


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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

September 4, 2024



(U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Bahrain

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Bahrain

(U) September 4, 2024

(U) Objective

(~~CU~~) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD stored munitions at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain and [REDACTED] Bahrain, in accordance with applicable safety and security policies.

(U) This is the third in a series of four reports reviewing munitions storage within the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

(U) Background

(~~CU~~) Munitions consist of ammunition and components used by the Armed Forces for national defense and security. At NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] individual units are responsible for their own munitions. Explosives safety officers are responsible for providing explosives safety for munitions storage, and Navy Security Forces officials are responsible for planning and coordinating installation security, including the security of munitions storage.

(U) Findings

(~~CU~~) Navy officials at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies, including maintaining site planning documentation, storing munitions in accordance with approved net explosive weight limits, and protecting munitions storage structures with lightning protection systems. However, Navy officials could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions.

- (~~CU~~) Navy officials at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] did not always maintain accurate inventory records or post restricted area signs at munitions storage areas, which potentially reduced the ability of Navy officials to fully determine readiness for completing

(~~CU~~) missions and potentially exposed unauthorized personnel to dangerous areas.

- (~~S~~) Navy officials at NSA Bahrain did not [REDACTED], which could potentially [REDACTED].
- (~~CU~~) Navy officials at [REDACTED] did not always store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks, which reduces the ability of Navy officials to locate munitions quickly in the event they are issued for use, require maintenance, or are deemed defective.

(~~S~~) This occurred because Navy officials made administrative errors when accounting for munitions and did not provide oversight of the officials conducting inventories; misinterpreted the requirements for posting restricted area signs; did not establish roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED]; and did not prioritize storing munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks.

(U) Management Actions Taken

(~~CU~~) In October 2023 and February 2024, contractor personnel and Navy officials posted restricted area signs in the host nation language and in English at applicable munitions storage areas at [REDACTED] and NSA Bahrain.

(U) Recommendations

(~~CU~~) We recommend that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of materiel accountability for munitions to all officials at Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain who are responsible for munitions at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED].

(U) We also recommend that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic, in coordination with the Commanding Officer of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15, review Helicopter Mine Countermeasures



(U) Results in Brief

(U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Bahrain

(U) Recommendations (cont'd)

(U) Squadron 15's inventory procedures and implement required corrective actions, and update guidance to include responsibilities for providing oversight of inventory procedures.

(S) We recommend that the NSA Bahrain Commanding Officer develop and implement written procedures establishing roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED].

(~~CU~~) We recommend that the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer emphasize the importance of storing munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks within munitions storage structures to all units storing munitions at [REDACTED].

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic agreed with the four recommendations and described actions planned to address them. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved. We will close the recommendations once we verify that Navy Munitions Command Atlantic has completed the agreed-upon actions.

(S) The Commander of Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central, responding for the NSA Bahrain Commanding Officer, [REDACTED] and described actions planned to address them. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved. We will close the recommendations once we verify that NSA Bahrain has completed the agreed-upon actions.

(~~CU~~) The Commander of Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central, responding for the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer, disagreed with the draft recommendation to develop and implement written procedures requiring units at [REDACTED] to store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks within munitions storage structures. As a result of the management comments, we revised the

(~~CU~~) recommendation. We consider the recommendation unresolved until the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer provides comments on the final report within 30 days.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

(CU) Management	Recommendations	Recommendations	Recommendations
Commander, Navy Munitions Command Atlantic	None	A.1, A.2.a, A.2.b, B.1	None
Commanding Officer, Naval Support Activity Bahrain	None	A.3.a, A.3.b	None
Commanding Officer, [REDACTED]	B.2	None	None (CU)

Please provide Management Comments by October 4, 2024.

NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed-upon corrective actions were implemented.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 4, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, NAVY REGION EUROPE, AFRICA, CENTRAL
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of Munitions Storage in Bahrain
(Report No. DODIG-D2024-125)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) This report contains one recommendation that is considered unresolved because the Commander of Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central did not agree with the recommendation. We will track the recommendation until management has agreed to take actions that we determine to be sufficient to meet the intent of the recommendations and submit adequate documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions are completed.

(U) This report contains six recommendations that are considered resolved and open. We will close these recommendations when the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic and the Naval Support Activity Bahrain Commanding Officer provide us adequate documentation showing they have completed all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations.

(U) DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Therefore, please provide us within 30 days your response concerning specific actions in process or alternative corrective actions proposed on the recommendations. Please send your response for the unresolved recommendation to audrgo@dodig.mil. For the resolved recommendations, please provide us documentation showing you have completed the agreed-upon actions within the estimated completion dates. Please send your documentation for the resolved recommendations as a PDF to followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED] We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit.

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:



Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(~~CUI~~) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD stored munitions at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain and [REDACTED] Bahrain, in accordance with applicable safety and security policies.¹

(U) This is the third in a series of four reports reviewing munitions storage within the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. The first two reports reviewed munitions storage at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. The fourth report will review munitions storage in Jordan. See Appendix A for the scope, methodology, and prior coverage related to the objective.

(U) Background

(~~CUI~~) U.S. Service members conducting operations in USCENTCOM's area of responsibility require munitions to complete missions. Munitions consist of ammunition and components used by the Armed Forces for national defense and security.² DoD officials store munitions in locations across USCENTCOM's area of responsibility, including NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED]

(U) Munitions Storage Roles and Responsibilities

(~~CUI~~) The DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) is the lead agency for explosives safety management for the DoD. Individual units account for their own munitions at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED]. In addition, explosives safety officers are responsible for providing explosives safety for munitions storage, and Navy Security Forces (NSF) officials are responsible for planning and coordinating installation security, which includes security of munitions storage.³

¹ (~~CUI~~) We refer to [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] for the purposes of this report.

(U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as either classified or Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

² (U) Section 101(e)(4), title 10, United States Code. Military munitions include devices and components of propellants, explosives, smokes, rockets, guided and ballistic missiles, bombs, artillery and small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, and more. However, military munitions do not include nuclear weapons and components.

³ (~~CUI~~) At [REDACTED] the explosives safety officer is a contractor.

(U) DoD Explosives Safety Board

(U) Under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Executive Director of the DDESB serves as the principal representative and adviser on explosives safety matters related to DoD munitions. The DDESB published Defense Explosives Safety Regulation (DESR) 6055.09, which establishes DoD explosives safety standards.⁴

(U) Naval Support Activity Bahrain

(U) NSA Bahrain provides operational support to Service members operating throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility to ensure the security of ships, aircraft, detachments, and remote sites. Units at NSA Bahrain account for their own munitions. An explosives safety officer is responsible for the safety of stored munitions and NSF officials are responsible for planning and coordinating installation security, which includes security of munitions storage. Table 1 shows the units storing munitions at NSA Bahrain as of July 2023.

(U) Table 1. Units Storing Munitions at NSA Bahrain as of July 2023

(CU) Military Service	Unit	Quantity of Stored Munitions
Navy	Commander, Task Force 52	█
	Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment Bahrain	████
	Maritime Expeditionary Security Group Two Detachment Bahrain	████
	Naval Criminal Investigative Service Bahrain	████
	Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain*	████
	Navy Security Forces	████
	Naval Special Warfare Group One Detachment Bahrain	████

~~(CU)~~

⁴ (U) DDESB DESR 6055.09, "Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09," Edition 1, January 13, 2019. In February 2024, the DDESB updated DESR 6055.09. However, we conducted our review in August 2023 and the requirements in the February 2024 update did not impact the findings identified in this report.

