what did they do during the last seven days?

I am not sure of the timeframes, but I believe they are required to retain information from a FOIA for at least one year or more depending on the severity of the issue. There are also timeframes for retaining MORs and the supporting documentation.

Again, in the pilot deviation MOR, the Agency states the issue (pilot executed an approach without a clearance, not the fly-through) was discovered during a QC review. The date of the review is unknown. The only time in that email string where the pilot deviation is mentioned is on page 8 into page 9 of A2 where the Agency states, "An MOR was entered by QC for a possible pilot deviation." This email's subject line is, "Sept. 22 Review FOIA Request TRIPS". Then on page 10 of the same email they discuss the approach clearance omission.

Prior to my retirement in September of 2020, if triple ILS approaches were conducted, the Agency would review the operation the next business day. If this is still in place, the review

[REDACTED] sent an email. For a moment, let us say it is still in place. So, either they went [REDACTED] and did no review, did the review, and did not supply or redacted the [REDACTED] other possibility is the practice is no longer in place.

If a facility or QC review was conducted, it would have generated an email with a date and a subject line matter stating so. The earliest date of the emails provided is October 1, 2021. None of the email subject lines contain any "QC-facility-review" verbiage. All of them contain FOIA or FOIA review in the subject line.

Let us look at the timeframe. The D21 captures from the September 29, 2021, FOIA are date stamped September 30<sup>th</sup>, which is a Thursday. Page 5 of A3, has a sent date of Friday, October 1, 2021, at 10:00 AM. As stated earlier, every part of that email is redacted except for the sent, subject, and sensitive signature information. I am going to assume the redaction of this email is probably due to the fact of what was found.

On Monday, October 4, 2021, at 8:20 AM (A3, page 5) the emails continued. This email is heavily redacted. At 8:34 AM on Monday, October 4, 2021 (A3, page 3 into 4), the string continues, heavily redacted, except for "23:42:35EDV4996 does not join the Y localizer/corrected by controller- Pilot "waiting for it to capture". Trainer verified "Yankee PRM 04L"- Pilot "it is"". This dialog is oddly in red.

A3, page 3, is dated Tuesday, October 5, 2021, at 2:14 PM. This is where the initial check in of the fly-through aircraft is requested as well as the ATIS information.

On Wednesday, October 6, 2021, at 10:37 AM (A3, page 10 into 11) is where everything about the fly-through was abandoned and the decision to file a pilot deviation was made when they stated, "...however no approach clearance was issued...The pilot did not say anything...An MOR was entered by QC for a possible pilot deviation." They had enough information to file an MOR over the fly-through as a critical area issue, hell, more than enough.

In A3, page 8, there is another October 6<sup>th</sup> email sent at 10:48 AM. It too is redacted, but curiously has the red dialog from October 4<sup>th</sup>.

Not one D21 controller involved with the fly-through said a word to management, or they did, and management did nothing. Given the FOIA email dates, subject lines, and capture dates, there is no way this information was found during a facility review. It was found during the review of the FOIA requests. Why would they capture and review something on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September, then go back and re-review the same date and time frames and then say the information was discovered during a facility review?

I will offer this. The Agency supplied a playback of the C2 position, the arrival end coordinator, during the triple approaches and I recognized the voice as a D21 supervisor from my time at the facility. An excerpt (A7 video) captures the coordination when triple ILS approaches began and ended.

[REDACTED] located at the opposite end of the radar room from where the supervisors’

Since the supervisor coordinated the start and finish of triple ILS approaches with the tower from the C2 position, in all likelihood, he physically staffed the C2 position for the entire triple operation. This certainly put him in a position to observe the fly-through. There is no documentation provided by the Agency to prove that anyone reported the incident from D21.

Let us go back to the “Because this was discovered upon a QC review, this event is over 2 weeks old” statement in A3, page 2. If you go back two weeks from the date of the MOR, October 6, 2021, you will come up with September 22, 2021. The day requested in the September 29, 2021, FOIA. The event was two weeks old, not over two weeks old. September 22, 2021, is the date of the RWY 3R GS MOR.

If you review the email times and dates in A2 and A3, you will find a lot of similarities showing the issues were being discussed during the same timeframes. In the MOR on page 2 of A2, the Agency states they received a phone call from a mechanic with no date or time denoted.

