Separate but Not Equal: The Uneven Cost of Residential Segregation for Network-Based Hiring

by

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Abstract

This paper studies how residential segregation by race and by education affects job search via neighbor networks. Using confidential microdata from the US Census Bureau, I measure segregation for each characteristic at both the individual level and the neighborhood level. My findings are manifold. At the individual level, future coworkership with new neighbors on the same block is less likely among segregated individuals than among integrated workers, irrespective of races and levels of schooling. The impacts are most adverse for the most socioeconomically disadvantaged demographics: Blacks and those without a high school education. At the block level, however, higher segregation along either dimension raises the likelihood of any future coworkership on the block for all racial or educational groups. My identification strategy, capitalizing on data granularity, allows a causal interpretation of these results. Together, they point to the coexistence of homophily and in-group competition for job opportunities in linking residential segregation to neighbor-based informal hiring. My subtle findings have important implications for policy-making.

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The neighborhood in which a person lives can have far-reaching consequences for their life. It has been documented in many contexts that individuals in high-poverty areas have worse health, attain less education, and achieve lower general economic wellbeing than those in low-poverty areas (see Durlauf 2004 and Chyn and Katz 2021 for reviews). However, the evidence for the effects of neighborhoods on employment and earnings is mixed. Most research to date points to a null impact of neighborhood quality[1] on job prospects and earnings for adults (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001, Oreopoulos 2003, Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007, Damm 2014). Yet more recent works discover that living in a low-poverty area in childhood significantly improves employment and wages in adulthood (Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016, Chyn 2018).

Two shortcomings of the neighborhood effects literature are apparent. First, most studies are silent on the mechanisms underlying their estimates, although it is probable that different mechanisms drive the disparate findings for employment, resulting in the observed lack of consensus. Second, researchers often characterize neighborhoods in terms of quality and use aggregate economic indicators to measure this quality. By contrast, the social aspect of a neighborhood is understudied. Existing works that do address residential networks either consider very large "neighborhoods" (e.g., a municipality or a city) or focus exclusively on network size (Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund 2003, Beaman 2012). Other, more detailed properties of the network such as segregation are less explored.

This paper looks at neighbor networks and examines how residential segregation by race and by education affects employment through access to such networks. Specifically, I study the effects of residential segregation on the likelihood that an individual, conditional on taking up a new job, joins a hyperlocal neighbor's firm. A hyperlocal neighborhood takes the form of a census block: a person's neighbors are the other residents on their block. I first document the existence of neighbor-based informal hiring—a worker is in fact more likely to become a coworker of a hyperlocal neighbor than that of a distant neighbor—then quantify the effects of residential segregation on the utilization of neighbor networks for employment.

I avail of confidential administrative data from the US Census Bureau for both measurement and identification. The backbone of the data is the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program. This rich dataset covers workers and firms in the formal private sector of the US and contains extensive information on individual workers, including demographic characteristics, employment history, and residential addresses. Each worker address is given as a pair of latitude and longitude. I assign the geocoded addresses to blocks

1. Besides poverty rate, common proxies of neighborhood quality include average income, employment rate, and crime rate.

according to Decennial Census 2010's designation and refer to blocks as neighborhoods.

I use the Spectral Segregation Index (SSI) developed by Echenique and Fryer 2007 to measure segregation at both the block level and the individual level. The geocoded addresses are once again indispensable. The fine-grained locational data allow me to peer into a block and categorize pairs of workers as immediate or distant neighbors based on the physical distance between them. The algorithm uses this classification to calculate the SSI. For each category of the characteristic used to measure segregation—race or education—the algorithm returns two main outputs: an index of block segregation and a vector of individual segregation for the workers on the block.[2] In light of data availability and computational costs, *ex ante*, I restrict attention to the 2010-2011 period and a collection of 20 core-based statistical areas (CBSA) within the borders of the 14 states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington. This covers some of the most racially and educationally diverse cities in the US: Los Angeles, Miami, Orlando, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, and Seattle. These geographical restrictions also serve the purpose of fine-tuning my empirical strategy, which I now briefly preview.

Residential choice is anything but random: households and individuals make deliberate decisions as to where to live. Unaccounted for, this gives rise to selection bias and thwarts the identification of causal effects of neighborhood characteristics on individual outcomes. To overcome this challenge, I adapt the spatial identification strategy in Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008 by criss-crossing it with a mover-stayer design. The baseline approach involves making comparisons between neighborhoods (blocks) within a sufficiently narrow reference residential area (block groups). On top of this spatial juxtaposition, I scrutinize incumbent residents (stayers) on a block relative to newcomers (movers) on the same block. I view the incumbent residents as potential beneficiaries of a growing network: the movers, when there are vacancies in their firms, may spread the word to the stayers or even directly refer them to their employers.

My hybrid empirical strategy rests on two identifying assumptions. First, individuals can sort into different reference areas, but their ability to further select into a specific block is constrained by local circumstances at the time of a move (e.g., limited housing options). In particular, it is improbable that stayers can induce movers to relocate to their exact blocks in hopes of learning about or reaping employment opportunities from them. In a later section,

2. These objects are termed the SSI and the "little SI," respectively by Echenique and Fryer 2007. To avoid confusion, throughout the rest of the paper, I refer to the former as the block SSI and the latter as the individual SI.

I show evidence in support of this premise in my data. Second, neighbor interactions are local in nature: the closer in space two residents are, the more frequently or intensely they get in touch with each other. To the extent that the housing market in the city is "thinner" than that in the suburbs or the countryside, these identifying assumptions are more likely to be true in urban areas, hence my geographical restriction to CBSA.

The time frame of the analysis is as follows. I fix 2010 as the year of residential moves and 2011 as the year of employment changes. In practice, this means that I first identify stayers and movers in 2010. I then investigate if, conditional on occupying a new job in 2011—one year after the movers' arrivals—the stayers join the movers' firms. For ease of exposition, I refer to 2010 (2011) as the current (next) year. I find that the effects of residential segregation on neighbor-based informal hiring are unequivocally negative. Irrespective of races, at the individual level, segregated incumbent residents are less likely to become coworkers of new block neighbors than more integrated stayers. The impacts are large. Most stayers in my sample do not share the workplace with their block neighbors: only 4% of them do, depending on the exact definition of coworkership. The effect is the most negative for Blacks: one unit higher in individual segregation implies over 11 percentage points (pp) lower in the probability of coworking with new block neighbors for them. The same declines for the other races are only 2-4 pp. Interestingly, however, at the block level, racial segregation instead raises the odds that a racial *group* has at least a stayer who will soon start working in the same firm as any movers on the block.

The same patterns of differential effects of segregation at the individual level versus the block level repeat for education. Regardless of levels of schooling, segregated incumbent residents are less likely to join the same firm as new neighbors than more integrated stayers. The impacts are economically meaningful, albeit smaller than those documented for racial segregation. A one-unit increase in individual segregation by education translates into a 3-6 pp decrease in the probability of coworking with new neighbors. The least educated—those without a high school diploma—are affected most adversely. Yet again, the opposite pattern emerges when the focus is shifted from the individual to the group on a block. At the block level, segregation by education increases the odds that an educational *group* has at least one incumbent resident later employed by some new neighbor's firm.

I conduct a battery of sensitivity checks, including estimating non-linear variants of the main specifications and altering the definition of coworkership, the type of the outcome variable (a dummy or a count), as well as the variable at which to cluster standard errors. Reassuringly, all of my results are qualitatively stable. In particular, the robust contrast between the individual- and block-level estimates for both race and education suggests that both homophily and in-group competition are present, although future work is needed to rigorously unpack this contrast.

Related literature Besides research on neighborhood effects, this paper contributes to two other strands of literature: informal hiring and segregation. A body of theoretical work has long incorporated social networks into models of job search to study their implications for labor market outcomes (Granovetter 1973, 1995, Montgomery 1991). These theories have their roots in the stylized fact that individuals often rely on social connections to look for jobs (Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004, Topa 2011). Specific to neighbor networks, the link between the place of work and the place of residence can be analyzed from two angles. From the firm's point of view, Hellerstein, McInerney, and Neumark 2011 quantify the disproportionate concentration of an establishment's workforce in particular residential census tracts. I instead pivot to the neighborhood and ask how likely neighbors are to become coworkers. While complementing previous work, this change of perspective is apposite to the central question of how residential segregation influences neighbor-based job search.

Why residential segregation? The use of neighbor networks in informal hiring appears to be stratified by worker characteristics: coworkership is more common between demographically or economically similar neighbors than between dissimilar neighbors (Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008, Hellerstein, Kutzbach, and Neumark 2014, Schmutte 2015). This is consistent with homophily, or the predilection for seeking out and connecting with people who are like oneself (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, Currarini, Jackson, and Pin 2009). To the degree that neighbor ties are stronger within groups than between groups, living in a segregated neighborhood may be advantageous to a job seeker. However, in-group competition for scarce resources can negate this positive effect (Calvó-Armengol 2004, Beaman 2012). Given these ambiguous theoretical predictions, it is unclear whether neighbor networks are more useful in segregated or integrated neighborhoods. In addition, the existing evidence for the effects of residential segregation on economic success is inconclusive. Racial and ethnic segregation at aggregate levels (e.g., a metropolitan area or a municipality) is found to have adverse effects at large (Cutler and Glaeser 1997), but benefit certain demographics such as immigrants in ethnic enclaves (Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund 2003, Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 2008). In contrast to these previous studies, this paper takes advantage of granular data to measure segregation at disaggregate levels (block and individual) and finds that micro-segregation also matters to employment.

Network segregation is but one form of social capital that can influence a person's socioeconomic (SES) outcomes. The present paper therefore also connects to the broader research on social networks (see Jackson 2011 for a review). As friendship data from social media platforms become increasingly available for academic research, new works in this area have started delving into the relationship between *real* (as opposed to proxied) social interactions and economic behavior and performance at a large scale (e.g., Bailey et al. 2018). For example, analysis of Facebook friendships in the US reveals substantial variation across ZIP codes in economic connectedness and social cohesion, both of which are measures of social capital (Bailey et al. 2020, Chetty et al. 2022a, 2022b). These measurements consider an individual's entire network of friends regardless of geographical locations and are only aggregated to the neighborhood to check for potential correlations with SES characteristics (e.g., economic mobility) at this level. By contrast, I center on the individual's social network *within* the neighborhood and identify the causal effects of one important attribute of this network—segregation—on employment prospects at the individual and group levels.