(S) Military Service	Unit	Quantity of Stored Munitions
Coast Guard	U.S. Coast Guard Bahrain	██████
Total		██████

~~(S)~~

* (U) Through a memorandum of agreement, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 Detachment Bahrain provides monthly inventories to Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain.

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(S)~~ ██████████
~~(S)~~ At ██████████ USNAVCENT is responsible for providing base and operational support. Units at ██████████ account for their munitions. A contracted explosives safety officer is responsible for providing explosives safety for stored munitions and NSF officials are responsible for planning and coordinating installation security, which includes security of munitions storage. Table 2 shows the units storing munitions at ██████████ as of July 2023.

~~(S)~~ Table 2. Units Storing Munitions at ██████████ as of July 2023

(S) Military Service	Unit	Quantity of Munitions Stored
Army	4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment	██████
Navy	Commander, Task Force 57	██████
	Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment Bahrain	██████
	Maritime Expeditionary Security Group Two Detachment Bahrain	██████
	Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain	██████
	Navy Security Forces	██████

~~(S)~~

(~~CU~~) event of an accidental explosion. Site plans establish storage limits, such as net explosive weight (NEW) limits for munitions storage structures. NEW is the maximum weight of munitions in pounds of explosive material. For example, each munitions storage structure has an authorized NEW limit based on design, condition, and proximity to other munitions or inhabited buildings. According to a DDESB official, explosives safety officers are responsible for maintaining awareness of NEW totals of stored munitions on a consistent basis. In addition, DESR 6055.09 requires most munitions storage structures to be protected with a lightning protection system (LPS).

[REDACTED]

(U) DoD Instruction 6055.16 allows DoD officials to accept, assess, and document the risk for not complying with the explosives safety standards established in DESR 6055.09. Specifically, when operational requirements require deviations from explosives safety standards, DoD Components are required to acknowledge and accept the added risk to personnel or property, and document the risk and methods used to reduce the risk to an acceptable level in relation to the operational requirement.

(U) Security Requirements for Munitions Storage

(U) DoD Manual 5100.76 establishes requirements for protecting munitions stored at DoD installations during peacetime conditions. For example, DoD Manual 5100.76 requires all munitions storage areas to have “restricted area” signs in English and the host nation language when located in host nation countries. In addition, DoD Manual 5100.76 applies to munitions with the designated security risk category (SRC) of I through IV. The SRC is the classification and sensitivity of munitions based on the relative use and availability of the munitions to criminal elements.⁷ Table 3 lists examples of munitions by the SRC.

(U) Table 3. Examples of Munitions by the SRC

(U) SRC	Examples of Munitions
SRC I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Missiles and rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration - Complete explosives rounds for missiles and rockets
SRC II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Missiles and rockets that require personnel or equipment to function - Military dynamite

(U)

⁷ (U) Not all munitions have an SRC designation. For example, some munitions are categorized as non-sensitive and do not maintain an SRC designation.

(U) SRC	Examples of Munitions
SRC III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Missiles and rockets that require complex hardware or software to function - Ammunition with explosive projectiles
SRC IV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Explosive components of missiles and rockets - Ammunition with non-explosive projectiles <p style="text-align: right;">(U)</p>

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) SRC I and II munitions pose a higher risk than SRC III and IV munitions and require additional security measures. DoD Manual 5100.76 requires munitions storage structures containing SRC I and II munitions to be equipped with an intrusion detection system (IDS), unless the storage area is continuously staffed or under constant surveillance. DoD Manual 5100.76 also requires monthly IDS testing to ensure alarm sensors are functioning properly. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 5530.13D implements the IDS testing requirement in DoD Manual 5100.76 by requiring Navy officials to: (1) conduct testing of IDS sensors and maintain documentation of the dates of the tests, names of persons performing the tests, results, and any corrective action taken; and (2) perform unannounced opening of munitions storage structures at least annually to set off the IDS alarm to evaluate alarm monitor and response procedures.⁸ Munitions storage structures containing SRC III and IV require security force checks daily during non-duty hours.⁹

~~(CUI)~~ DoD Instruction 4140.01 requires DoD officials to maintain records for all inventory, including munitions, within the DoD supply chain. OPNAVINST 5530.13D requires Navy officials to account for munitions using the Ordnance Information System (OIS), which is the munitions accountable property system of record for the Navy. In addition, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. A lot number is a series of numbers and letters assigned to identify the production date of the munitions.

⁸ (U) OPNAVINST 5530.13D, "U.S. Navy Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Physical Security Policy Manual," May 28, 2021.

⁹ (U) If a munitions storage structure containing SRC III and IV munitions is equipped with IDSs, daily security force checks during non-duty hours are not required.

(U) Munitions Stored at Naval Support Activity Bahrain


~~(CUI)~~ As of July 2023, DoD officials stored over [REDACTED] munitions, valued at more than \$11.2 million, in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at NSA Bahrain. We nonstatistically selected a sample of [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to review based on the following factors.

- (U) SRC of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) NEW of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) Location of storage structures on the installation

~~(CUI)~~ The [REDACTED] munitions storage structures stored over [REDACTED] munitions, valued at more than \$1.7 million. See Appendix B for the list of [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed at NSA Bahrain.

~~(CUI)~~ DoD officials stored munitions at NSA Bahrain in [REDACTED]. An [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. For example, DoD officials stored munitions in [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Figure 1 shows examples of a [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at NSA Bahrain.

~~(CUI)~~ Figure 1. [REDACTED] (left) and [REDACTED] (right) at NSA Bahrain



(U) Source: NSA Bahrain.

~~(CUI)~~ **Munitions Stored at [REDACTED]**


~~(S)~~ As of July 2023, DoD officials stored over [REDACTED] munitions, valued at more than \$148.2 million, in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at [REDACTED]. We nonstatistically selected a sample of [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to review based on the following factors.

- (U) SRC of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) NEW of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) Location of storage structures on the installation

~~(S)~~ The [REDACTED] munitions storage structures stored over [REDACTED] munitions, valued at more than \$109.5 million. See Appendix C for the list of [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed at [REDACTED].

~~(CUI)~~ DoD officials stored munitions at [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. For example, Navy officials stored munitions in [REDACTED]. Navy officials also stored munitions in [REDACTED], referred to as [REDACTED], on a [REDACTED] and other locations in the [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. In addition, [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. Figures 2 and 3 show examples of an [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at [REDACTED].

~~(CUI)~~ Figure 2. [REDACTED]



(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(S)~~ Figure 3. [REDACTED]



(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Finding A

(U) Navy Officials at Naval Support Activity Bahrain Stored Munitions in Accordance with Safety Policies, but Could Improve Accountability and Security of Stored Munitions

(~~CONF~~) Navy officials at NSA Bahrain stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies. For example, of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, Navy officials maintained site planning documentation, stored munitions in accordance with approved NEW limits, and protected munitions storage structures with LPSs. However, Navy officials could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions.