The phone call verbiage on page 2, “LEAD MECHANIC FOR EDV, (Redaction), CALLED TO QUESTION THE ILS 3R. HE SAID THAT NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT TODAY WERE LOSING GS FUNCTION. I SPOKE WITH (Redaction) FROM NAVCOM AND FORWARDED HIM THIS INFORMATION. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO LOOK INTO IT” is identical to verbiage on page 11 of A2. The date and time of that email is Friday, September 24, 2021, at 9:15 AM.

On Monday, September 27, 2021, at 8:33 AM an update request was made. (A2, page 11) Later that day at 3:56 PM (A2, page 10) a response was given with identical verbiage from the MOR on page 2 of A2. Tuesday, September 28, 2021, at 7:55 AM (A2, page 10) the RWY 3R GS issue was closed.

The emails are so disjointed and redacted so heavily, and the information so poorly reported, that it is difficult to track exactly what happened. But I think I pieced together a decent timeline. It will be tough to know exactly without unredacted information. But that is their goal, I guess.

As I mentioned early in this response, the facility has published RNAV (GPS) approaches. (A1) After EDV4858 abandoned the approach due to the glideslope malfunction, he was vectored to conduct an RNAV (GPS) approach to RWY 3R. A replay (A8 video) shows EDV4858 being cleared for an RNAV approach. EDV4858 is a CRJ9, an updated version of the type of CRJ2 discussed on page one.

A1 and A8 are offered to show that RNAV (GPS) approaches are published and utilized at DTW. This is an example to show there is no reason to be utilizing the Y offset localizer.

A9 is a screenshot of the alignment of aircraft, within the red box, during triple ILS approaches utilizing the Y offset localizer. The yellow arrow is the landing direction, and the yellow type are the runway assignments for the aircraft in the red box.



[REDACTED] on example of staggered and simultaneous approaches I spoke of in the addendum. This is a little bit more complicated to explain. The yellow arrow on, and I will be discussing the aircraft within the blue box.

Instead of the Y offset localizer being utilized, D21 can use a combination of simultaneous and staggered approaches using all three straight-in localizers.

At the bottom of the blue box, you have DAL2766 landing RWY 4L. Paralleling that aircraft on the right, denoted with a yellow line, is SKW3706 landing RWY 3R. They are side-by-side, simultaneously approaching their respective runways.

The next two aircraft in the middle of the box are SKW3639, landing RWY 4R and paralleling off the right is RPA5601, denoted with a yellow line, landing RWY 3R. They are side-by-side, simultaneously approaching their respective runways.

Ahead and to the left of SKW3639, denoted by a blue line, and landing RWY 4L is EDV4737. Under the combination of simultaneous and staggered approaches, those two aircraft cannot be side-by-side. They would be required to be diagonally separated by no less than one mile.

The next two aircraft at the top, denoted by a red line, are EDV4868 and EDV4804. They would not be authorized to be side-by-side, because they are landing RWY 4L and RWY 4R. Again, under the combination of simultaneous and staggered approaches they would be required to be diagonally separated by no less than one mile.

This screen capture is from triple ILS approaches utilizing the Y offset localizer, but it is the best examples I could find to show the differences between the two types of operations.

So, during the combination of simultaneous and staggered approaches, and utilizing A10 as reference, the following separation is as follows: RWY 4L and 3R - side-by-side, RWY 3R and 4R - side-by-side, RWY 4R and 4L - at least one mile of diagonal separation.

Landing the other direction during the combination of simultaneous and staggered approaches, the following separation is as follows: RWY 22R and 21L - side-by-side, RWY 21L and 22L - side-by-side, RWY 22L and 22R - at least one mile of diagonal separation. No screenshot included.

After reviewing the latest information, not only does it support my “these people are so unqualified not only to hold their positions, but to make safety related determinations and decisions” from my previous response, you can add pathetic, incompetent, derelict investigators.