In sum, the contribution of this paper is both conceptual and methodological. Conceptually, my study bridges two strands of literature—informal hiring and neighborhood effects—that so far have developed mostly in isolation from each other. Methodologically, I combine precise measurement and a refined credible identification strategy to attain causality. These contributions arise as the paper answers the open empirical question of whether neighbor networks are more useful in segregated or integrated neighborhoods. This is a policy-relevant question, not least because place-based jobs policies are widely used to promote local job growth and reduce interregional economic inequality (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008, Bartik 2020). Better neighborhoods can benefit residents in many ways, including improvement in employment prospects. To inform policy-making, however, it is imperative to first learn what it is about a neighborhood that makes it desirable for job search. To this end, this paper homes in on an important, yet understudied aspect of the neighborhood: social networks.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources, the sample construction, and the measurement of residential segregation in detail. Section 3 explains the identification strategy and specifies the corresponding econometric models. Section 4 provides empirical justifications for the identification strategy and summarizes the main samples. Section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Data sources

This paper combines confidential administrative data from the US Census Bureau. The backbone is the LEHD, a census of private sector employment that provides quarterly earnings records as drawn from state Unemployment Insurance (UI) database. A comprehensive statistical program, the LEHD is comprised of many components.[3] In this paper, I merge the Employment History File (EHF), the Employer Characteristics File (ECF), and the Unit-to-Worker File (U2W) to match workers to firms and (imperfectly) to establishments. The resulting matched employer-employee dataset contains information on quarterly employment and earnings as well as basic employer characteristics at both the firm level and the establishment level. One caveat is duly noted: this dataset does not cover the entire US labor market because access to the underlying files is granted on a state-by-state basis and varies by project.[4]

The state-specific employment and earnings histories are augmented with two individual characteristics files (ICF) with national coverage: (1) worker demographics and (2) geocoded worker addresses. The worker addresses, available annually, are furnished through the Statistical Administrative Records System (StARS), itself a compilation of administrative data from the Internal Revenue Service, Housing and Urban Development, Medicare, Indian Health Service, and Selective Service. At six implied decimal places, the latitudes and longitudes are generally accurate to the rooftop level. This granularity allows me to precisely assign worker addresses to census blocks and flexibly define neighborhoods according to that assignment. Since the worker addresses are provided yearly, I collapse employment and earnings from quarter to year to synchronize work and residential data.

2.2 Sample construction

From the 2014 snapshot of the LEHD, I construct a number of interrelated cross-sectional samples, in which worker addresses are as of 2010. This year is chosen for its best quality

3. See Abowd et al. 2009 and Vilhuber and McKinney 2014 for additional details about the history and the construction of the LEHD.

4. For this research, I have access to the employment and earnings data in the LEHD for District of Columbia and 23 states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia.

of geographical data.[5] Historically, 2010 also marks the beginning of the recovery from the 2007-2009 Great Recession during which the housing market collapsed and unemployment soared. In addition to identical timing, all of the samples cover the same 20 CBSA listed in Table 1. Only residential blocks with at least five building addresses, i.e., five distinct pairs of latitude and longitude, are retained.[6] The boundaries of the blocks are as of Decennial Census 2010 and the configuration of the CBSA is as of December 2009.[7] The selected CBSA are the 20 most populous metropolitan areas that are completely nested within the states available to this research in the LEHD.[8] Urban areas are prioritized over rural areas also because most economic activity is concentrated in cities and because residential sorting at a hyperlocal level (e.g., a block) is arguably more difficult in metropolis where housing is more limited.

One prong of my identification strategy, a full description of which is deferred to Section 3, can be characterized as a mover-stayer design. Specifically, I distinguish between two types of resident: incumbents who have lived on their blocks prior to 2010 and new comers who only move to their blocks in that year. I focus on incumbents as potential recipients of job referrals from movers. Looking ahead one year, I identify incumbent residents who start working for a new employer in 2011 and ask if this firm has already employed any of their new neighbors in 2010. An affirmative answer to this question, along with the other prong of my empirical strategy, would provide credible evidence of neighbor networking for employment. While my analysis is centered on incumbent residents, it also relies on ancillary samples. My samples differ from and relate to each other as follows:

- **Reference Sample (RS):** from the national file of worker addresses in the LEHD, I extract all workers who in 2010 reside on a residential block in the selected CBSA.
  - **Incumbents Sample (IS)** subsets the **RS** to only workers who are between 18-61 years old (working age) in 2010, move to their current blocks prior to 2010,

5. The StARS database underlying the worker addresses in the ICF has been under constant development since its debut in 1999. Gradual improvements have been made over the years. Starting in 2011, however, the Census Bureau has transitioned to a new Residence Candidate File (RCF). To date, the RCF is still an internal product and not yet available to external researchers (Graham, Kutzbach, and Sandler 2017). For this reason, the worker address records in the LEHD 2014 snapshot have likely encountered a "structural break" in 2011.

6. I drop blocks with fewer addresses to ensure that the neighborhoods defined by the blocks are "true" or meaningful residential neighborhoods. To study residential segregation, it makes little sense to consider very sparsely populated areas.

7. Hereafter, I also use the terms "metropolitan area" and "metropolis" interchangeably to refer to a CBSA.

8. A metropolitan area typically spans three to four contiguous counties, possibly across states. As I use a metropolitan area to define a local labor market, I exclude metropolitan areas that spill, in part or in full, into any inaccessible states.

Table 1 List of core-based statistical areas

CBSA Code	CBSA Title
12580	Baltimore-Towson, MD
19740	Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO
26900	Indianapolis-Carmel, IN
28140	Kansas City, MO-KS
29820	Las Vegas-Paradise, NV
31100	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
33100	Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL
34980	Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN
36740	Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
38060	Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ
38300	Pittsburgh, PA
38900	Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
40140	Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
40900	Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA
41180	St. Louis, MO-IL
41740	San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA
41860	San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA
41940	San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
42660	Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
45300	Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL

Notes: This table lists the 20 core-based statistical areas underlying the empirical analysis. As of December 2009, all of these areas are metropolitan.

and start working in a new firm in 2011.

  – **Movers Sample (RS)** subsets the **RS** to only workers who are between 18-61 years old in 2010 and move to their current blocks in 2010.

- **Pairs Sample (PS):** for each worker in the **IS**, I first identify their block of residence in 2010. I then randomly select two movers on this block in the **MS** and pair them with the incumbent resident. Random sampling is inevitable due to the large size of the LEHD data; pairing all incumbents and movers is computationally expensive.

- **Blocks Samples (BS):** I aggregate the **IS** from the individual level to the block level, separately by race and by level of schooling. There are thus two types of block sample: **BS-R** with block-race as the unit of observation and **BS-E** with block-education as the unit of observation. These samples are "unbalanced": a particular racial or educational group may or may not be represented on a block. Hence, the number of observations need not equal the product of the number of blocks and the maximum number of racial or educational categories in the entire sample.

For ease of exposition, henceforth, I denote an individual in the **RS**, **IS**, and **MS** by r, i, and m, respectively. A pair in the **PS** is therefore indexed by im. Finally, a block in the **BS** samples is denoted by b. The later sections will make explicit references to these samples and the corresponding indices where relevant.

2.3 Variable construction

This section describes how I construct the main variables of the empirical analysis: the outcomes first, followed by the primary regressors.

2.3.1 Measuring coworkership

In general, I define coworkership at the firm level using the State Employer Identification Number (SEIN) in the LEHD. Two workers with overlapping job spells in the same firm, regardless of their exact establishments, are considered coworkers. This choice is both deliberate and driven by data constraints. First, using the firm as opposed to the establishment to define coworkership allows for the possibility of cross-establishment referrals: a worker may alert an acquaintance to a job opening in another establishment, not necessarily their own. Second, a known limitation of the LEHD is that for employers that operate multiple units, a worker's exact establishment is not observed.[9] To identify the plausible workplace for a worker in a multi-unit firm, I use the U2W file in the LEHD. For each job spell, the U2W estimates a probabilistic model based on information about, *inter alia*, the worker's place of residence in the ICF as well as the establishment location and employment size in the ECF, to impute the worker's establishment (SEINUNIT) ten times. For each worker in a multi-unit firm, I identify the establishment(s) with the highest frequency among the ten imputes. This plurality rule is not guaranteed to result in one single establishment. When more than one SEINUNIT "survive" the elimination, I break ties by choosing the establishment located closest to the worker's home address. Despite its imperfections, this attempt to pinpoint a person's workplace down to the establishment level is still useful. As explained below, I use the distance between the worker's place of residence and their place of work to fine-tune the definition of coworkership with neighbors.