- (~~CONF~~) Officials from the Navy Munitions Command Atlantic (NMCLANT) Detachment Bahrain did not maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in which they stored munitions. Specifically, we identified that NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not properly account for [REDACTED] munitions in the records for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. This occurred because of administrative errors, such as moving munitions without updating the OIS, and because NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not provide oversight of the officials conducting the inventories.
- (S) Officials from NSA Bahrain did not conduct [REDACTED] for any of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures that required [REDACTED]. This occurred because NSA Bahrain officials did not establish roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED] and because NSF officials misinterpreted the requirements for [REDACTED].
- (~~CONF~~) Officials from the NSF did not post restricted area signs at a munitions storage area where [REDACTED] munitions storage structures were located. This occurred because the explosives safety officer misinterpreted an exemption for the posting of fire symbol signs to include restricted area signs.

(S) When Navy officials do not maintain accurate and effective accountability of munitions, it potentially reduces the ability of Navy officials to fully determine readiness for completing missions and increases opportunities for unnecessary procurement costs for munitions that may already be available in the Navy's supply. Without [REDACTED], Navy officials cannot ensure [REDACTED], which could leave a munitions storage area [REDACTED]. In addition, the lack of restricted area signs potentially exposed unauthorized personnel to dangerous areas.

(U) Navy Officials at Naval Support Activity Bahrain Stored Munitions in Accordance with Safety Policies

~~(CUI)~~ Navy officials at NSA Bahrain stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies. For example, for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, Navy officials maintained site planning documentation, stored munitions in accordance with approved NEW limits, and protected munitions storage structures with LPSs.

(U) Navy Officials Maintained Site Planning Documentation

~~(CUI)~~ Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, Navy officials at NSA Bahrain maintained site planning documentation for the [REDACTED] munition storage structures that required a site plan. DESR 6055.09 requires munitions storage structures to have an approved site plan to minimize damage or injuries in the event of an accidental explosion. The remaining [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED], which do not require site plans. The explosives safety officer at NSA Bahrain maintained site planning documentation for all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures requiring site plans. Specifically, the site plans for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures contained the site plan submission documents with established NEW limits and installation maps, as well as DDESB approval.

(U) Navy Officials Stored Munitions in Accordance with Net Explosive Weight Limits

~~(CUI)~~ Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, Navy officials at NSA Bahrain stored munitions in accordance with approved NEW limits for all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. DESR 6055.09 requires munitions storage structures to have approved site planning documentation that includes established NEW limits. We reviewed the established NEW limits and the NEW totals for all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to determine whether Navy officials stored munitions in accordance with approved NEW limits. Specifically, Navy officials stored [REDACTED] pounds of NEW in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures, and we did not identify any instances where NEW totals exceeded the NEW limits for the munitions stored.

~~(CUI)~~ In addition, the explosives safety officer at NSA Bahrain stated that they maintained consistent awareness of the NEW totals for munitions stored in all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. According to a DDESB official, explosives safety officers are responsible for maintaining awareness of NEW totals of stored munitions on a consistent basis. In addition, the explosives safety officer stated that maintaining awareness of NEW totals is an inherent responsibility of explosives safety officers. For example, the explosives safety officer stated that they obtain and conduct monthly reviews of the NEW totals for the munitions stored in all munitions storage

(~~CUH~~) structures at NSA Bahrain. The explosives safety officer provided us with an example of a NEW storage report that they review for NEW limit compliance. According to the explosives safety officer, if they believed there was an issue with the NEW totals for the munitions stored in a munitions storage structure, they would work with the unit storing the munitions to ensure the unit accurately recorded NEW totals and did not exceed NEW limits.

(U) We previously identified that explosives safety officers lacked awareness of the NEW totals in munitions storage areas at other installations within the USCENCOM area of responsibility. Specifically, the DoD OIG issued two reports in March 2024 which found that explosives safety officers did not maintain awareness of NEW totals in munitions storage structures at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar and Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.¹⁰ The DoD OIG made recommendations to the Army and Air Force commanders overseeing explosives safety to develop and implement procedures requiring explosives safety officers to verify, at least quarterly, the NEW totals in all munitions storage structures at the installations.

(U) Navy Officials Protected Munitions Storage Structures with Lightning Protection Systems

(~~CUH~~) Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, Navy officials at NSA Bahrain protected munitions with functioning LPSs for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures that required LPSs. DESR 6055.09 requires DoD officials to protect most munitions storage structures with LPSs. The remaining [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED] in accordance with DESR 6055.09 and [REDACTED]

(~~CUH~~) In addition, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. We reviewed visual inspection and test records for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures with an LPS. The visual inspection records included the inspection date, the inspector, and the results of the inspection. In addition, the test records included drawings of the munitions storage structures that identified the LPS points and documented the test dates and results. We determined that NSA Bahrain officials conducted semiannual visual inspections and biennial tests of LPSs for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures.

¹⁰ (U) Report No. DODIG-2024-063, "Audit of Munitions Storage at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar," March 19, 2024.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-064, "Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait," March 19, 2024.

(U) Navy Officials at NSA Bahrain Could Improve the Accountability and Security of Stored Munitions

(S) Navy officials at NSA Bahrain could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions. Specifically, of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not always maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS. In addition, officials from NSA Bahrain did not conduct [REDACTED], and officials from the NSF did not post restricted area signs at a munitions storage area.

(U) Navy Officials Did Not Always Maintain Accurate Inventory Records

(CU) Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in which they stored munitions.¹¹ Navy officials maintained accurate inventory records for the other [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed at NSA Bahrain. DoD Instruction 4140.01 requires DoD officials to maintain records for all inventory within the DoD supply chain, including munitions, which require the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility. We obtained munitions records from the eight units storing munitions at NSA Bahrain and performed inventories at all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. Specifically, we performed book-to-floor (existence) and floor-to-book (completeness) inventories of [REDACTED] munitions to verify whether officials at NSA Bahrain properly accounted for munitions stored in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. As a result, we identified that NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not properly account for [REDACTED] munitions in OIS for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. For example, in one munitions storage structure, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials overstated the quantity of a munition by [REDACTED]. Table 4 summarizes the inventory discrepancies for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at NSA Bahrain by lot number or serial number.

(U) Table 4. Inventory Discrepancies at NSA Bahrain

(CU) Munitions Storage Structure	Lot or Serial Number	OIS Quantity ¹	Physical Quantity ²	Difference	Percentage
[REDACTED]					

¹¹ (CU) NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain stored munitions in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed at NSA Bahrain. See Appendix B for the list of munitions storage structures reviewed and the units that used them at NSA Bahrain.

(CU) Munitions Storage Structure	Lot or Serial Number	OIS Quantity ¹	Physical Quantity ²	Difference	Percentage
[Redacted Content]					

¹ (U) As of July 24, 2023.

² (U) As of August 10, 2023.

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(~~CUH~~) NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not maintain accurate inventory records for [REDACTED] munitions because of administrative errors.¹² Specifically, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that they did not remove [REDACTED] munitions from the OIS in a timely manner and receipted the wrong lot number in the OIS for [REDACTED] munitions. In August 2023, we notified NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials of the inventory discrepancies, and NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials corrected the inventory discrepancies for the [REDACTED] munitions in the OIS. Although NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials corrected the inventory discrepancies, Navy officials are required to provide the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions. Therefore, the NMCLANT Commander should emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials responsible for munitions at NSA Bahrain.