The Agency’s February 1, 2022, report contains the following statements from only seven pages in no particular order:

- FAA, through its Office of Safety and Technical Training and Office of *Audit and Evaluation*, conducted the *investigation* into this matter


██████████ been *no reports of anomalies or safety incidents* related to the use of the ILS-  
██████████ since June 1, 2021

- The FAA *investigation* did not substantiate the allegations and *discovered* no additional wrongdoing
- FAA *uncovered* no such wrongdoing during its *investigation*
- The current *investigation* was conducted by the Air Traffic Organization's Office of Safety and
- Technical Training, including its Quality Assurance, Runway Safety, and Litigation Groups, working with FAA's Office of *Audit and Evaluation*... The Office of Safety and Technical Training *interviewed* the Cleveland Air Traffic Services District Manager of Operations and the Assistant General Manager, and *searched* for and *reviewed* records related to this matter. Such records include refresher training briefings, *emails*, and other documents
- During the *investigation*, a *search* for any documentation of additional or related allegations of wrongdoing was conducted, including *Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MORs)*, *emails*, and other documentation. No such records were *discovered*
- A *review* of applicable *MORs* and Service Integrity Risk Analysis Process (SIRAP) data was conducted in October 2021 by the *investigative team*. *MORs* are required electronic documents the air traffic control facilities complete when certain events happen within a facility's airspace, such as a bird strike, two aircraft losing separation, or a medical emergency or *equipment malfunction*. These reports are *reviewed* by Quality Assurance employees in the region to validate the event and evaluate risk. A search of *MORs* for Detroit identified no noted *safety events* associated with ILS-Y since June 1, 2021
- As noted above, the FAA *investigation* did not substantiate the allegations and *discovered* no additional wrongdoing.

In their report, the Agency mentions MOR four times, as if trying to point out there were none filed. They refer to emails twice. The other words in italic should be spoke and executed by individuals in a safety related organization in the highest degree. They should have meaning, not used in a flippant arrogant manner with no conviction.

Thank you very much for your time, patience, and effort in addressing this safety issue at Detroit Metro Airport.

Respectively and sincerely,



Vincent M. Sugent



A1

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

AL-119 (FAA)



21168

WAAS CH <b>82439</b> <b>W04A</b>	APP CRS <b>038°</b>	Rwy Idg <b>10000</b> TDZE <b>645</b> Apt Elev <b>645</b>
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
# RNAV (GPS) Y RWY 4L

DETROIT METRO WAYNE COUNTY (DTW)

RNP APCH. Simultaneous approach authorized. LNAV procedure NA during simultaneous operations. Use of FD or AP required during simultaneous operations. For uncompensated Baro-VNAV systems, LNAV/VNAV NA below -19°C or above 54°C.		ALSF-2 	MISSED APPROACH: Climb to 1100 then climbing left turn to 4000 direct DOHNT and hold.	
D-ATIS <b>133.675</b>	DETROIT APP CON <b>124.05 284.0</b>	METRO TOWER <b>135.0 317.725</b>	GND CON <b>121.8 (NW) 119.45 (NE)</b> <b>132.725 (SW) 119.25 (SE)</b>	CLNC DEL <b>120.65</b>



ELEV 645	<b>D</b>	TDZE 645
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CATEGORY	A	B	C	D
LPV DA		895/24	250 (300-1/2)	
LNAV/VNAV DA		1068/45	423 (500-3/4)	
LNAV MDA	1040/24	395 (400-1/2)	1040/35	395 (400-3/4)
<b>C</b> CIRCLING	1180-1	535 (600-1)	1180-1 1/2 535 (600-1 1/2)	1240-2 595 (600-2)

TDZ/CL Rwy 3R, 4L, 4R and 22R  
REIL Rwy 3L, 9L, 9R and 21R  
HIRL all runways

DETROIT, MICHIGAN  
Orig-A 10OCT19

42°13'N-83°21'W

# DETROIT METRO WAYNE COUNTY (DTW)

## RNAV (GPS) Y RWY 4L

EC-1, 24 MAR 2022 to 21 APR 2022

EC-1, 24 MAR 2022 to 21 APR 2022

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

WAAS CH <b>42939</b> <b>W22B</b>	APP CRS <b>213°</b>	Rwy ldg TDZE Apt Elev	<b>10000</b> <b>642</b> <b>645</b>
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# RNAV (GPS) Y RWY 22R

DETROIT METRO WAYNE COUNTY (DTW)

⚠ For uncompensated Baro-VNAV systems, LNAV/VNAV NA below -19°C (-2°F) or above 54°C (130°F). DME/DME RNP-0.3 NA. Simultaneous approach authorized. LNAV procedure NA during simultaneous operations. Use of FD or AP providing RNAV track guidance required during simultaneous operations.


MAISR



MISSED APPROACH: Climb to 1100 then climbing right turn to 4000 direct DOHNT and hold.