I start with the **PS**, where an observation is a random incumbent-mover pair ($\boldsymbol{im}$) in the same block group. In this sample, I create a binary variable to indicate coworkership between the two individuals ($\boldsymbol{CW_{im}}$) in the year following $\boldsymbol{m}$'s move to their current block. I refer to the year of this residential move as the *current year* and the year of possible coworkership as the *next year*. The dummy $\boldsymbol{CW_{im}}$ takes a value of one if in the next year, incumbent $\boldsymbol{i}$ starts working in the firm (SEIN) that already employs mover $\boldsymbol{m}$ in the current year, and zero otherwise. This mover approach helps alleviate concerns about reverse causation that individuals make housing referrals to coworkers as opposed to making job referrals to neighbors: by design, $\boldsymbol{i}$ and $\boldsymbol{m}$ are neighbors before $\boldsymbol{i}$ joins $\boldsymbol{m}$'s current firm for the first time observable.[10]

I refine the definition of the baseline coworkership dummy in two ways. First, it is possible that an incumbent resident and a mover are already connected in some other way before the mover's relocation. The LEHD is generally uninformative about workers' social networks, including the closest circle of family and relatives. Beside neighbors, however, this dataset allows me to uncover another type of social tie: former coworkers. A more conservative variant of $\boldsymbol{CW_{im}}$ is equal to one if in addition to the conditions for the baseline variant, $\boldsymbol{i}$ and $\boldsymbol{m}$ are never former coworkers. Second, to address concerns about spurious referrals driven

9. On average, single-unit firms account for about 60-70% state-level employment (Vilhuber and McKinney 2014).

10. A qualification is in order. State participation in the LEHD is staggered: the start date of the UI records in the LEHD varies across states and overall, these records only date back to 1985 at the earliest. Likewise, the StARS residential data only begin in 1999. As a result of these data shortcomings, it is not possible to ascertain when a worker joins a firm for the first time *ever* and when two individuals become neighbors for the first time *ever*.

by work location choices—individuals tend to work closer to home—I impose geographical restrictions on firm locations. The preferred restriction requires that the firm common to a pair of workers be located outside their block group of residence for CW_{im} to "turn on." For robustness, an alternative restriction instead maintains that such a firm be located at least 22 kilometers from the incumbent resident's address;[11] otherwise, CW_{im} is zero. These pairwise dummies of coworkership are the dependent variables in the pair-level analysis to be described in Section 3.1.

I next look at the **IS**, where an observation is an incumbent (i) who changes jobs in the year after their block receives new residents. As an intermediate step, I create a coworkership dummy similar to CW_{im} in the **PS** except that m is now *any* new neighbor of i on the same *block*.[12] For robustness, I also construct variants of CW_{im}, applying the same two refinements for its counterpart in the **PS** as well as two additional restrictions. The third refinement factors in the incumbent's and mover's race (education) to distinguish between coworkership with neighbors within the same racial (educational) group and that across racial (educational) groups. The fourth and last refinement takes into account how new a firm is to a block: it only considers coworkership in a firm that, prior to the mover's arrival, has not employed any incumbents on the block. In particular, CW_{im} takes the value of one only if the current year, i.e., when m arrives, is the first time that m's firm is observed to hire anyone (m and any other contemporary newcomers) from the block.[13] From the above dyadic dummies of coworkership, I then create two aggregate measures: a dummy equal to 1 if i becomes a coworker of any m on the same block and a count variable to tally i's coworker-cum-neighbors. In mathematical notation, the first variable can be characterized as $CW_i := \max_m CW_{im}$ and the second as $NCW_i := \sum_m CW_{im}$. Both variables are the outcomes of interest in the individual-level analysis in Section 3.2.

Finally, pivoting from the **IS** to the **BS**, I aggregate the above individual-level coworkership variables to the block level, stratifying by race and by education. For race, the outputs are $CW_{bR} := \max_{bR,i} CW_i$, a dummy equal to 1 if any stayer i of race R on block b joins any new neighbor's firm in the next year, and $NCW_{bR} := \max_{bR,i} NCW_i$, the maximum number of coworker-cum-neighbors for any stayer i of race R on block b. Similarly for education: $CW_{bE} := \max_{bE,i} CW_i$ and $NCW_{bE} := \max_{bE,i} NCW_i$. For both characteristics, the block-level

11. I calculate the distance between a worker's residence and their place of work (i.e., the establishment imputed in the U2W file) as of 2011 (2010) in the **IS** (**MS**). The median value of this work-home distance in both samples turns out to be approximately 22 kilometers.

12. That is, I pair i with all new block neighbors m instead of a random subset of them like in the **PS**.

13. For brevity, hereafter, I refer to such a firm as a "first" firm.

variables inherit the same refinements from their individual-level counterparts in the **IS**. These variables will be the outcomes in the block-level specifications in Section 3.3.

2.3.2 Measuring segregation

I adapt the SSI developed by Echenique and Fryer 2007 to measure residential segregation, the explanatory variable of interest. This index is built on two main premises: (1) a measure of segregation should disaggregate to the individual level, and (2) a person is more segregated the more segregated their contacts are. As a measure of segregation, the SSI is fairly recent. Previous sociological and economic literature offers a variety of other measures, most popular of which are the dissimilarity index introduced by Jahn, Schmid, and Schrag 1947 and the isolation index first noted by Bell 1954 (Massey and Denton 1988). Compared to these conventional indices, however, the SSI has several unrivaled appeals.

First, it captures the cascading effect of an individual's social network on their own segregation. Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical example with race as the dimension of segregation and block as the geography of interest. On this block, Whites and Blacks congregate in clusters, or to use the terminology in Echenique and Fryer 2007, "connected components." There can be more than one connected component of each race on the same block. The SSI for a given race measures the degree of connectivity of that race's social network. Consider a Black resident in Figure 1. Their SSI is equal to the weighted sum of the SSI of their neighbors (including both Blacks and Whites), where the weights are the intensities of interaction between the individual and the neighbors. Zooming out from the Black resident to their connected component, the component-wide SSI for Blacks in this cluster is the average of the individual SSI across all of its members. Finally, the block-wide SSI for Blacks is the average of the component SSI across Black clusters on the block, weighted by their size. Reversing this process, the SSI at the block and connected component levels can, by construction, disaggregate to the individual level.[14] By contrast, individual segregation is undefined for more commonly used segregation indices.

Second, the SSI is insensitive to arbitrary partition of a geography while most alternative measures are not. For example, to measure residential segregation for a city, both the dissimilarity index and the isolation index require the city be divided into sections. In practice, such sections are often defined using administrative divisions, e.g., census tracts. These administrative divisions are convenient, yet potentially problematic: redrawing the

14. Computationally, the component SSI is the first quantity to be calculated by Echenique and Fryer 2007's algorithm. The individual SSI should thus be interpreted as the distribution of the component SSI within a network.

Figure 1 A hypothetical block



Notes: This figure illustrates a hypothetical block with two races, as in Echenique and Fryer 2007. Each dot represents an individual resident and the color of the dot indicates their race (White or Black). Black individuals cluster into four "connected components," to use the terminology in Echenique and Fryer 2007: the upper left, upper right, lower left, and lower right connected components have a size of one, six, sixteen, and two, respectively. A micro-neighborhood of radius r is drawn around each dot so that the dots inside this circle are the center's immediate (distant) neighbors. For example, $F5$ has eight immediate neighbors, five of whom are Whites ($E4$, $E5$, $E6$, $F6$, and $G6$) and three are Blacks ($F4$, $G4$, and $G5$). For practical purposes, I set $r = 100$ (meters). In addition, I assume that within an individual-specific circle, the center individual interacts in equal intensity with the other individuals, although the theoretical construction of the SSI in Echenique and Fryer 2007 allows for heterogeneity in contact intensity. Conceptually, given a race: for each connected component, the component SI is the average of the individual SI (a.k.a "little SI") across the members in the component; the block SSI is in turn the size-weighted average of the component SI. Computationally, the component SI is first calculated, using information on the component's members (i.e., their positions, the radius of the individualized neighborhood, and the assumption of equal interaction with immediate neighbors). Then, the individual SI (block SSI) are (is) obtained by disaggregating (weighted-averaging) the component SI.

sections can result in significant changes in the traditional measures of segregation, even when the locations of the individuals are unchanged (Cowgill and Cowgill 1951, Taeuber and Taeuber 1965, Massey and Denton 1988). The SSI is not afflicted with this shortcoming. At the same time, it can be calculated for levels much more disaggregated than a city, owing to the fact that the index is constructed based on social micro-interactions. This, however, hints that compared to the alternative indices, the SSI is more data demanding.

In practice, computation of the SSI proceeds through a series of steps. A practitioner first decides which entity to measure segregation at, e.g., a geography or a school ("entity"). The data input is the exact network configuration within this entity: a map of who is next to or linked to whom ("linkages"). Also required is a parameter vector to indicate the strengths of the linkages: an agent may interact with many other agents, but to varying extents ("linkage strengths"). In my application of residential segregation, the entity of interest is a block; the linkages are close neighborships; and the linkage strengths are intensities of interactions with close neighbors. I define close neighborships by drawing a circle 100 meters in radius[15] around each worker: on the worker's block, the individuals inside this circle except for the individual themselves are considered their immediate neighbors and all others their distant neighbors. This individualization would not be possible without the granularity of the geocoded addresses in the LEHD. An obvious drawback, however, is that actual neighbor interactions are unobserved in the data, although this deficiency is not unique to the LEHD. Absent this information, I assume equal intensity of contact with close neighbors (think a person spends equal amounts of time or social capital with the individuals in their circle).[16] With these parameter choices, I use the full set of all workers in the 20 selected metropolitan areas (the **RS**) to compute the SSI for five racial groups (Non-Hispanic White, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and Others)[17] and four educational groups (Below High School, High School, Some College, and College and Above) at two levels (block and individual).[18]

15. In the **RS**, the median distance between any two residents on the same block is around 100 meters, hence this parameterization. The estimation results are qualitatively unchanged when the radius is set at 50 meters instead.

16. In this regard, my measure of segregation is one of exposure (Athey et al. 2020, Dong et al. 2020, Levy, Phillips, and Sampson 2020, Reme et al. 2022). Lack of data on real interactions precludes a separate examination of friending bias conditional on exposure à la Chetty et al. 2022b.

17. Henceforth, I use "White" instead of "Non-Hispanic White" for short.

18. Calculated this way, the SSI technically captures worker segregation rather than population segregation. In my setting, however, this is not a loss: given my focus on job search via neighbor networks, segregation among workers is the more relevant statistic.

3 Empirical strategy

Causal estimates of neighborhood effects on any outcomes are difficult to obtain because residential choice is seldom random. To overcome endogeneity, previous research on neighborhood effects has mostly relied on experimental or quasi-experimental variation induced by public policy that rules out locational selection. This paper takes a different approach to identification: I allow for residential sorting, but at the same time, assume that there is a limit to how far individuals can sort into neighborhoods. To this end, my identification strategy slices the population of residents in two ways: spatial and temporal. The spatial dimension involves comparisons between different blocks within the same block group. The unit of comparison varies with the type of analysis: an individual worker, a pair of individual workers, or a group on a block. A person's block group of residence is considered their reference neighborhood and their exact block their hyperlocal neighborhood. On this spatial basis, I further stagger the residents on a block by their time of arrival on the block and distinguish between stayers and movers. Throughout the analysis that follows, the incumbent resident is the pivot whereas the mover plays the auxiliary role of the new neighbor who may introduce the incumbent to their firm. The rest of the section explains this mixed space-time identification strategy in more detail.