(~~CUH~~) NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not maintain accurate inventory records for [REDACTED] munitions because they did not provide oversight of the officials conducting the inventories.¹³ Through a memorandum of agreement, Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 Detachment Bahrain is responsible for conducting and providing monthly inventories to NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain, including the quantity and location of munitions.¹⁴ NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that squadron officials provided inaccurate monthly inventories for [REDACTED] munitions. Specifically, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that squadron officials provided monthly inventories reflecting the location of the munitions in structures [REDACTED] however, the munitions were actually located in a different structure or were issued for use. In August 2023, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that they do not provide any oversight of the squadron's inventory procedures and that they were unaware the monthly inventory records were inaccurate. Although NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials updated the OIS to correct the inventory discrepancies for the [REDACTED] munitions, without oversight of the squadron's inventory procedures, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain cannot ensure accurate inventories of the munitions. Therefore, the NMCLANT Commander, in coordination with the Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 Commanding Officer, should conduct a review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures and implement corrective actions. In addition, the NMCLANT Commander, in coordination with the Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15 Commanding Officer, should update the "Memorandum of Understanding in Case of

¹² (~~CUH~~) Munitions from lot numbers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

¹³ (~~CUH~~) Munitions from lot numbers [REDACTED] and serial numbers [REDACTED].

¹⁴ (U) Department of the Navy, Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain, "Memorandum of Understanding in Case of Ammunition and Explosives Accountability," October 2022.

(CUH) Ammunition and Explosives Accountability” to include responsibilities for providing oversight of inventory procedures for Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15.

(S) Navy Officials Did Not Conduct [REDACTED]

(S) Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, only [REDACTED] munitions storage structures that contained [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] and required [REDACTED].¹⁵ However, officials from NSA Bahrain did not conduct [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. In addition, officials from NSA Bahrain did not perform [REDACTED] for all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in our sample [REDACTED].

(S) Navy Officials Did Not Conduct [REDACTED]

(S) Officials from NSA Bahrain did not conduct [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED]. OPNAVINST 5530.13D requires Navy officials to conduct [REDACTED] and document the [REDACTED]. We requested [REDACTED] records for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures from August 2022 through August 2023. While NSF officials provided the requested records for [REDACTED] munitions storage structure in which they stored munitions, NSA Bahrain officials were unable to provide the requested records for the remaining [REDACTED] munitions storage structures.

(S) Officials from NSA Bahrain did not conduct [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures because NSA Bahrain officials did not establish roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED]. Although OPNAVINST 5530.13D states that units in possession of munitions are responsible for the security of the munitions, the host installation or activity is also responsible for coordinating the security of munitions for all units to ensure effective planning for security requirements. The explosives safety officer at NSA Bahrain stated that units storing the munitions were responsible for conducting [REDACTED]; however, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Detachment Bahrain stated that they thought NSF officials were responsible for conducting [REDACTED]. In addition, an NSF official stated that NSA

¹⁵ (CUH) Of the munitions storage structures in our sample, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stored [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED], EOD Detachment officials stored [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures [REDACTED], and NSF officials stored [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] munitions storage structure [REDACTED].

(S) Bahrain does not have established procedures for complying with security requirements, such as [REDACTED], and that NSA Bahrain officials follow OPNAVINST 5530.13D. While OPNAVINST 5530.13D requires [REDACTED], the Instruction also requires NSA Bahrain officials to establish the roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED]. Therefore, the NSA Bahrain Commanding Officer should develop and implement written procedures establishing roles and responsibilities for conducting [REDACTED] for munitions storage structures that [REDACTED].

(S) Navy Officials Did Not Perform [REDACTED]

(S) Officials from NSA Bahrain did not perform [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in our sample [REDACTED]. OPNAVINST 5530.13D requires Navy officials to perform [REDACTED]. In addition, Navy officials are required to document the results of the [REDACTED] in a logbook. We requested the logbook of [REDACTED] from August 2021 through August 2023. NSA Bahrain officials were unable to provide the requested records for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. Officials from NSF provided records of [REDACTED]; however, the records were specific to [REDACTED] munitions storage structures that were not included in our sample.

(S) Officials from NSA Bahrain did not perform [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures because NSA Bahrain officials did not establish roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED]. Although OPNAVINST 5530.13D states that units in possession of munitions are responsible for the security of the munitions, the host installation or activity is also responsible for coordinating the security of munitions for all units to ensure effective planning for security requirements. The explosives safety officer at NSA Bahrain stated that the units storing the munitions were responsible for performing [REDACTED] however, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain and EOD Detachment Bahrain stated that they thought NSF officials were responsible for conducting the [REDACTED]. In addition, an NSF official stated that NSA Bahrain does not have established procedures for complying with security requirements, such as [REDACTED], and that NSA Bahrain officials follow OPNAVINST 5530.13D. While OPNAVINST 5530.13D requires [REDACTED] the Instruction also requires NSA

(S) Bahrain officials to establish the roles and responsibilities for [REDACTED].

(S) Officials from NSA Bahrain did not perform [REDACTED] because they misinterpreted the requirement for [REDACTED]. Specifically, NSF officials thought that performing an [REDACTED] met the requirement. For example, NSF officials conducted an [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] munitions storage structures with an [REDACTED]—one in March 2022 and another in January 2023. However, the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures tested were not part of our sample. NSF officials should have conducted [REDACTED], in accordance with OPNAVINST 5530.13D. Therefore, the NSA Bahrain Commanding Officer should develop and implement procedures that establish roles and responsibilities for performing [REDACTED].

(U) Navy Officials Did Not Always Mark Munitions Storage Areas as Restricted Areas


(CUH) Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from the NSF did not post restricted area signs at a munitions storage area where [REDACTED] munitions storage structures were located. DoD Manual 5100.76 and OPNAVINST 5530.13D require all munitions storage areas to have restricted area signs in English and the host nation language when located in host nation countries. However, one munitions storage area, referred to as the [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] munitions storage structures we reviewed were located, did not have restricted area signs.

(CUH) Officials from the NSF did not post restricted area signs at the [REDACTED] because the explosives safety officer misinterpreted an exemption for the posting of fire symbols at munitions storage areas to include restricted area signs. Specifically, due to security concerns, in November 2022 the NSA Bahrain Commanding Officer approved an exemption for posting hazard class fire symbols on munitions storage structures at NSA Bahrain. However, the exemption did not include signs designating munitions storage areas as restricted areas.

(U) Corrective Actions Taken

(CUH) As a result of our audit, in February 2024, NSA Bahrain officials posted a restricted area sign at the [REDACTED] and we confirmed the signs were in English and the host nation language. Figure 4 shows the restricted area sign that at the [REDACTED]. Because NSA Bahrain officials' actions addressed the issue identified in this report, we are not making a recommendation related to posting a restricted area sign at the [REDACTED].

~~(S)~~ Figure 4. Restricted Area Sign at the [REDACTED]



(U) Source: NSA Bahrain.