D-ATIS <b>133.675</b>	DETROIT APP CON <b>124.05 284.0</b>	METRO TOWER <b>135.0 317.725</b>	GND CON <b>121.8 (NW) 119.45 (NE)</b> <b>132.725 (SW) 119.25 (SE)</b>	CLNC DEL <b>120.65</b>	CPDLC
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
## RADAR REQUIRED




### MISSED APCH FIX



ELEV <b>645</b>	<b>D</b>	TDZE <b>642</b>
-----------------	----------	-----------------



1100 4000 DOHNT VGSI and RNAV glidepath not coincident (VGSI Angle 3.00/TCH 71).



CATEGORY	A	B	C	D
LPV DA		892/24	250 (300-½)	
LNNAV/VNAV DA		1050/45	408 (500-¾)	
LNNAV MDA	1060/24	418 (500-½)	1060/40	418 (500-¾)
<b>C</b> CIRCLING	1180-1	535 (600-1)	1180-1½ 535 (600-1½)	1240-2 595 (600-2)

TDZ/CL Rwy 3R, 4L, 4R and 22R  
HIRL all runways  
REIL Rwy 3L, 9L, 9R and 21R

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

Orig 10NOV16

42°13'N-83°21'W

DETROIT METRO WAYNE COUNTY (DTW)

# RNAV (GPS) Y RWY 22R

EC-1, 24 MAR 2022 to 21 APR 2022

EC-1, 24 MAR 2022 to 21 APR 2022



A2

# Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

DTW-M-2021/09/22-0001

1. Reporting FAC ID			2. Date UTC (dd/mm/yyyy)							3. Time UTC					4. Significant Occurrence?	
D	T	W	2	2	0	9	2	0	2	1	1	9	3	5	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No	
5. MOR reported by (select one):													6. Did equipment outage potentially contribute to this event?			
<input type="radio"/> Controller providing services			<input type="radio"/> FLM			<input type="radio"/> Internal Facility Review					<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No					
<input type="radio"/> CIC			<input type="radio"/> Aircraft Owner/Operator			<input type="radio"/> Electronically Detected										
<input type="radio"/> External Facility Referral			<input type="radio"/> Hotline (Describe in summary)			<input type="radio"/> Other (Describe in summary)										
Training in progress? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No							Nearest Airport: <u>DTW</u>							Alert #: _____		
<b>Inquiry MORs</b>																
G1. MOR Type - public inquiry: Any expression of concern or inquiry, by any external entity, that is made by email, telephone, radio, etc., concerning the proximity or operation of an aircraft, either airborne or on the surface																
G2. Airborne occurrence:			NMAC:			G3. Reporting source:						G4. Contact number:				
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No			<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No			██████████						██████████				
G5a. Reporting Aircraft:																
Aircraft ID		Aircraft type/suffix		Facility communicating with A/C				Position communicating with A/C				Frequency				
EDV		UNKN		DTW				OPSCIC				118.4				
G5b. Wake Source Aircraft:																
Aircraft ID		Aircraft type/suffix		Facility communicating with A/C				Position communicating with A/C				Frequency				
Required separation:					Observed separation:					Airspace Class:						
Vertical _____ Lateral _____ nm					Vertical _____ Lateral _____ nm											
A/C Location (F/R/D):					A/C Altitude:		Number Injured:			Control Issue Experiences:						
Injuries Suffered																
<b>METAR Observation</b>																
KDTW 221853Z 36013G27KT 2SM RA BR FEW010 BKN015 OVC030 13/12 A2986 RMK AO2 PK WND 35027/1849 SFC VIS 3 SLP111 P0015 T01330122																



# Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

[DTW-M-2021/09/22-0001](#)