First, "block" and "block group" are the two lowest levels of the geographical hierarchy devised by the Census Bureau for statistical purposes. Officially, census blocks are defined as "statistical areas bounded by visible features, such as streets, roads, streams, and railroad tracks, and by nonvisible boundaries, such as selected property lines and city, township, school district, and county limits and short line-of-sight extensions of streets and roads" (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). In particular, in a metropolitan area, a census block corresponds to a city block bounded on all sides by streets, hence, is usually regular in shape (e.g., rectangular) and small in area. "Block group" is the intermediate level of geography between "block" and "tract," the latter of which is frequently used in studies of neighborhood effects in the US context (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001, Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007, Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016, Chetty and Hendren 2018a, 2018b, Bergman et al. 2019). A collection of adjacent blocks, each block group generally covers a contiguous area housing between 600 and 3,000 people. It should be noted that local participants contribute to the delineation of block groups, so block groups are not artificial statistical concepts but indeed represent real communities.

This disaggregative strategy based on comparing blocks within a block group is introduced by Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008, who study the general role of neighbor networks in informal job search, but do not investigate residential segregation. It contrasts with the aggregative approach in Cutler and Glaeser 1997. Like the present paper, this classic study on urban ghettos focuses on residential segregation. But while Cutler and Glaeser 1997 measure segregation at a macro level (a metropolitan area), the richness of the LEHD data allows me to adopt and adapt the disaggregative method to get a closer, micro look at the relationship between residential segregation and labor market outcomes.

Furthermore, I harness the longitudinal dimension of the LEHD data to track both residential and employment history. Although my final cross-sectional samples give snapshots of residence as of 2010, I look backward in the residential records to identify when a certain worker first appears on a given block in order to tell incumbent residents and new comers apart. Having made this distinction, I then look ahead one year in the employment records to investigate if in a year, a given incumbent resident joins any firm that has already employed any of their new neighbors. The employment history reveals the earliest year observable when a certain individual takes up any paid job in a given firm. I use this fact to identify what is likely the incumbent's first-time employment at the mover's current firm rather than a coincidental return to a former employer.[19]

Two identifying assumptions undergird my space-time empirical strategy. First, conditioning on the block group of residence—the reference geography—there is no further correlation in unobservable characteristics across the different blocks within that affects the individual's choice of workplace. On the one hand, this assumption does not exclude residential sorting altogether, realistically allowing for selection at the block group level. On the other hand, I postulate that sorting is imperfect: individuals cannot decide who to become their block neighbors, at least for the sake of seeking employment through neighbors. This is ultimately untestable. However, it is arguably more credible for incumbent residents than in general. It seems implausible that existing residents are able to induce other individuals to move to their communities specifically for the purpose of job search. In addition, the assumption in question is more likely to hold in metropolitan areas—the geography of the analysis—thanks to the "thinness" of urban housing markets. Last but not least, it is worth emphasizing that segregation is measured using the locations of all workers on the same block. A person's degree of segregation depends not only directly on their next-door neighbors', but also indirectly on their neighbors' neighbors'. If it is unlikely that a person can choose their next-door neighbors, the odds are even lower that they can target an exact position on the

19. Although the UI records in the LEHD do not trace back to the genesis of the state UI programs, these payroll data are generally available from the early 1990s onwards. This antedates the years of my analysis, 2010 for residence and 2011 for employment, by almost two decades, long enough to limit the probability of misidentifying return employment as first-time employment.

block taking into account the relative positions of all other workers. In Section 4, I show empirical evidence in support of this first identifying assumption.

The second identifying assumption is that neighbor interactions are very local in nature. Within the same block group, a person interacts more with individuals who live on the same block than with others off-block. Granted, such a "hyperlocality" assumption risks omitting interpersonal communications not strictly constrained by geographical distance (e.g., individuals can meet and mingle in public places near their residences, not necessarily on the same block). In the absence of data on actual interactions, however, this assumption permits conservative estimation of the impacts of residential segregation, as mediated by neighbor networks, on individual workplace choices.

3.1 Detecting coworkership among neighbors

The empirical analysis proceeds in sequence. I first investigate if an incumbent resident is more likely to take up a new job in a firm that employs a mover on the same block than another firm that employs a mover on a different block within the same block group. This exercise refines the method in Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008 in several important aspects. First, this paper marries the spatial approach therein with an incumbent-mover design. Second, using Decennial Census 1990, Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008 can only identify a person's place of work down to the block level. As such, coworkership or neighbor-based referral as these authors put it is imprecisely defined: two individuals who work on the same block may nonetheless work for two different firms. By contrast, exact identification of a person's employer is straightforward in an employer-employee matched dataset like the LEHD. Moreover, the longitudinal structure of the LEHD allows me to track a worker's employment history at a firm, including when the employment relationship starts. I can therefore flexibly define coworkership so that it likely reflects a referral.[20] The sample of estimation for the first step of my empirical framework is the **PS**. The baseline specification is a linear probability model:

$$CW_{im} = \alpha_0 \, CR_{im} + \rho_g + \epsilon_{im}, \tag{1}$$

where i denotes a stayer who occupies a new job in a year while m denotes a newcomer who moves to their block in the current year. Both individuals reside in the same block group. The dependent variable, CW_{im}, is an indicator of coworkership between i and m in the year

20. Referrals are not directly observed in administrative data such as the LEHD or Decennial Censuses. For lack of a better term, I will however at times use the word "referral" to loosely refer to coworkership that likely results from a referral.

following m's arrival (see Section 2.3.1 again for detail). On the right hand side, CR_{im} is a dummy equal to 1 if i and m live on the same block and 0 otherwise; ρ_g are the block group fixed effects; and ϵ_{im} are the error terms. The inclusion of the block group fixed effects, ρ_g, is the econometric translation of the identification strategy of comparing different blocks within the same block group. The parameter of interest, α_0, is hypothesized to be positive.

The next specification adds pairwise characteristics to Equation 1 to test the prediction that a job referral is more likely between similar workers than between dissimilar workers:

$$CW_{im} = \beta X'_{im} + \left(\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X'_{im}\right) CR_{im} + \rho_g + \epsilon_{im}. \tag{2}$$

Except for X_{im}, all of the other terms are the same as in Equation 1. The vector X_{im} includes observables that indicate demographic characteristics of (i,m) in terms of gender, place of birth, race, and education, as well as any former coworkership between the individuals. For example, a pair (i,m) can be characterized as of the same race or difference races, or more finely, as belonging to one of the 25 possible permutations: White-White, White-Black, White-Asian, White-Hispanic, White-Others, and so on. Of the attributes included in X_{im}, race and education are most relevant to my analysis. Differentials in the probability of coworkership among same-type pairs compared to cross-type pairs would suggest that segregation affects the chance that an incumbent resident takes up a new job through networking with new neighbors. The next section tests this hypothesis directly.

3.2 Residential segregation and likelihood of coworkership with neighbors: individual-level analysis

Using the **IS**, I estimate the linear equation:

$$CW_i = (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \, si_{iC})\, C_i + \rho_g + \beta X'_i + \epsilon_i, \tag{3}$$

where again i indexes an incumbent resident who takes up a new job in the year immediately after someone joins their block of residence. On the left hand side is CW_i, an indicator or a count of coworkership between i and their new block neighbors, as described in Section 2.3.1. On the right hand side, C denotes a characteristic: *Race* for race and *Educ* for education. The variable *Race* takes five categorical values—White, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and Others—while the variable *Educ* takes four—Below High School, High School, Some College, and College and Above. The main explanatory variable is the individual segregation index si_{iC}, one for each characteristic C. As before, ρ_g are the block group fixed effects and ϵ_i are the error terms. The vector X_i is comprised of i's demographic characteristics (a dummy for female, a dummy for nativity status, linear and quadratic terms of age in years) as well as controls for the size of i's new-neighbor network. The vector α_1 contains the parameters of interest: the estimate in α_1 for a given racial (educational) group reveals how individual racial (educational) segregation at the place of residence affects the probability that an incumbent receives a job referral from newcomers on their block. As a check on specification sensitivity, I also estimate non-linear variants of Equation 3: conditional logit models for binary outcomes and Poisson models for count outcomes.

3.3 Residential segregation and likelihood of coworkership among neighbors: block-level analysis

From a theoretical perspective, it is not necessarily the case that the more segregated an individual is, the more likely they will become a coworker of a new neighbor. *Ceteris paribus*, homophily suggests that residential segregation has a positive effect on coworkership with neighbors. Countervailing homophily, however, is in-group competition for limited employment opportunities. One way to uncover this competitive force is to shift the focus from the individual to the group on a block and examine coworkership with neighbors at this higher level. To this end, I estimate a block version of Equation 3:

$$CW_{bC} = (\alpha_0 + \alpha_1\, SSI_{bC})\, C_b + \rho_g + \beta\, X'_{bC} + \epsilon_{bC}, \tag{4}$$

where again, C is either *Race* for race or *Educ* for education.

The estimation samples are the block samples. The unit of observation is block-race (in the **BS-R**) or block-education (in the **BS-E**) so that bC denotes a racial or educational group on block b. The left-hand-side variable, CW_{bC}, is aggregated from the dependent variable, CW_i, of Equation 3. Details on this aggregation have been provided in Section 2.3.1. On the right hand side, the main explanatory variable is the block segregation index, SSI_{bC}, separately for each characteristic C. Again, ρ_g are the block group fixed effects and ϵ_{bC} are the error terms. The vector X_{bC} controls for the size of the new-neighbor network for the relevant racial or educational category on block b. In particular, these covariates are the maxima of their individual-level counterparts in Equation 3, X_i, over each block-race or block-education group, bC. The vector of parameters of interest, α_1, indirectly measures the homophilic impacts of racial or education segregation at the place of residence on employment via neighbor networks. As such, comparing the signs and the magnitudes of the elements of α_1 with those of their individual-level counterparts in the previous section can help answer two important questions: are homophily and in-group competition both present?, and if so, which of these factors drives the net effects of residential segregation on neighbor-based job search captured in Equation 3?