(U) Insufficient Accountability and Security of Munitions Reduces the Ability to Determine Readiness and Prevent Unauthorized Access to Munitions Storage Areas

~~(S)~~ Although Navy officials at NSA Bahrain stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies, Navy officials could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions. When Navy officials do not maintain accurate and effective accountability of munitions, it potentially reduced the ability of Navy officials to fully determine readiness for conducting and completing missions. Without [REDACTED], Navy officials cannot [REDACTED], which could potentially [REDACTED]. In addition, the lack of restricted area signs at munitions storage areas potentially exposed unauthorized personnel to dangerous areas.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation A.1

(U) We recommend that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all officials at Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain who are responsible for munitions at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Comments

(U) The NMCLANT Commander agreed with the recommendation, stating that NMCLANT will increase the frequency of the current biannual operation support visit and inspection to annual; direct immediate periodic inventory sampling of all ammunition and explosives storage locations; and initiate hiring personnel, including a director of operations, an inventory accuracy officer, and an ammunition accountant. NMCLANT plans to complete the corrective actions by August 1, 2025.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once NMCLANT provides us with evidence of: (1) the increase of the frequency of operation support visits and inspections from biannual to annual; (2) periodic inventory sampling of all ammunition and explosives storage locations; and (3) the hiring of a director of operations, an inventory accuracy officer, and an ammunition accountant.

(U) Recommendation A.2

(U) We recommend that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic, in coordination with the Commanding Officer of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15:

- a. **(U) Conduct a review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures and implement required corrective actions.**

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Comments

(U) The NMCLANT Commander agreed with the recommendation, stating that NMCLANT will include a review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures during annual operation support visits and inspections. The Commander further stated that NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain will include Helicopter

(U) Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's locations in routine inventory sampling. NMCLANT plans to complete the corrective actions by September 1, 2024.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once NMCLANT provides us with evidence of an annual review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures and evidence that the NMCLANT Detachment included Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's routine inventory sampling.

- b. (U) Update the "Memorandum of Understanding in Case of Ammunition and Explosives Accountability" to include responsibilities for providing oversight of inventory procedures for Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15.**

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Comments

(U) The NMCLANT Commander agreed with the recommendation, stating that NMCLANT guidance establishes munitions transaction reporting procedures for both NMCLANT activities and hosted units, such as Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15. The Commander further stated that when requesting and accepting munitions reporting services, hosted units agree to the conditions outlined in NMCLANT guidance, removing the need for a memorandum.

(U) Our Response

(U) Although the Commander agreed with the recommendation, the Commander did not provide information to support the establishment of procedures for providing oversight of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures. However, comments from the Commander in response to Recommendation A.2.a meet the intent of Recommendation A.2.b. Therefore, Recommendation A.2.b is resolved and open. We will close Recommendation A.2.b once NMCLANT provides us with evidence of an annual review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures and evidence that the NMCLANT Detachment included Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's routine inventory sampling.

(U) Recommendation A.3

(U) We recommend that the Naval Support Activity Bahrain Commanding Officer develop and implement written procedures establishing roles and responsibilities for:

a. (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Naval Support Activity Bahrain Comments

(S) The Commander of Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central (EURAFCENT), responding for the NSA Bahrain Commander [REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once Navy Region EURAFCENT provides us with evidence that the [REDACTED]

b. (S) [REDACTED]

(U) Naval Support Activity Bahrain Comments

(S) The Navy Region EURAFCENT Commander, responding for the NSA Bahrain Commander, [REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(S) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once Navy Region EURAFCENT provides us with evidence that the [REDACTED]

(U) Finding B

~~(CUI)~~ DoD Officials at ██████████ Stored Munitions in Accordance with Safety Policies, but Could Improve Accountability and Security of Stored Munitions

~~(CUI)~~ DoD officials and contractor personnel at ██████████ stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies. For example, of the ██████ munitions storage structures reviewed, Navy officials and contractor personnel maintained required site planning documentation. In addition, Army and Navy officials stored munitions in accordance with approved net explosive weight (NEW) limits. However, Navy officials could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions.

- ~~(CUI)~~ Officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS for ██████ munitions storage structures in which they stored munitions. Specifically, we identified that NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not properly account for ██████ munitions in the records for the ██████ munitions storage structures. This occurred because of administrative errors, such as moving munitions without updating the OIS.
- ~~(CUI)~~ Officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks in ██████ munitions storage structures in which they stored munitions. This occurred because NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not prioritize storing munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks during a previous relocation.
- ~~(CUI)~~ Officials from the NSF did not post restricted area signs at ██████ munitions storage areas, where ██████ munitions storage structures were located. This occurred because NSF officials stated that they did not think the host nation would allow restricted area signs at munitions storage areas.

(U) When Navy officials do not maintain accurate and effective accountability of munitions, it potentially reduces the ability of Navy officials to fully determine readiness for completing missions and increases opportunities for unnecessary procurement costs for munitions that may already be available in the Navy's supply. In addition, when Navy officials do not store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks, it potentially reduces the ability of Navy officials to locate munitions quickly in the event the munitions are issued for use, require maintenance, or are deemed defective. Furthermore, the lack of restricted area signs potentially exposed unauthorized personnel to dangerous areas.

(~~CUI~~) In addition, the explosives safety officer at [REDACTED] stated that they maintained consistent awareness of the NEW totals for munitions stored in all [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. According to a DDESB official, explosives safety officers are responsible for maintaining awareness of NEW totals of stored munitions on a consistent basis. In addition, the explosives safety officer stated that maintaining awareness of NEW totals is an inherent responsibility of explosives safety officers. For example, the explosives safety officer stated that they obtain and conduct quarterly reviews of the NEW totals for the munitions stored in all munitions storage structures at [REDACTED]. The explosives safety officer provided us with examples of NEW storage reports and a NEW storage tracker for the [REDACTED], which included [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in our sample that the explosives safety officer used to track and ensure compliance with NEW limits. According to the explosives safety officer, if they believed there was an issue with the NEW totals for the munitions stored in a munitions storage structure, they would work with the unit that owned the munitions to ensure the unit accurately recorded NEW totals and did not exceed NEW limits.

(U) As mentioned in Finding A, we previously identified that explosives safety officers lacked awareness of the NEW totals in munitions storage areas at other installations within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The DoD OIG made recommendations in Report No. DODIG-2024-063 and Report No. DODIG-2024-064 to the Army and Air Force commanders overseeing explosives safety to develop and implement procedures requiring explosives safety officers to verify, at least quarterly, the NEW totals in all munitions storage structures at the installations, respectively.

(~~CUI~~) Navy Officials at [REDACTED] Could Improve Accountability and Security of Stored Munitions

(~~CUI~~) Navy officials at [REDACTED] could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions. Specifically, of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not always maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS and did not always store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks. In addition, officials from the NSF did not always post restricted area signs at munitions storage areas.

(U) DoD Officials Did Not Always Maintain Accurate Inventory Records

(~~S~~) Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS for

(S) [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in which they stored munitions.¹⁷ Navy and Army officials maintained accurate inventory records for the other [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at [REDACTED]. DoD Instruction 4140.01 requires DoD officials to maintain records for all inventory within the DoD supply chain, including munitions, which require the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility. We obtained munitions records from the eight units storing munitions at [REDACTED] and performed inventories at [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed. Specifically, we performed book-to-floor (existence) and floor-to-book (completeness) inventories of [REDACTED] munitions to verify whether officials at [REDACTED] properly accounted for munitions stored in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. As a result, we identified that NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials did not properly account for [REDACTED] munitions in the OIS for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures. For example, in [REDACTED] munitions storage structure, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials understated the quantity of a munition by [REDACTED]. Table 5 summarizes the inventory discrepancies for the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at [REDACTED] by lot number or serial number.