Pilot Deviation			
<b>Was this a possible pilot deviation?</b>			
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No	Preliminary Number: _____	Phase of Flight: _____	
Airspace Class: _____	Aircraft #: _____	ORG Choices: _____	Office Number: _____
Type of Deviation: _____		Control Surface: _____	
Pilot Summary:			
NMAC			
<b>Was this a NMAC?</b>			
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No	NMAC Number: _____		
Summary			
<p>J1. Summary - provide a brief summary for all MORs in this section that will provide enough information for QA to understand what occurred. Include information about items that require additional information in the specific MOR you are reporting.</p> <p>LEAD MECHANIC FOR EDV, [REDACTED], CALLED TO QUESTION THE ILS 3R. HE SAID THAT NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT TODAY WERE LOSING GS FUNCTION. I SPOKE WITH [REDACTED] FROM NAVCOM AND FORWARDED HIM THIS INFORMATION. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO LOOK INTO IT.</p>			
QC Summary			
<p>From D21 NAVCOM...</p> <p>After talking to D21 and AT, they said that they had no issues reported and that one endeavor pilot reported an issue but told D21 that it was their fault. After receiving the call from AT, I went into D21 and asked them for a few PIREPS and then monitored the frequency. All PIREPS were good.</p> <p>I informed the mechanic that our equipment was good because the indication he got would be a complete loss of signal. If this happened with the GS, since it's a CAT III, it would have shutdown with no attempts to restart and subsequent aircraft would have had GS off flags, as well. IMO, the pilots either had the wrong frequency selected or they were outside the correct flight path for the GS.</p> <p>My 2 cents but PIREPS and D21 confirmed the system was fully functional.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>			
QA Summary			
<p>QA reviewed.</p>			





[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 05, 2021 2:30 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Re: Sept. 22 Review FOIA Request Dual

[REDACTED]

Thanks for sharing the synopsis with us. Do you happen to have a FALCON bookmark for this session?

[REDACTED]  
Air Traffic Manager | Detroit TRACON | D21  
[REDACTED]

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 5, 2021 1:52 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: Sept. 22 Review FOIA Request Dual

There was a FOIA request submitted for STARS and Audio data from both D21 and DTW covering "Dual and TRIP" operations on Sept. 22 2021. The requested replays will be uploaded to the CSA QA KSN site as requested.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**LNE-**

- 1836Z EDV4858 reported to LNE "We have to break off the approach" The pilot then reported navigation issues with both the RWY3R localizer and glide slope, no previous aircraft had reported any anomalies.
- LNE stated that the monitoring equipment was in the green and asked the next aircraft on final, EDV5333 if they were experiencing any issues with either localizer or glide slope, that aircraft reported no issues.
- EDV4858 indicated that they believed it was their equipment and they would require an RNAV approach and completed that approach without issue.
- There was no entry in the facility log regarding the report of nav-aid malfunction and second aircraft report. Ref. 7110.65 2-1-10-a-2.
- After the arrival bank the DTW OS received a call from EDV Maintenance Lead Mechanic, he indicated that several aircraft may have had issues with the glide slope through- out the day. This was entered in the Facility Log as an MOR and passed onto to Tech-Ops.
- Follow-up received from DTW Tech-Ops in regards to glide slope.

*"After talking to D21 and AT, they said that they had no issues reported and that one endeavor pilot reported an issue but told D21 that it was their fault. After receiving the call from AT, I went into D21 and asked them for a few PIREPS and then monitored the frequency. All PIREPS were good.*

*I informed the mechanic that our equipment was good because the indication he got would be a complete loss of signal. If this happened with the GS, since it's a CAT III, it would have shutdown with no attempts to restart and subsequent aircraft would have had GS off flags, as well. IMO, the pilots either had the wrong frequency selected or they were outside the correct flight path for the GS."*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1 was on the B side, EDV4858 who experienced navigational issues, after EDV4858 reported the issue to LNE a report was requested from the next arrival who reported no issues.

After the arrival rush EDV lead mechanic contacted ATC regarding the navigational issues, this

was passed to Tech-ops, it was determined that the GS was functioning properly and there were no other aircraft who reported issues with the localizer or glide slope during the session reviewed.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Support Manager - Quality Control

D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT

Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: EDV ILS issue  
**Date:** Friday, February 25, 2022 10:27:00 AM  
**Attachments:** [image001.png](#)

---

This EDV ILS Issue captured in the falcon replay below needs to be converted to mp4. There are 4 audio tracks 3 are ATC and 1 is the mechanic phone call.'

I guess that would be 3 separate camtasia's with replay and a standalone mp3 of the mechanic call.

[REDACTED]  
Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, October 04, 2021 12:39 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** EDV ILS issue

[REDACTED] I have captured the whole event with the EDV and the ILS issue via FALCON. The FALCON includes the DTW and D21 side. The phone call to DTWT is included. The time of the phone call was 1936Z but the FALCON does not show the correct time for the call.

Like you said, maybe that is what the FOIA is about.