4 Plausibility of identification and summary statistics

4.1 Plausibility of identification

How credible is the within-block-group identification strategy? Consider for example the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana (California) metropolitan area. As of December 2009, this urban sprawl is made up of two counties: Los Angeles County and Orange County. Using the Census Bureau's public shapefiles, Figure 2 maps the first enumerated census tract of each county:[21] the constituent block groups are demarcated by the black lines and the blocks within each block group by the gray lines. The block groups that comprise each tract are similar both in area and in the number of member blocks. The block groups are approximately rectangular-shaped and so are many of the member blocks. To be clear, these geometric patterns are not necessarily common to the other tracts in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana or to the remaining metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, within a tract (block group), the block groups (blocks) are comparable in population. This is unsurprising given that similarity in population size is a primary criterion used by the Census Bureau to determine administrative divisions for statistical purposes.

For the whole sample of 20 selected CBSA, Figure 3 plots the distribution of block groups by number of blocks. About three quarters of the block groups have 30 or fewer blocks each and just over half of all of the block groups contain at most 20 blocks each. The average number of blocks per block group is 28.6. While this number is larger than that for the Boston metropolitan area studied in Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008, the block groups and blocks in my 20-metropolis sample are still small both in terms of land area and in terms of worker population. The typical block group and block cover a land area of 7.3 and 0.2 square kilometers (or 2.8 and 0.08 square miles), respectively. Figure 4 plots the distribution of blocks by number of workers (regardless of age and incumbent/mover status) in the **RS**. Close to 73% of the blocks have 50 or fewer workers each. The average number of workers per block is approximately 45.8. Taken together, these geographical and demographic facts suggest that block groups are small enough as reference areas to hinder selection into blocks

21. The first enumerated census tract refers to the tract with the smallest tract code in the county as designated in the Decennial Census 2010. To enhance visibility, I only illustrate the first tract. For completeness, all blocks and block groups, including those not retained in the estimation samples, are included.

Figure 2 CBSA: Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA
First enumerated census tract by county

Los Angeles County, CA: Tract no. 101110

Orange County, CA: Tract no. 001101



Notes: Each map is the layout of the first enumerated census tract in the indicated county and CBSA, as of Decennial Census 2010. The tract is partitioned into block groups whose boundaries are marked by the black lines. Each block group is in turn subdivided into blocks whose boundaries are given by the gray lines.

within a block group.

More rigorously, I follow Schmutte 2015's regression-based approach to check for the *prima facie* plausibility of the within-block-group identification strategy. Fixing an observable characteristic, I first calculate for each worker in the **RS** the average of this characteristic across all other workers on the same block. I then randomly select one worker from each block.[22] Finally, I regress the individual characteristics on the average neighbor characteristics, with and without block group indicators. The adjusted R^2 statistics from these regressions are reported in Table 2. As seen in Column 1, individual race and nativity status are positively correlated with neighbor race and nativity status, respectively. However, these correlations are driven by between-block group variation. The addition of the block group dummies in Column 2 attenuates the own-neighbor correlations in terms of race and nativity toward zero. The same can be said of the remaining characteristics (gender, age, real earnings, and education), although for these attributes, the correlations before controlling for block groups are already small.[23]

22. I select one observation per block to avoid the bias that would arise if all workers on a block were included in the estimation. The bias stems from a mechanical negative correlation between individual and average neighbor characteristics: a worker is counted as a neighbor for everyone else on the same block, but not for themselves. Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008 discuss this point in greater detail.

23. This matches the stylized fact that residential segregation operates primarily along racial lines. The other characteristics are either harder to observe before location selection or less salient to residential sorting than race.

Figure 3 **BS**: Distribution of block groups by number of constituent blocks



Notes: Using Decennial Census 2010's graphical delineation, this figure displays the distribution of the block groups in the **BS** by the total number of blocks that they contain *in reality*, i.e., including blocks with fewer than five addresses or without any sampled workers. All frequencies are rounded according to the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules.

Figure 4 **BS**: Distribution of blocks by number of workers per block



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of blocks in the **BS** by the number of all workers per block. All frequencies are rounded according to the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules.

TABLE 2 **RS**: Sorting within block groups, R^2 method

Control for block groups	Adjusted R^2	
	No	Yes
	(1)	(2)
Female	0.002	0.004
Age	0.043	0.011
Native	0.181	0.020
Real earnings (2018$)	0.031	0.002
Race		
White	0.373	0.040
Black	0.407	0.057
Asian	0.205	0.039
Hispanic	0.315	0.031
Education		
Below high school	0.042	0.002
High school	0.008	0.000
Some college	0.001	0.000
College and above	0.060	0.002
N	558,000	

Notes: This table illustrates the extent of sorting within block groups. From the **RS** that satisfies the geographical restrictions described in the main text, one worker is selected randomly from each block. Each entry is the adjusted R^2 from a regression of the randomly selected individual's characteristic on the fraction of same-block neighbors who share this characteristic or the average of this characteristic across all same-block neighbors. Column 2 controls for block group-specific effects so that the reported R^2 in this column are the adjusted within-R^2 from the relevant regressions.

Recall that my identification strategy interlaces the spatial within-block-group comparison with a mover-stayer design. I thus repeat the above exercise in the **IS** to examine the correlations between incumbent characteristics and the averages of the same characteristics across their new neighbors.[24] Table 3 reports the adjusted R^2 results. The estimates are much smaller than their equivalents in Table 2. More important, the takeaway remains unchanged: within a block group, incumbent characteristics exhibit little to no correlations

24. I randomly select one worker per block in the **IS**, just like in the **RS**, to be able to compare the results from the two samples. This random selection is not necessary *per se* in the **IS** as the R^2 test using this sample is not subjected to the same bias as that using the **RS**.

with average mover characteristics. Finally, Table A1 in the appendix replicates the R^2 test in the **MS**, swapping the role of the incumbent and that of the mover, and reaches a similar conclusion. While the R^2 test can only use observable variables, hence, does not constitute a proof of exogeneity for unobservables, its reassuring results on the observables lend credence to my identification strategy.

TABLE 3 **IS**: Sorting within block groups, R^2 method

	Adjusted R^2	
Control for block groups	No (1)	Yes (2)
Female	0.000	−0.000
Age	0.009	0.001
Native	0.100	0.002
Real earnings (2018$)	0.006	0.000
Race		
White	0.280	0.007
Black	0.323	0.014
Asian	0.109	0.004
Hispanic	0.225	0.005
Education		
Below high school	0.015	0.000
High school	0.002	0.000
Some college	0.000	−0.000
College and above	0.022	0.000
N	514,000	

Notes: This table illustrates the extent of sorting within block groups. From the **IS** that satisfies the geographical restrictions described in the main text, one worker is selected randomly from each block. Each entry is the adjusted R^2 from a regression of the randomly selected individual's characteristic on the fraction of same-block new neighbors (movers) who share this characteristic or the average of this characteristic across all same-block new neighbors (movers). Column 2 controls for block group-specific effects so that the reported R^2 in this column are the adjusted within-R^2 from the relevant regressions.

4.2 Summary statistics

Table 4 describes the sample of primary interest: the individual sample of approximately 3.2 million incumbent residents who take up a new job in 2011. For each characteristic in the leftmost column, the mean, the standard deviation, and three quasi-quartiles are reported.[25] The sample is largely balanced in terms of gender. Close to 80% of the workers were born in the US. In terms of age, the sample is neither too young nor too old: the average and (quasi)median age are both about 35 years. For an individual, annual earnings is the sum of pays across all SEIN that employ the worker at any time of the year. Earnings is deflated using a seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index and 2018 as the base year. In 2010, the average real earnings across incumbent residents is just shy of $29,000 (in 2018$), but the (quasi)median real earnings is much lower at around $17,000; overall, the distribution of real earnings is rather disperse. Compared to the overall population in the **RS** (see Appendix Table A2), the incumbent residents are on average younger and earn less.

With regard to race, just over half of the **IS** identify as White. The sample includes a sizable portion of Hispanics (24%) and Asians (8%). This is to be anticipated given that Miami (Florida), Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Jose (California) account for most of the sample size. The first two cities are known for large Hispanic populations while the last three are popular destinations among Asians. As for education, as of the 2014 snapshot of the LEHD, over a half of the sampled incumbent residents have at least some college education. A quarter are high school graduates and the remaining one-fifth have attained even less schooling. These racial and educational distributions in the **IS** are similar to the racial and educational compositions of the overall population in the **RS**.

While there is much variation in race and schooling across individuals, most workers in either sample are neighbors with members from multiple racial and educational groups. Since segregation is measured using the entire population of workers regardless of incumbent/mover status, the remainder of this section will center on the **RS**. As shown in Table A2 and complemented by Panel A of Figure 5, about 60% of the workers live on a block with at least four races; consequently, the typical worker lives in close proximity with members of three other races. By contrast, the distribution of *blocks* by racial representation is not as right-skewed as that of individual workers (Panel A of Figure 6). This should come as no surprise: probabilistically, the chance of encountering different races is greater in dense

25. For data privacy and confidentiality reasons, the Census Bureau prohibits release of true quantiles, but allows disclosure of quasi-quantiles in publication. In practice, I calculate a quasi-quartile of a variable by first identifying the true quartile, then extracting 10 observations whose variable values are closest to this true value (five observations on either side), and finally taking the average of the variable in question over this 11-observation neighborhood (the true quartile plus its 10 nearest neighbors).

