

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 30, 2024

TO: Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: B. Caleca, P. Fox, and P. Meyer, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending August 30, 2024

105KW: A resident inspector observed a critique for a procedure noncompliance during mechanical isolations of various pieces of equipment to meet the cold and dark requirements for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) work following the grouting of the 105KW basins. The package is similar to other mechanical isolation packages used for D&D preparations at facilities prior to gross demolition, with a high-level reference work instruction and a significantly larger index document describing each mechanical isolation in detail. The field work supervisor (FWS) had performed work in the field with only the index as a reference. As a result, they only discovered a week later that work had been performed without completing a signature step requiring verification that a 480-volt switchgear had been isolated. The FWS fully cooperated during the critique, noting that work in the field was largely driven by the index rather than the work instruction itself. Further discussion noted that the approach to mechanical isolation had been changed, and that the index had been written with clear work instruction-like steps rather than acting as a reference document contrary to expectations for work instruction development, review, and approval. CPCCo management is conducting a detailed review to identify all areas where the work package may deviate from CPCCo procedural requirements.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): In anticipation of readiness activities for WTP, WTCC personnel have been standing up their radiological protection program, including hiring and training radiological control technician (RCT) candidates. A resident inspector observed two on-the-job training and evaluation (OJT and OJE) sessions for source checks and operating benchtop sample counters and radiation instruments. The resident inspector noted that the trainer and evaluator were experienced, knowledgeable, and shared best practices above and beyond the core training material and procedure requirements for each activity. However, without contamination controls such as postings in the testing area, practices such as appropriate handling of smear samples, glove use, and disposing of contaminated waste could not be demonstrated. The OJE did not demonstrate the candidate's ability to identify their mistakes and correct them without pointed evaluator questions. The OJT/OJE cards did not provide either the candidate or evaluator critical tasks or information that determine pass or fail criteria and included at least one task not performed because a separate OJT/OJE card provides redundant training on the task. The resident inspector shared their observations with the trainer, evaluator, and radiological control manager for WTCC, who were receptive to the feedback and stated they would review the OJT material and expectations for evaluations.

Capsule Storage Area (CSA): The contractor conducted a walkdown of the CSA with members of the DOE readiness team to preview proposed demonstrations in support of the contractor Operational Readiness Review (ORR). The contractor is still awaiting DOE approval of the CSA safety basis documents. The resident inspector notes consistency in technical safety requirements (TSRs) between the CSA and the currently approved Waste Storage and Encapsulation Facility TSRs will help ensure safe operations between the two facilities.