(CU) Table 5. Inventory Discrepancies at [REDACTED]

(CU) Munitions Storage Structure	Lot or Serial Number	OIS Quantity ¹	Physical Quantity ²	Difference	Percentage
[REDACTED]					

¹ (U) As of July 24, 2023.

² (U) As of August 1, 2023.

³ (U) Sum of absolute values.

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

¹⁷ (CU) NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain stored munitions in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed at [REDACTED]. See Appendix C for the list of munitions storage structures reviewed at [REDACTED] and the units that used them.

(~~CU~~) Officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not maintain accurate inventory records for the [REDACTED] munitions because of administrative errors. Specifically, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that they understated the quantity of a munition by [REDACTED] while previously preparing for an inspection.¹⁸ For [REDACTED] munitions, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials moved the munitions to different munitions storage structures without updating the OIS.¹⁹ In addition, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials entered the quantities in the OIS for [REDACTED] munitions incorrectly.²⁰ NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials were unable to verify why they understated the inventory for a munition by [REDACTED] and stated that the discrepancy was most likely due to an administrative error.²¹ In August and October 2023, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials corrected the inventory discrepancies in the OIS for all [REDACTED] munitions.

(~~CU~~) Although NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain corrected the inventory discrepancies, Navy officials are required to provide the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions. Therefore, the NMCLANT Commander should emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials responsible for munitions at [REDACTED].

(U) Navy Officials Did Not Always Store Munitions in Adjacent Stacks

(~~CU~~) Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks for [REDACTED] munitions storage structures in which they stored munitions. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] However, we identified 11 lot numbers total in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at the [REDACTED] that were not stored in adjacent stacks. For example, we located lot number [REDACTED] in three different areas in [REDACTED]. The munitions storage structure contained [REDACTED] lot numbers and [REDACTED] munitions, which made it difficult to efficiently locate and verify the total quantity for lot number [REDACTED]. Table 6 summarizes the munitions storage structures and lot numbers not stored in adjacent stacks.

¹⁸ (~~CU~~) Munitions from lot number [REDACTED].

¹⁹ (~~CU~~) Munitions from lot numbers [REDACTED].

²⁰ (~~CU~~) Munitions from lot number [REDACTED] and serial numbers [REDACTED].

²¹ (~~CU~~) Munitions from lot number [REDACTED].

(U) Table 6. Munitions Lot Numbers Not Stored in Adjacent Stacks

(CU) Munitions Storage Structure	Lot Number	Number of Locations Within Structure
[REDACTED]		

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

~~(CU)~~ Officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not always store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks because they did not prioritize munitions storage structure layout when relocating the munitions in 2022. Specifically, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that they were previously storing munitions in [REDACTED] on a Bahraini installation and that in April 2022, Naval Facility Engineering Systems Command officials conducted a study and found the munitions storage structures to be insufficient for munitions storage. As result, in August 2023, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that they were required to move their munitions to the [REDACTED] and that since moving the munitions, they had not had the time to reorganize the munitions to store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks. In February 2024, NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain officials stated that they reorganized the munitions in the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures into adjacent stacks by lot number. However, to ensure officials continue to store munitions in adjacent stacks, the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer should emphasize the importance of storing munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks within munitions storage structures to all units storing munitions at [REDACTED]

(U) Navy Officials Did Not Always Mark Munitions Storage Areas as Restricted Areas


~~(U)~~ Of the [REDACTED] munitions storage structures reviewed, officials from the NSF did not post restricted area signs at [REDACTED] munitions storage areas, where [REDACTED] munitions storage structures were located. DoD Manual 5100.76 and OPNAVINST 5530.13D require all munitions storage areas to have restricted area signs in English and the host nation language when located in host nation countries. However, the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not have restricted area signs.

~~(U)~~ NSF officials stated that they did not post restricted area signs at the [REDACTED] munitions storage areas because they did not think that the host nation would allow restricted area signs. Specifically, NSF officials stated that they did not receive host nation approval on previous requests for approval to post restricted area signs at munitions storage areas. However, NSF officials were unable to provide documentation to support the previous requests.

(U) Corrective Actions Taken

~~(U)~~ As a result of our audit, in August 2023, NSF officials requested and received approval from the host nation to post restricted area signs at munitions storage areas. In October 2023, contractor personnel posted the restricted area signs and we confirmed the signs were in English and the host nation language. Figure 5 shows an example of a restricted area sign that contractor personnel posted at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Because NSF officials' actions addressed the issues identified in this report, we are not making a recommendation related to posting restricted area signs at the [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

~~(CU)~~ Figure 5. Restricted Area Sign at the [REDACTED]



~~(CU)~~ Source: [REDACTED]

(U) Insufficient Accountability and Security of Munitions Reduces the Ability to Determine Readiness and Prevent Unauthorized Access to Munitions Storage Areas

~~(CU)~~ Although Navy officials at [REDACTED] stored munitions in accordance with applicable safety policies, Navy officials could improve the accountability and security of stored munitions. When Navy officials do not maintain accurate and effective accountability of munitions, it potentially reduces the ability of Navy officials to fully determine readiness for completing missions and increases opportunities for unnecessary procurement costs for munitions that may already be available in the Navy's supply. In addition, when Navy officials do not store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks, it potentially reduces Navy officials' ability to locate munitions quickly in the event the munitions are issued for use, require maintenance, or are deemed defective. Furthermore, the lack of restricted area signs potentially exposed unauthorized personnel to dangerous areas.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Revised Recommendation

~~(CUI)~~ As a result of management comments, we revised draft Recommendation B.2 to clarify the nature of actions needed to improve the storage of munitions at [REDACTED]

(U) Recommendation B.1

~~(CUI)~~ We recommend that the Commander of Navy Munitions Command Atlantic emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of materiel accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain officials responsible for munitions at [REDACTED]

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Comments

(U) The NMCLANT Commander agreed with the recommendation, stating that NMCLANT will increase the frequency of the current biannual operation support assist visit and inspection to annual; direct immediate periodic inventory sampling of all ammunition and explosives storage locations; and initiate hiring personnel, including a director of operations, an inventory accuracy officer, and an ammunition accountant. NMCLANT plans to complete the corrective actions by August 1, 2025.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Commander addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once NMCLANT provides us with evidence of: (1) the increase of the frequency of operation support visits and inspections from biannual to annual; (2) periodic inventory sampling of all ammunition and explosives storage locations; and (3) the hiring of a director of operations, an inventory accuracy officer, and an ammunition accountant.

(U) Recommendation B.2

~~(CUI)~~ We recommend that the Commanding Officer of the [REDACTED] emphasize the importance of storing munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks within munitions storage structures to all units storing munitions at [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ [REDACTED] Comments

~~(CUI)~~ The Navy Region EURAFCENT Commander, responding for the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer, [REDACTED]

(~~CU~~) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Our Response

(~~CU~~) Comments from the Commander did not address the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We did not redirect the recommendation to NMCLANT because [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Our intent was for the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer to emphasize storing munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks within munitions storage structures to all units storing munitions at [REDACTED] including units that are not part of the NMCLANT chain of command. As a result, we revised the recommendation to clarify our intent to improve the storage of munitions at [REDACTED]. We request that the [REDACTED] Commanding Officer provide comments within 30 days in response to the final report.