TABLE 4 **IS**: Summary statistics

	Mean	SD	"Q1"	"Q2"	"Q3"
Female	0.48	0.50	0	0	1
Age	35.32	12.33	24	34	46
Native	0.79	0.41	1	1	1
Real earnings (2018$)	28,720	77,890	6015	16,560	35,720
Race					
White	0.55	0.50	0	1	1
Black	0.11	0.32	0	0	0
Asian	0.08	0.27	0	0	0
Hispanic	0.24	0.42	0	0	0
Education					
Below high school	0.18	0.38	0	0	0
High school	0.26	0.44	0	0	1
Some college	0.31	0.46	0	0	1
College and above	0.25	0.44	0	0	1
Residential Segregation					
No. of racial groups/block	3.88	1.18	3	4	5
No. of educational groups/block	3.96	0.20	4	4	4
Individual racial SI	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.04
Individual educ SI	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.04
N	3,203,000				

Notes: This table summarizes the characteristics of the workers in the **IS**. "Q1," "Q2," and "Q3," are the pseudo first quartile, pseudo median, and pseudo third quartile, respectively. The pseudo statistics are close to the true statistics and calculated according to the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules. All counts and estimates are rounded for the same reason. Except for age, real earnings, numbers of racial/educational groups per block, and segregation indices, all other variables are binary.

blocks than in less populous ones. Regarding education, almost 90% of the sampled blocks are fully mixed (Panel B of Figure 6). Consequently, almost all workers in the sample are neighbors with someone from each of the other educational groups (Panel B of Figure 5).

However, the simple counts of racial and educational groups on a block only paint a crude—if not naïve—picture of racial and educational representation at the place of residence. At the individual level, the mean racial (educational) SI is 0.04 (0.03) and the (quasi)median racial (educational) SI is 0.02 (0.02). Both metrics are similarly and highly disperse with a corresponding standard deviation of 0.06 and 0.04. Taking a closer look at the overall population **RS**, Figure 7 plots the kernel distributions of individual SI separately by race and by education. For the most common races (White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic), Panel A shows that the distributions of individual racial SI are remarkably similar. All are skewed to the left: many individuals are relatively racially integrated with an SI below the sample-wide (quasi)median value of 0.02. However, a non-trivial proportion of the workers are highly segregated; the 95^{th} percentile of each distribution exceeds 0.1—five times as high as the median value. Like Panel A, Panel B demonstrates an apparent similarity in the distributional shape of the individual SI across educational groups. However, the workers in the **RS** are less segregated by education than by race. A larger proportion of them have an educational SI below the sample-wide median value of 0.02 and the 95^{th} percentile of each distribution hovers around 0.08, or four times the (quasi)median value.

For a racial or educational group, the block SSI aggregates the individual SI of the workers in that group. Figure 8 plots the the kernel distributions of block racial SSI and block educational SSI separately by category. As evident in Panel A, racial segregation is more pronounced at the block level: the distributions of the block racial SSI for the four most common races are flat relative to their individual-level counterparts, although these distributions are similar across races, especially among minorities. By contrast, the distributions of block educational SSI shown in Panel B are dissimilar. Interestingly, less educated workers live on more integrated blocks than more educated workers: the distributions of block SSI for the lowest educational levels, Below High School and High School, are to the left of and peak higher than those for Some College and College and Above. All in all, figures 7 and 8 give a more nuanced account of integration (or the lack thereof): there is much more to residential segregation than suggested by the simplistic tallies of racial and educational groups represented on a block.

Figure 5 **RS**: Distribution of workers by number of racial and educational groups per block

(a) Panel A (b) Panel B



Notes: Panel A displays the distribution of workers in the **RS** who live on a block with 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 racial groups. Panel B displays the distribution of workers in the **RS** who live on a block with 1, 2, 3, or 4 educational groups. All frequencies are rounded according to the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules.

Figure 6 **RS**: Distribution of blocks by number of racial and educational groups per block

(a) Panel A



(b) Panel B



Notes: Panel A displays the distribution of blocks in the **RS** with 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 racial groups. Panel B displays the distribution of blocks in the **RS** with 1, 2, 3, or 4 educational groups.

Figure 7 **IS**: Distribution of individual segregation index

(a) Panel A



(b) Panel B



Notes: Panels A and B show the distribution of individual-level segregation by race and education, respectively. The SI are calculated using "block" as the unit of neighborhood so that individuals who live on the same block as a worker are their neighbors. Among these neighbors, those who live within 100 meters from the worker are considered their immediate contacts. The Gaussian kernel function is used to estimate the densities. The top and bottom 5% of each distribution are winsorized and the bandwidths are suppressed per the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules.

FIGURE 8 **BS**: Distribution of block segregation index

(a) Panel A



(b) Panel B



Notes: Panels A and B show the distribution of block-level segregation by race and education, respectively. The SI are calculated using "block" as the unit of neighborhood so that individuals who live on the same block as a worker are their neighbors. Among these neighbors, those who live within 100 meters from the worker are considered their immediate contacts. The Gaussian kernel function is used to estimate the densities. The top and bottom 5% of each distribution are winsorized and the bandwidths are suppressed per the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules.

5 Results

5.1 Detecting coworkership with neighbors

This section reports the results of the pairwise analysis aimed to establish the presence of job referrals likely due to neighbor networks and investigate if this use of neighbor networks for informal job search is stratified by individual characteristics. The sample of estimation is the **PS**, the random sample of pairs of stayers and movers in the same block group of residence. My random selection results in 116.5 million such dyads. Table 5 decomposes this sample by pair characteristics. About 5% of the pairs live on the same block. Unsurprisingly, the sample is balanced in terms of gender and earnings quartiles.[26] The racial composition of the **PS** reflects that of the population of workers (**RS**): White is the most common in both racially homogenous and mixed pairs, followed by Hispanic. Finally, there are more pairs in which at least one worker is highly educated (at least some college) than pairs of less educated workers. This is again consistent with the educational composition of the **RS** documented in Table A2.

26. The earnings quartiles are determined with respect to the metro-wide distribution of real earnings in 2010.

Table 5 **PS**: Composition of random pairs residing in same block group

	Percentage
Residential location	
Reside on different blocks	94.63
Previous coworkership	
Not former coworkers	98.41
Birthplace	
Both non-native	5.91
Native × Non-native	25.82
Both native	68.27
Gender	
Both female	23.66
Female × Male	49.85
Both male	26.49
Real earnings	
Both first quartile	12.26
First quartile × Second quartile	18.50
First quartile × Third quartile	14.17
First quartile × Fourth quartile	12.07
Both second quartile	7.21
Second quartile × Third quartile	11.02
Second quartile × Fourth quartile	8.56
Both third quartile	4.41
Third quartile × Fourth quartile	7.43
Both fourth quartile	4.38
Race	
Both White	43.81
White × Black	7.88
White × Asian	6.22
White × Hispanic	15.64
White × Other race	2.30
Both Black	4.27
Black × Asian	1.01
Black × Hispanic	3.88
Black × Other race	0.39
Both Asian	1.56
Asian × Hispanic	3.03
Asian × Other race	0.36
Both Hispanic	8.82

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Hispanic × Other race	0.78
Both other race	0.06
Education	
Both below high school	3.45
Below high school × High school	8.93
Below high school × Some college	10.34
Below high school × College and above	7.36
Both high school	7.11
High school × Some college	16.49
High school × College and above	12.65
Both some college	9.88
Some college × College and above	16.07
Both college and above	7.72
N	116,500,000

Notes: This table characterizes the random **PS**: each entry is the percentage of random stayer-mover pairs that satisfy the condition in the leftmost column. Real earnings are in 2018$ and real earnings quartiles are based on the distribution of real earnings in the CBSA of residence.

Table 6 presents the regression results of estimating equations 1 and 2, where coworkership is defined using the first restriction on firm locations: the common firm is located outside the pair's block group of residence. For ease of exposition, all of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. Column 1 reports the estimates for the baseline specification, Equation 1, with block group dummies but without pair controls. The coefficient on *Same block* indicates that conditional on taking up a new job in 2011, an incumbent resident is 0.04 pp more likely to join a firm that has employed a new neighbor on the same block than another firm that has employed a mover on another block in the same block group. This coworkership plausibly signals a referral given the conservative construction of the dependent variable. Since the average likelihood of coworkership across all pairs in the sample is only 0.18 pp, an estimate of 0.04 pp represents 20% of this sample mean. Put into perspective, thus, the coefficient on *Same block* demonstrates that residing on the same block raises the probability of future coworkership for a pair of workers, but also indicates that this increase is economically significant.

Column 2 adds pair characteristics in terms of demographics and coworkership history. There are signs of homophily at large: within a block group, coworkership is more likely among pairs of workers who are former coworkers, are of the same gender, were born in the same country or region, are of the same race, and have attained the same level of education.

Among pairs on the same block, the evidence is even stronger along two dimensions: race and former coworkership. The coefficient on the interaction between *Same block* and *Same race* or *Former coworkers* is both positive and much larger than that on *Same race* or *Former coworkers* alone. On the contrary, educational homophily appears to be no more intense on the same block than off-blocks.

Column 3 breaks down the pair demographic characteristics in Column 2. This column utilizes comprehensive information on the individual's race, education, gender, and nativity status[27] to admit all combinations of own and neighbor category along each dimension. The omitted demographic group consists of pairs of workers who are not former coworkers, are both White, both female, both native, and neither has completed high school. For this reference group, Column 3 indicates a 0.06 pp increase in the probability that the incumbent resident will join the firm that employs a mover on the same block than off-blocks—greater than the baseline estimate in Column 1. In addition, the coefficients on former coworkership are virtually identical to those in Column 2.

Most important, Column 3 both confirms the existence and the patterns of homophily uncovered in Column 2. Racial homophily is pronounced: the coefficients on the terms indicating racial homogeneity (e.g., both Black and both Asian) are positive and significant. Moreover, the interactions of these terms with block coresidence, *Same block*, are positive though mostly insignificant. By contrast, the coefficients on the cross-race terms are insignificant both when these terms stand alone and when they are interacted with *Same block*. This suggests that racial homophily, when measured at granular levels, is similar whether the stayer and the mover in a pair live on the same block or on different blocks. The picture is flipped for education. For the block group at large, there is rather evidence of *heterophily*: the coefficients on the cross-type terms are positive, significant, and generally greater than those on the same-type terms. Further interacting the detailed educational mixes with block coresidence does not change these patterns.