<http://deploy.falcon.faa.gov/Falcon%20NexGen/Falcon%203.application?1299599&REPLAYTYPE=Bookmark&PARENT>

[REDACTED]  
TCOB Quality Control Support Specialist  
DTW QC  
Cell [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, October 4, 2021 9:19 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW:

Can you see if you can capture the recording from EDV to ATCT on this.



I believe this may be connected to the events that the FOIA request cover.

It doesn't need to be sent up, but I would like to hear it to help in the review.

[REDACTED]  
Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 28, 2021 7:55 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE:

Thanks for the information. I will close this out.

[REDACTED]  
TCOB Quality Control Support Specialist  
DTW QC  
Cell [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, September 27, 2021 3:56 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE:

After talking to D21 and AT, they said that they had no issues reported and that one endeavor pilot reported an issue but told D21 that it was their fault. After receiving the call from AT, I went into D21 and asked them for a few PIREPS and then monitored the frequency. All PIREPS were good.

I informed the mechanic that our equipment was good because the indication he got would be a complete loss of signal. If this happened with the GS, since it's a CAT III, it would have shutdown with no attempts to restart and subsequent aircraft would have had GS off flags, as well. IMO, the pilots either had the wrong frequency selected or they were outside the correct flight path for the GS.

My 2 cents but PIREPS and D21 confirmed the system was fully functional.

[REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, September 27, 2021 8:33 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Cc:** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE:

Hello [REDACTED]

I'm not aware of any updates.

[REDACTED] do you have any further information?

[REDACTED]

DTW NAVCOM SSCM

C [REDACTED]

O [REDACTED]

Courage, Trust, Empowerment, Teamwork



**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Friday, September 24, 2021 9:15 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Cc:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:**

[REDACTED] DTW had a public inquiry from the lead mechanic at Endeavor (below).

LEAD MECHANIC FOR EDV, [REDACTED], CALLED TO QUESTION THE ILS 3R. HE SAID THAT NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT TODAY WERE LOSING GS FUNCTION. I SPOKE WITH [REDACTED] FROM NAVCOM AND FORWARDED HIM THIS INFORMATION. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO LOOK INTO IT.

I need to update this inquiry in CEDAR. Do we have any information on this issue?

[REDACTED]

TCOB Quality Control Support Specialist

DTW QC

Cell [REDACTED]



A3

# Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

**D21-M-2021/10/06-0001**

1. Reporting FAC ID			2. Date UTC (dd/mm/yyyy)						3. Time UTC				4. Significant Occurrence?		
D	2	1	2	2	0	9	2	0	2	1	2	3	4	3	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No
5. MOR reported by (select one):													6. Did equipment outage potentially contribute to this event?		
<input type="radio"/> Controller providing services <input type="radio"/> FLM <input type="radio"/> CIC <input type="radio"/> Aircraft Owner/Operator <input type="radio"/> Internal Facility Review <input type="radio"/> External Facility Referral <input type="radio"/> Hotline (Describe in summary) <input type="radio"/> Electronically Detected <input type="radio"/> Other (Describe in summary)													<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No		
Training in progress? <input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No										Nearest Airport: <u>DTW</u>			Alert #: _____		
<b>Airspace/Altitude/Route/Speed MORs</b>															
<b>E1. Aircraft information:</b>															
Aircraft ID			Aircraft Type/Suffix			IFR/VFR		Facility communicating with A/C		Position communicating with A/C		Frequency			
EDV4996			CRJ9			<input checked="" type="radio"/> IFR <input type="radio"/> VFR		D21		WEST FINAL					
Violated Facility					Position					Frequency					
<b>E2. MOR type (only complete one sub-section as applicable):</b>															
<b>E2a. Aircraft entered airspace other than expected/intended and alternate actions were taken by ATC or the flight crew:</b>															
Airspace entered:															
Facility			Position			Frequency			Foreign facility deviation:			Action taken by:			
									<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No			<input type="checkbox"/> ATC <input type="checkbox"/> Flight crew			
Unexpected/unintended:															
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Altitude			Assigned: <u>4000</u>			Observed: <u>600</u>			TCAS RA:			Spillover:			
<input type="checkbox"/> Speed			Assigned: _____			Observed: _____			<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No			<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No SUA Name: _____			
<input type="checkbox"/> Route															
<b>METAR Observation</b>															
KDTW 22253Z 36016G28KT 9SM OVC020 13/11 A2977 RMK AO2 PK WND 36035/2156 SLP082 T01330106															
<b>Pilot Deviation Information</b>															
Brasher Warning Given? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No															
Reason for Brasher Statement not being given:															
Found during facility review.															
Pilot Information Available? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No															
Reason for no pilot information being given:															
Found during facility review.															

# Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report

**D21-M-2021/10/06-0001**

Pilot Deviation			
<b>Was this a possible pilot deviation?</b>			
<input checked="" type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No	Preliminary Number: _____	Phase of Flight: _____	
Airspace Class: _____	Aircraft #: _____	ORG Choices: _____	Office Number: _____
Type of Deviation: _____		Control Surface: _____	
Pilot Summary:			
NMAC			
<b>Was this a NMAC?</b>			
<input type="radio"/> Yes <input checked="" type="radio"/> No	NMAC Number: _____		
Summary			
<p>J1. Summary - provide a brief summary for all MORs in this section that will provide enough information for QA to understand what occurred. Include information about items that require additional information in the specific MOR you are reporting.</p> <p>Found during facility review. EDV4996 was issued a heading to join the localizer and a speed to the FAF, however the controller mistakenly did not issue an approach clearance and switched the aircraft to the Tower. The pilot did not question the missing approach clearance and completed the approach and landed.</p>			
QA Summary			
<p>EDV4996 was vectored to join the RWY 04L localizer, but was not cleared for an approach. The (A) controller then switched EDV4996 to tower. EDV4996 checked on with tower on the ILS and was cleared to land. Because this was discovered upon a QC review, this event is over 2 weeks old. Will forward to FSDO for informational purposes.</p>			

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: 1/2 of FOIA request 1830z-1924z DUALS  
**Date:** Wednesday, October 06, 2021 8:04:37 AM  
**Attachments:** [09-22 ATIS E.mp3](#)

---

<http://deploy.falcon.faa.gov/Falcon%20NexGen/Falcon%203.application?1301356&REPLAYTYPE=Bookmark&PARENT>

23:17:42 Handoff accepted for EDV4996

23:23:13 Controller Broadcasted ILS PRM Y in use now

23:26:01 EDV4996 checks in with E. Controller assigns 04L. (ATIS E is in effect)

[REDACTED]  
TCOB Support Specialist

Work # [REDACTED]

Cell # [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 05, 2021 2:14 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: 1/2 of FOIA request 1830z-1924z DUALS

[REDACTED] please go back and find the initial check in with Feeder for EDV4996 and send me the recording with runway / approach assigned and readback, also a copy of the Arrival ATIS that was broadcasting that he should have had.

Thanks!

[REDACTED]  
Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, October 04, 2021 8:34 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: 1/2 of FOIA request 1830z-1924z DUALS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A

[REDACTED]

23:42:35EDV4996 does not join the Y localizer/corrected by controller- Pilot "waiting for it to capture". Trainer verified "Yankee PRM 04L" - Pilot "it is"

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
TCOB Support Specialist  
Work # [REDACTED]  
Cell # [REDACTED]



**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, October 04, 2021 8:20 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: 1/2 of FOIA request 1830z-1924z DUALS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, October 01, 2021 10:00 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** 1/2 of FOIA request 1830z-1924z DUALS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
TCOB Support Specialist  
Work # [REDACTED]  
Cell # [REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: Sept. 22 Review FOIA Request TRIPS  
**Date:** Wednesday, October 06, 2021 10:48:00 AM

---

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

FOIA REQUEST-D21 STARS video and audio replay from all three finals and monitors for triple ILS operations on Wednesday, September 22, 2021, from the time triple ILS approaches commenced until triple ILS approaches ceased. The operation commenced at approximately 1915L.

<http://deploy.falcon.faa.gov/Falcon%20NexGen/Falcon%203.application?1297244&REPLAYTYPE=Bookmark&PARENT>

A

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

23:42:35EDV4996 does not join the Y localizer/corrected by controller- Pilot "waiting for it to capture". Trainer verified "Yankee PRM 04L"- Pilot "it is"

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: [REDACTED]

[TCOB QC KSN](#)

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 06, 2021 10:37 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Sept. 22 Review FOIA Request TRIPS

There was a FOIA request submitted for STARS and Audio data from both D21 and DTW covering "Dual and TRIP" operations on Sept. 22 2021. The requested replays will be uploaded to the CSA QA KSN site as requested.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**D21 A (RWY4L-Y)-**