(U) Appendix A

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from July 2023 through May 2024 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Components failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

(U) Safety and Security Criteria for Stored Munitions

~~(U)~~ We reviewed criteria to determine whether DoD officials stored munitions at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] in accordance with safety and security policies. Specifically, we reviewed the following DoD and Navy guidance.

- (U) DoD Instruction 4140.01, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy," March 6, 2019
- (U) DoD Instruction 6055.16, "Explosives Safety Management Program," July 29, 2008 (Incorporating Change 3, August 31, 2018)
- (U) DDESB DESR 6055.09, "Defense Explosives Safety Regulation," Edition 1, January 13, 2019
- (U) DoD Manual 5100.76, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)," April 17, 2012 (Incorporating Change 2, October 5, 2020)
- (U) OPNAVINST 5530.13D, "U.S. Navy Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Physical Security Policy Manual," May 28, 2021
- (U) OPNAVINST 8020.14B, "U.S. Navy Explosives Safety Management Program Policy Manual," July 18, 2022

- ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]
- (U) Naval Supply Systems Command Publication 724, "Conventional Ordnance Stockpile Management Policies and Procedures," Revision 25, January 2023

(U) Munitions Storage Structures Reviewed

~~(S)~~ As of July 2023, DoD officials stored over [REDACTED] munitions, valued at more than \$11.2 million, in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at NSA Bahrain, and DoD officials stored over [REDACTED] munitions, valued at more than \$148.2 million, in [REDACTED] munitions storage structures at [REDACTED]. We nonstatistically selected a sample of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to review at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] munitions storage structures to review at [REDACTED]. Specifically, we nonstatistically selected [REDACTED] structures at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] structures at [REDACTED] for review based on the following factors.

- (U) SRC of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) NEW of munitions stored in the structures
- (U) Location of storage structures on the installation

(U) Analysis for Stored Munitions

~~(S)~~ For each munitions storage structure reviewed at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] we obtained and analyzed documentation, including site plans, munitions inventories, standard operating procedures, safety deviation risk assessments, key control access logs, safety and security inspection results, LPS inspection and testing records, and IDS testing records.

~~(S)~~ We conducted meetings with the DDESB and Navy personnel to discuss roles and responsibilities related to munitions storage, site planning, risk management, and oversight. We also reviewed documentation from these organizations related to the safe and secure storage of munitions at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED].

(U) During the site visit, we interviewed staff responsible for munitions storage, security, and safety. Key personnel interviewed included the contracting officer's representative, explosives safety officers, and security officials. We inspected storage conditions at the munitions storage structures to determine whether munitions were stored in accordance with applicable safety and security policies. At the tested munitions storage structures, we visually observed the following features.

- (U) Intrusion detection systems

- (U) Lightning protection systems
- (U) Interior and exterior lighting
- (U) Doors
- (U) Ventilation
- (U) Evidence of flooding
- (U) Vegetation, trash, and debris on and around the structure

~~(S)~~ We also tested inventory accountability at each of the sampled structures at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED]. Specifically, we performed book-to-floor (existence) inventories by reconciling 25 line items from the inventory provided by the command to the munitions that were present in the structure. We also performed floor-to-book (completeness) inventories by reconciling 25 additional line items from each structure back to the inventory provided by the command. If there were fewer than 25 line items in a structure, we conducted a complete book-to-floor inventory of the structure.

(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

~~(S)~~ We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed control environment, control activities, risk assessment, and monitoring. As a result, we identified internal control weaknesses related to control environment, control activities, and monitoring. Specifically, at NSA Bahrain and [REDACTED] officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain did not always maintain accurate inventory records in the OIS, and officials from the NSF did not always post “restricted area” signs at munitions storage areas. In addition, officials from NSA Bahrain did not conduct [REDACTED]. Officials from NMCLANT Detachment Bahrain at [REDACTED] did not always store munitions of the same lot number in adjacent stacks. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We used computer-processed data from the Navy OIS to identify the munitions on hand at the munitions storage structures we selected for testing. To assess the reliability of the data, we performed existence and completeness testing of the munitions inventories. Our testing identified discrepancies in the munitions inventories; however, these discrepancies were not a result of system errors. We describe the inventory discrepancies in the finding sections of this report.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 6 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DoD OIG, and Army Audit Agency issued five reports discussing the DoD's storage of munitions. We did not identify any Naval Audit Service Agency reports related to munitions storage issued in the last 6 years.

(U) Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>. Unrestricted Army Audit Agency reports can be accessed from .mil and gao.gov domains at <https://www.army.mil/aaa>.

(U) GAO

(U) Report No. GAO-19-118, "Actions Needed to Enhance the Security of High-Risk Ammunition at Storage Locations," November 2018

(U) The GAO found that Military Service guidance for safeguarding SRC I munitions was not consistent with all DoD minimum requirements. The report also noted that the Military Services conducted inspections of the physical security at locations with SRC I ammunition and identified security deficiencies. The GAO was unable to determine whether the Military Services resolved all security deficiencies because the Services did not consistently document resolution.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-064, "Audit of Munitions Storage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait" March 19, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that Army and contractor officials at Camp Arifjan did not consistently follow safety and security policies for storing munitions. Specifically, they stored munitions without a DDESB-approved site plan. Army officials also did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved NEW limits and did not maintain continuous awareness of NEW totals stored in munitions storage structures. In addition, Army officials did not ensure compliance with semiannual emergency evacuation drills and annual inspections for munitions storage structures, nor did they remove vegetation around munitions storage structures.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-063, "Audit of Munitions Storage at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar," March 19, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that DoD officials at Al Udeid Air Base generally followed safety and security policies for munitions storage, but there is room for improvement. Specifically, Air Force officials did not manage munitions storage in accordance with approved NEW limits, were unaware of the NEW of munitions

(U) stored, and did not track the NEW totals of munitions stored by two tenant organizations.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2021-090, "Audit of Munitions Storage in the U.S. European Command," June 10, 2021

(U) This report is classified. To submit a Freedom of Information Act request, please visit <https://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/>.

(U) Army

(U) Report No. A-2019-0003-FMP, "Ammunition Facilities Management, Lualualei Annex, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii," October 19, 2018

(U) The Army found that munitions storage facilities at the Navy's Lualualei Annex generally were not sufficient because none of the facilities had lightning protection systems, most earth-covered magazines did not have 2-foot soil coverage, and most structures required concrete or electrical repairs. Furthermore, the 402nd Army Field Support Brigade did not have plans to assume munitions operations at Lualualei when the Navy ceases providing this support. The U.S. Army Pacific did not take sufficient steps to prioritize relocating munitions to the Naval Ammunition Depot West Loch.