Robustness. I test the sensitivity of the results discussed thus far in several ways. Two involve redefining the outcome. First, I strip off any former coworkership so that the binary dependent variable is equal to 1 only if the stayer and the mover in a pair have never been observed to be coworkers until after the mover arrives on their current block. Second, I switch to the alternative restriction on firm locations: the common firm is located at least 22 km from the the workers' addresses. I then repeat the above analysis using these alternative definitions, dropping redundant regressors where necessary. The estimates are are reported in

27. Given the sheer number of countries of birth in the data, I substitute birth country with the dummy of having been born in the US to streamline the analysis.

appendix tables A3-A5. Given the change in the definition of coworkership, the coefficients in these tables are slightly smaller in magnitude than their equivalents in Table 6. Nonetheless, the general patterns—signs and significances—are preserved. Likewise, while not reported, clustering standard errors at a less conservative level, block instead of block group as in the presented output, does not alter the conclusions drawn from Table 6. Taking stock, this section yields robust evidence that neighbor networks are indeed a channel through which informal job search operates and that this use of neighbors is stratified by individual characteristics, especially by race and to a lesser extent, by education. These results provide a firm foundation for the main analysis that follows.

Table 6 Main results—**PS**: Detect referrals

	CW_1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Same block	0.037***	0.011*	0.057***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.015)
Former coworkers		0.142***	0.141***
		(0.012)	(0.012)
Same block × Former coworkers		0.424***	0.422***
		(0.035)	(0.035)
Same race		0.032***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same race		0.015***	
		(0.004)	
Same educ		0.007***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same educ		−0.003	
		(0.005)	
Same birth country		0.044***	
		(0.002)	
Same block × Same birth country		0.011*	
		(0.004)	
Same gender		0.048***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same gender		0.002	
		(0.004)	
Self: White × Neighbor: Black			−0.053***
			(0.015)
Self: White × Neighbor: Asian			0.008
			(0.011)
Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic			−0.016
			(0.009)
Self: White × Neighbor: Other race			−0.039
			(0.025)
Self: Black × Neighbor: White			0.003
			(0.027)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Black			0.061*
			(0.030)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian			0.043
			(0.029)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic			0.015
			(0.027)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: White			0.025
			(0.027)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black			0.007

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	(0.030)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian	0.097***
	(0.028)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.028
	(0.027)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	0.033
	(0.025)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	0.012
	(0.028)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.053*
	(0.026)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.061*
	(0.025)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Black	0.003
	(0.012)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Asian	−0.018
	(0.011)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.010
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Other race	−0.015
	(0.018)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: White	−0.016
	(0.012)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Black	0.006
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian	−0.060**
	(0.023)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.018
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Other race	0.057
	(0.052)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: White	0.004
	(0.011)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black	−0.033
	(0.027)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian	0.028
	(0.016)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.024
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Other race	0.033
	(0.044)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	−0.006
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	−0.014
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.019

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	(0.013)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.027**
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Other race	−0.020
	(0.029)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: White	−0.004
	(0.019)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Black	0.042
	(0.059)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Asian	0.053
	(0.040)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.039
	(0.030)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Other race	0.185
	(0.116)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	−0.004
	(0.004)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.018***
	(0.004)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.044***
	(0.004)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	0.027***
	(0.004)
Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	0.025***
	(0.003)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	0.014***
	(0.003)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school	0.018***
	(0.004)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school	0.018***
	(0.003)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college	0.012***
	(0.003)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	−0.003
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	0.010
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.002
	(0.016)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	0.011
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	−0.006
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	0.001
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.015

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			(0.014)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school			−0.013
			(0.014)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school			−0.012
			(0.014)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college			−0.023
			(0.013)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: College and above			−0.026
			(0.014)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Below high school			−0.034*
			(0.015)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: High school			−0.026
			(0.014)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Some college			−0.020
			(0.014)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: College and above			−0.018
			(0.014)
Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.050***
			(0.003)
Same block × Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.020*
			(0.010)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Native			−0.041***
			(0.010)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.015
			(0.010)
Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			−0.095***
			(0.002)
Same block × Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			0.006
			(0.006)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Female			−0.007
			(0.006)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Male			0.002
			(0.006)
Block group & individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.184	0.184	0.184
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.032	0.032
N	116,500,000		

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equations 1–2 on the **PS** of workers who reside in the same block group: one worker in the pair is an incumbent resident on their current block as of 2010 and the other is a mover who just relocates to their current block in 2010. The dependent variable, CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, the incumbent resident starts working in the firm that has employed the mover in 2010; and (2) this firm is located outside the pair's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted categories of race, education, gender, nativity status are white, below high school, female, and native, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

5.2 Residential segregation and individual likelihood of coworkership with neighbors

Does residential segregation affect the probability of coworkership with neighbors? The dyadic estimates seem to suggest that segregation would increase this likelihood. However, it is not straightforward to extrapolate from the analysis of stayer-mover pairs to individual incumbents. The first only involves a collection of separate links (an incumbent resident and one new neighbor at a time) whereas the second puts these links in a network (the incumbent resident and all of their block neighbors). By virtue of their positions in the encompassing network, the other individuals, though not part of a pair, may nonetheless indirectly influence the pair's work relationship. Estimation of Equation 3 on the **IS** indeed reveals a subtle answer.

Race. Table 7 summarizes the findings for racial segregation on the extensive margin. A given incumbent resident may or may not be a former coworker of a new neighbor. For each stayer, the first two columns make no distinction among the new neighbors in this respect while the last two columns exclude any former coworkers. Within each type, the new neighbors are further classified by race, with a subgroup only consisting of the incumbent's coethnics. The dependent variable is $Has\ \boldsymbol{CW}_1$, an indicator for whether the stayer later joins the firm of any movers in the indicated network. Herein, the subscript, 1, refers to the condition on firm locations (1) used in constructing these outcomes. The coefficients and relevant statistics in the columns with $Has\ \boldsymbol{CW}_1$ as the heading are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. Each column controls for the size of the relevant network and individual observables (female, native, age, age squared, and education). All specifications include block group fixed effects to account for residential sorting at the block group level. To facilitate comparison, Figure 9 plots the key estimates: the coefficients on the interaction terms between race and the individual SI, centered in their 95% confidence intervals (CI).

Table 7 Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$ (1)	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$ (2)	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$ (3)	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$ (4)
Black	1.641***	0.957***	1.560***	0.927***
	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.061)	(0.072)
Asian	0.184**	−0.201**	0.275***	−0.063
	(0.060)	(0.076)	(0.057)	(0.072)
Hispanic	0.387***	0.027	0.444***	0.132*
	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.058)
Other race	0.322***	−0.837***	0.346***	−0.684***
	(0.086)	(0.123)	(0.083)	(0.117)
White × Individual racial SI	−2.396***	−1.364***	−1.990***	−1.080***
	(0.211)	(0.290)	(0.201)	(0.277)
Black × Individual racial SI	−11.470***	−7.617***	−10.800***	−7.333***
	(0.772)	(0.654)	(0.742)	(0.618)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−2.595**	−0.515	−2.733**	−0.949
	(0.902)	(0.619)	(0.870)	(0.590)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−3.864***	−1.647***	−4.042***	−2.045***
	(0.516)	(0.418)	(0.488)	(0.391)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−6.172***	0.258	−5.859***	−0.449
	(1.729)	(0.766)	(1.692)	(0.759)
No. of new neighbors	0.067***		0.064***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.083***		0.078***
		(0.006)		(0.005)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.683	2.376	3.377	2.145
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.041	0.045	0.036
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE 9 Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

(a) Panel A: All new neighbors (b) Panel B: All same-race new neighbors (c) Panel C: New neighbors, not former coworkers (d) Panel D: Same-race new neighbors, not former coworkers

Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × race in Table 7. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

The effects of racial segregation are negative across the board. Regardless of the stayer's race, the more segregated they are, the less likely they are to take up a job in any mover's firm. The largest reduction is found for Blacks. In Panel A, a one-unit increase in individual segregation lowers the probability of becoming a new neighbor's coworker by 11.5 pp for Blacks. The declines are much smaller for the other races, hovering around 2-4 pp. To put these estimates into perspective, the average probability of working with new block neighbors in the sample is 3.7 pp (see the bottom part of Table 7). Moreover, the effects are concentrated in coworkership with new neighbors of the same race. The estimates when coworkership is restricted to coethnics, summarized in Panel B, are of the same sign and more than half as large as their counterparts in Panel A. Finally, excluding former coworkers from an incumbent resident's new neighbor networks leaves these conclusions intact: the estimates in panels C and D are close those in the previous two panels. This suggests that neither reverse causality nor misidentification of job search via other social connections as neighbor networking is a cause for concern.

Estimating the conditional logit variant of Equation 3 with the binary outcome *Has* $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$ yields qualitatively similar conclusions, corroborating the robustness of the linear probability estimates. As shown in Table 8, the logistic estimates of the effects of racial segregation are all negative. Again, Blacks experience the largest average marginal effects, at least 1.5 times greater than what is observed for the other races. As for the intensive margin, Table 9 reports the results from estimating the Poisson model of Equation 3. The dependent variable, *No.* $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, counts the number of new neighbors in the indicated network that the incumbent resident later becomes coworkers of. The average marginal effects, shown at the bottom of the table, are generally negative but small in magnitude. All are less than one. The impacts of racial segregation on neighbor-based job search are thus mainly driven by the extensive margin.