- [REDACTED]
- EDV4996 was issued a 055 heading from the west to join the localizer however the aircraft flew through the RWY4L-Y localizer and appeared to align on the straight in final, the trainee asked EDV4996 to verify intercept the localizer, the pilot responded intercepting now waiting to capture.
- The OJTI asks EDV4996 to verify it's the ILS PRM Y RWY4L, EDV4996 responds "it is".
- The screenshot is after the pilot responds "it is", neither the trainee or OJTI issued corrective headings for the aircraft to join the Y localizer, the aircraft did eventually correct to the left and join the Y final, no loss of separation was observed as the aircraft were still outside the stepdown fixes for the parallel runways.
- EDV4996 was issued a speed of 180 to PEVSE however no approach clearance was issued and the aircraft was switched to the Tower. The pilot did not say anything and was cleared to land by DTW. An MOR was entered by QC for a possible pilot deviation.

ATIS E was broadcasting ILS PRM4L use localizer freq 111.75, EDV4996 checked in with ATIS E and was assigned RWY4L by D21 Feeder V.



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

One aircraft EDV4996 did not capture the Y localizer initially, although the location, speed and heading given to join seemed appropriate.

The aircraft did eventually join and although D21 forgot to issue an approach clearance the pilot completed the approach and landed without incident.

Other than the Trainee / OJT asking EDV4849 if they intercepted the localizer and verifying it was ILS PRM Y 4L, we could not locate any discussion with the pilot on what may have occurred.

[REDACTED]

██████████  
Support Manager - Quality Control  
D21 TRACON / CLEVELAND DISTRICT  
Cell: ██████████

[TCOB\\_QC\\_KSN](#)



A4





U.S. Department  
of Transportation  
**Federal Aviation  
Administration**

Office of the Air Traffic Organization  
Central Service Area

10101 Hillwood Parkway  
Fort Worth, Texas 76177

March 29, 2022

[REDACTED]  
WXYZ-TV 7 Investigators  
20777 West 10 Mile Road  
Southfield, MI 48075

Dear [REDACTED]:

[Subject: Freedom of Information Act \(FOIA\) Request Number 2022-04467](#)

This letter is in response to your FOIA request dated February 11, 2022. You requested copies of various records from Detroit Airport Traffic Control Tower about various positions on September 22, 2021, and on October 4, 2021.

A search for records was conducted at the appropriate air traffic control facilities within the Central Service Area. We are enclosing the requested documents applicable to your request, and a portion of the documents have been redacted. However, we have identified records responsive to your request that are being withheld under Exemption 5 and 6 of the FOIA. Exemption 5 allows agencies to withhold recommendations, opinions, and analysis under the deliberative process privilege. Exemption 6 protects information in personnel or similar files, the disclosure of which would “constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.”

There were no recordings of the three Ground Control positions from September 22, 2021; therefore, no records exist per FAA Order JO 7210.3Z. The retention period for data is 45 days for en route and terminal facilities. There are no fees associated with this request.


Please be advised that the voice recordings have an encoded time source on the right channel and can be listened to on any media player by adjusting the balance to the full left position.

You may request a reconsideration of this partial denial determination by writing to the Assistant Administrator for Finance and Management, Federal Aviation Administration National Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20591, or through electronic mail [FOIA-Appeals@faa.gov](mailto:FOIA-Appeals@faa.gov). Your request for reconsideration must be made within 90 calendar days from the date of receipt of the partial denial determination and must include all relied-upon information and arguments. Your letter must also state an appeal from a partial denial determination of a request made under the FOIA and include your assigned FOIA control number. The envelope containing the appeal should be marked “FOIA.”


You also have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the FAA FOIA Public Liaison via phone (202) 267-7799 or email at [7-AWA-ARC-FOIA@faa.gov](mailto:7-AWA-ARC-FOIA@faa.gov); please include "FOIA Public Liaison" in the Subject. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services at the website <https://www.archive.gov/ogis>, telephone (202) 741-5770/ toll-free (877) 684-6448; fax (202) 741-5769; or email at [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov).

Sincerely,

A large black rectangular redaction box covering the signature area.

For   
Acting Vice President, Mission Support Services  
Air Traffic Organization

Enclosures



A5



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11


12













A6



A6

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Check In

Video




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*A7*

C2 In Out

Video



A8



A8

RNAV

Approach


Video



A9







A10