(U) Appendix B

(U) Munitions Storage Structures Reviewed at Naval Support Activity Bahrain

(S// FOUO) Sample Number	Structure	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions	NEW of Munitions	Unit
[Redacted Content]					

(CU) Sample Number	Structure	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions	NEW of Munitions	Unit
[Redacted]					

(U) Legend

- (U) EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment Bahrain
- (U) MESHG2 Maritime Expeditionary Security Group Two Detachment Bahrain
- (U) NMC Navy Munitions Command
- (U) NSA Naval Support Activity
- (U) NSF Navy Security Forces
- (U) NSWG1 Naval Special Warfare Group One Detachment Bahrain
- (CU) [Redacted]
- (CU) [Redacted]

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Appendix C

(CUI) Munitions Storage Structures Reviewed at

[Redacted]

(S) Sample Number	Structure	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions	NEW of Munitions	Unit
[Redacted]					

(S) Sample Number	Structure	Structure Location	SRC of Munitions	NEW of Munitions	Unit
[Redacted]					

(U) Legend

- (U) 4-5 ADA BN 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment
- (S) [Redacted]
- (U) CTF Commander, Task Force
- (U) EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment Bahrain
- (S) [Redacted]
- (S) [Redacted]
- (U) N/A Not Applicable
- (U) NMC Navy Munitions Command
- (U) NSA Naval Support Activity
- (U) NSF Navy Security Forces
- (U) NSWG1 Naval Special Warfare Group One Detachment Bahrain
- (U) USMC U.S. Marine Corps
- (S) [Redacted]

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic

(U)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVY MUNITIONS COMMAND ATLANTIC
160 MAIN ROAD
YORKTOWN VA 23691

8023
N00/073
JUN 25 2024

From: Commander, Navy Munitions Command Atlantic (NMCLANT)
To: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (DoD)

Subj: REPORT RESPONSE ON REPORT NO. D2023-D000RJ-0083.000

Encl: (1) NMCLANT Responses to DODIG Report No. D2023-D000RJ-0083.000
and Recommendations

1. Pursuant to May 22, 2024 report Audit of Munitions Storage in Bahrain, NMCLANT is providing information concerning recommendations A.1, A.2.a, A.2.b and B.1.
2. My point of contact for this effort is [REDACTED] Executive Director, at [REDACTED]. Please feel free to contact him with any additional questions.


J. C. SHEPARD

(U)

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic (cont'd)

~~(CUI)~~

**NMCLANT Responses to DODIG Report
No. D2023-D000RJ-0083.000 and Recommendations**

Recommendation A.1

We recommend that Commander, Navy Munitions Command Atlantic emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of material accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all officials at Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain who are responsible for munitions at Naval Support Activity Bahrain.

Management Response to Recommendation A.1

Concur: As part of this effort and as a means to enhance the monitoring of NMCLANT Det Bahrain program NMCLANT will:

- a. Increase the current bi-annual Operation Support Technical Assist visit/inspection to an annual periodicity.
- b. Direct immediate periodic inventory sampling of all ammunition and explosives storage locations.
- c. In an effort to offset the local knowledge drain associated with the short-term assignment of military personnel, initiate hiring civilian personnel per the FY25 POM authorization to include Director of Operations, Inventory Accuracy Officer and Ammunition Accountant.

Estimated Date of Completion: 1 Aug 25

Recommendation A.2.a

We recommend that Commander, Navy Munitions Command Atlantic, in coordination with Commanding Officer of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15:

- a. Conduct review of Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures and implement required corrective actions.

Management Response to Recommendation A.2.a

Concur: NMCLANT will include a review of Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's inventory procedures during the annual Operation Support Technical Assist visit/inspection. In addition, NMCLANT Det Bahrain will include the Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15's locations in routine inventory sampling.

~~(CUI)~~

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic (cont'd)

(~~CUH~~)

Estimated Date of Completion: 1 Sept 24

Recommendation A.2.b

b. Update "Memorandum of Understanding in Case of Ammunitions and Explosives Accountability" to include responsibilities for providing oversight of inventory procedures for Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15.

Management Response to Recommendation A.2.b

Concur with consideration given to the following:

NMCLANTINST 8024.1A establishes the process, procedures and requirements as delineated in NAVSUP P-724 for Home Base Ammunition Transaction Report Host reporting procedures for both NMCLANT activities (hosting activities) and hosted activities (Helicopter Mine Countermeasures Squadron 15). In requesting/accepting for Home Base Ammunition Transaction Report Host reporting services from a NMCLANT activity, hosted activities agree to the conditions as delineated in the instruction precluding the need for a Memorandum.

Estimated Date of Completion: 1 Aug 24

Recommendation B.1

We recommend that Commander, Navy Munitions Command Atlantic emphasize the importance of providing the highest levels of material accountability and asset visibility for munitions to all officials at Navy Munitions Command Atlantic Detachment Bahrain who are responsible for munitions [REDACTED]

Management Response to Recommendation B.1

Concur: As part of this effort and as a means to enhance the monitoring of NMCLANT Det Bahrain programs, NMCLANT will:

- a. Increase the current bi-annual Operation Support Technical Assist visit/inspection to an annual periodicity.
- b. Direct immediate periodic inventory sampling of all ammunition and explosives storage locations.

(U) Navy Munitions Command Atlantic (cont'd)

~~(CUI)~~

- c: In an effort to offset the local knowledge drain associated with the short-term assignment of military personnel, initiate hiring civilian personnel per the FY25 POM authorization to include Director of Operations, Inventory Accuracy Officer and Ammunition Accountant.

Estimated Date of Completion: 1 Aug 25

3

Enclosure (1)

~~(CUI)~~

(U) Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central

(S)



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
NAVY REGION EUROPE, AFRICA, CENTRAL
PSC 817 BOX 108
FPO AE 09622-0108

5041
Ser N00/S001
1 Jul 24

From: Commander, Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central
To: Inspector General, U. S. Department of Defense

Subj: (U) NAVY REGION EUROPE, AFRICA, CENTRAL, NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
BAHRAIN, [REDACTED]
PROJECT NUMBER D2023-D000RJ-0083.000

1. (U) The following information is provided in response to the recommendations contained in subject report directed to Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central, Naval Support Activity Bahrain, [REDACTED]. We will provide additional notice to your office when we complete each item.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Revised
Recommendation
B.2

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: [REDACTED] @IREURAF/CENT-NB
Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20490620

(S)

(U) Navy Region Europe, Africa, Central (cont'd)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

Subj: (U) NAVY REGION EUROPE, AFRICA, CENTRAL, NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY
BAHRAIN, AND [REDACTED]
PROJECT NUMBER D2023-D000RJ-0083.000

[REDACTED]

2. My point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED], Inspector General. He can be reached at [REDACTED] or DSN: [REDACTED].


B. J. COLLINS

2

Classified by: [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~
Derived from Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20490628

(S)

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

(U) EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(U) DDESB	DoD Explosives Safety Board
(U) DESR	Defense Explosives Safety Regulation
(U) EURAFCENT	Europe, Africa, Central
(U) IDS	Intrusion Detection System
(U) LPS	Lightning Protection System
(U) NAVSEA OP	Naval Sea Systems Command Ordnance Pamphlet
(U) NEW	Net Explosive Weight
(U) NMCLANT	Navy Munitions Command Atlantic
(U) NSA	Naval Support Activity
(U) NSF	Navy Security Forces
(U) OIS	Ordnance Information System
(U) OPNAVINST	Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
(U) SRC	Security Risk Category
(U) USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
(U) USNAVCENT	U.S. Naval Forces Central

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