Table 8 Main results—**IS** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	35.550***	27.020***	36.780***	28.240***
	(1.393)	(2.138)	(1.438)	(2.224)
Asian	7.408***	−24.960***	11.060***	−19.530***
	(1.864)	(3.203)	(1.919)	(3.333)
Hispanic	11.260***	−2.035	14.180***	3.036
	(1.231)	(1.822)	(1.268)	(1.884)
Other race	7.645**	−168.300***	9.109***	−171 ***
	(2.405)	(7.579)	(2.500)	(8.176)
White × Individual racial SI	−179.200***	−116.600***	−175.500***	−113.600***
	(11.150)	(11.430)	(11.580)	(11.910)
Black × Individual racial SI	−332.800***	−335.300***	−345 ***	−362.300***
	(32.220)	(40.750)	(34.220)	(44.400)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−322.100***	−397.200***	−334.300***	−433.900***
	(57.470)	(100.200)	(60.110)	(108.200)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−260.400***	−259.600***	−284.900***	−301 ***
	(26.500)	(35.040)	(27.910)	(37.980)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−249.900**	253.200**	−247.200**	256.400*
	(79.140)	(91.970)	(82.140)	(100.300)
No. of new neighbors	1.068***		1.084***	
	(0.031)		(0.032)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		1.708***		1.737***
		(0.060)		(0.061)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.683	2.376	3.377	2.145
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−31.990	−20.720	−28.290	−18.020
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−66.760	−64.480	−63.920	−63.150
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−57.960	−58.810	−55.270	−57.790
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−48.140	−44.480	−48.240	−46.770
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−45.580	16.330	−41.130	13.620
Pseudo R^2	0.037	0.044	0.040	0.046
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

continued ...

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9 Main results—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	No. CW_1 (1)	No. CW_1 (2)	No. CW_1 (3)	No. CW_1 (4)
Black	0.300***	0.258***	0.311***	0.279***
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.030)
Asian	0.200***	0.002	0.247***	0.071
	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.058)	(0.076)
Hispanic	0.120*	−0.020	0.158**	0.043
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.037)
Other race	0.065	−1.814***	0.080	−1.830***
	(0.040)	(0.104)	(0.043)	(0.108)
White × Individual racial SI	−2.030***	−1.389***	−1.868***	−1.273***
	(0.167)	(0.157)	(0.170)	(0.159)
Black × Individual racial SI	−3.530***	−4.165***	−3.545***	−4.390***
	(0.395)	(0.501)	(0.413)	(0.547)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−4.703***	−8.482***	−4.906***	−8.971***
	(1.071)	(1.803)	(1.134)	(1.915)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−3.430***	−3.436***	−3.641***	−3.870***
	(0.728)	(0.556)	(0.781)	(0.638)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−2.375*	3.413***	−2.238*	3.197***
	(0.937)	(0.841)	(0.947)	(0.889)
No. of new neighbors	0.011***		0.012***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.016***		0.016***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.061	0.035	0.055	0.031
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.138	−0.067	−0.114	−0.055
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.313	−0.242	−0.284	−0.231
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.368	−0.348	−0.359	−0.347
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.255	−0.154	−0.250	−0.163
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−0.171	0.032	−0.147	0.026
Pseudo R^2	0.220	0.189	0.209	0.174
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, No. CW_1, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Education. Table 10 tabulates the findings on educational segregation on the extensive margin. Figure 10 plots the key estimates: the coefficients on the interaction terms between education and individual SI and the associated 95% CI. Irrespective of levels of schooling, the effects of educational segregation on the binary measure of coworkership with block neighbors, *Has* $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, are negative. A one-unit increase in individual segregation decreases an incumbent resident's probability of joining a new neighbor's firm by 3-6 pp. In particular, the lower the level of schooling, the greater the decline. These reductions are economically meaningful against an average probability of 3.7 pp in the sample. Unlike racial segregation, however, the observed effects for education are not primarily attributed to in-group networking. The estimates in Panel B, where coworkership is confined to be between stayers and movers with the same level of educational attainment, are only a quarter as large as those in Panel A. Panels C and D do not materially change the conclusions reached with panels A and B. Neither does reformulating Equation 3 as a conditional logit model (see Table 11). Finally, like racial segregation, for the most part, educational segregation affects neighbor-based job search on the extensive margin. The Poisson estimates with count outcomes in Table 12 are negative, consistent with the results thus far. Yet for all levels of schooling, the average marginal effects are small and less than one.

Table 10 Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−0.101*	−0.004	−0.082	0.019
	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.027)
Some college	−0.164***	−0.007	−0.155***	0.001
	(0.044)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.027)
College and above	−0.046	0.076*	−0.102*	−0.002
	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.027)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−5.911***	−1.243**	−5.918***	−1.634***
	(0.743)	(0.450)	(0.713)	(0.416)
High school × Individual educ SI	−4.800***	−0.712*	−4.611***	−1.059***
	(0.460)	(0.291)	(0.441)	(0.273)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−4.047***	−0.782**	−3.722***	−0.878***
	(0.402)	(0.264)	(0.382)	(0.248)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−3.285***	−0.841**	−2.255***	−0.170
	(0.442)	(0.290)	(0.416)	(0.265)
No. of new neighbors	0.067***		0.064***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.110***		0.101***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.683	1.398	3.377	1.251
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.033	0.045	0.027
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 10 Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

(a) Panel A: All new neighbors

(b) Panel B: All same-education new neighbors

(c) Panel C: New neighbors, not former coworkers

(d) Panel D: Same-education new neighbors, not former coworkers

Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × education in Table 10. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.

Table 11 Main results—**IS** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−2.136	0.208	−1.738	1.416
	(1.257)	(2.390)	(1.303)	(2.502)
Some college	−3.105*	4.967*	−3.064*	5.019*
	(1.239)	(2.357)	(1.287)	(2.451)
College and above	0.107	8.633***	−1.778	3.667
	(1.356)	(2.512)	(1.408)	(2.625)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−295.600***	−345.200***	−318.300***	−418.800***
	(32.990)	(63.750)	(34.960)	(69.270)
High school × Individual educ SI	−268.700***	−187.100***	−278.300***	−227.400***
	(22.510)	(35.700)	(23.500)	(38.360)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−288.500***	−228.400***	−295.700***	−246.700***
	(22.070)	(34.490)	(23.050)	(36.390)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−283.500***	−194.900***	−266.800***	−167.200***
	(26.390)	(37.460)	(27.470)	(39.220)
No. of new neighbors	1.066***		1.083***	
	(0.031)		(0.032)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		2.992***		2.987***
		(0.106)		(0.105)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.683	1.398	3.377	1.251
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−54.440	−70.770	−53.230	−77.700
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−49.210	−39.070	−46.430	−43.500
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−52.470	−48.180	−48.890	−47.730
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−52.320	−41.700	−44.590	−32.510
Pseudo R^2	0.037	0.038	0.039	0.040
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12 Main results—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	No. CW_1	No. CW_1	No. CW_1	No. CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	0.014	0.020	0.027	0.033
	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.036)
Some college	−0.027	0.040	−0.027	0.042
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.033)
College and above	0.076	0.214***	0.057	0.166***
	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−3.048***	−3.919***	−3.197***	−4.705***
	(0.495)	(0.778)	(0.525)	(0.796)
High school × Individual educ SI	−3.249***	−2.614***	−3.374***	−2.973***
	(0.478)	(0.508)	(0.510)	(0.546)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−2.964***	−2.286***	−2.861***	−2.356***
	(0.370)	(0.435)	(0.393)	(0.458)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−4.266***	−3.605***	−3.956***	−3.217***
	(0.495)	(0.644)	(0.518)	(0.672)
No. of new neighbors	0.011***		0.012***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.027***		0.027***
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.061	0.019	0.055	0.016
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.222	−0.116	−0.212	−0.127
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.240	−0.081	−0.229	−0.086
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.211	−0.073	−0.186	−0.070
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.328	−0.133	−0.274	−0.106
Pseudo R^2	0.220	0.180	0.209	0.166
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, No. CW_1, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Other robustness checks. As in Section 5.1, I conduct two additional sensitivity tests: one changes the restriction on firm locations used to define coworkership and the other clusters standard errors at the block level as opposed to the block group level. Appendix tables A6-A11 chart the results of the first check. Redefining the outcome changes the benchmark (the average value of the dependent variable) to compare the estimates against. Nevertheless, all of the qualitative observations made above carry over. Similarly, the second sensitivity check[28] confirms that the findings in this section are robust to different ways of clustering standard errors.

5.3 Residential segregation and block likelihood of coworkership with neighbors

Segregation at the individual level makes it less likely that *an individual* takes up a job at any new neighbor's firm. But how does overall segregation at the block level influence the chance of coworkership with neighbors for each race or schooling level as a *group*? Does this effect differ from what has been found at the individual level? If so, what can this disparity tell us about the relative importance of homophily and in-group competition? To answer these questions, I turn to the **BS-R** and **BS-E** samples to estimate Equation 4. Throughout, the outcomes of interest are binary. The baseline dummy is equal to 1 if *any* stayers in a block × race or block × education group join firms that have employed newcomers on the block, and 0 otherwise. The other dummies are variants of this baseline indicator; their definitions are self-explanatory in the tables and figures discussed below.

Race. Using the first restriction on firm locations to define the dependent variables, Table 13 summarizes the results for block × race and Figure 11 visualizes the estimates of interest. Each observation is a racial group on a block: a block appears as few as one time (a completely homogeneous block) and as many as five times (a completely heterogenous block). Again, I first define the neighbor network as comprised of all new neighbors (columns 1 and 2) before restricting attention to only those without previous coworker ties with stayers (columns 3 and 4). Within each type of network, I make another distinction with respect to its racial composition: the odd-numbered columns include new neighbors of any races while the even-numbered columns only count coethnics.

Across all races and blocks, the average probability that any incumbent members of a racial group will become coworkers of any movers (same-race movers) in the sample is about 8 (5) pp. Block segregation remarkably raises these probabilities. In Column 1, a one-unit

28. Results available upon request.

increase in block segregation translates into an 8 pp increase in the chance that any Whites on the block will start working in the same firm as any new block neighbors. The same notch in block segregation leads to an even larger increase, ranging from 17-20 pp, in the same probability for Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics. These estimates halve when only coworkership with coethnics among the new neighbors are considered (see Column 2). Accounting for former coworker ties in columns 3 and 4 makes little change. Finally, reestimating Equation 4 on block × race as a conditional logit model, as in Table 14, unveils even larger impacts of block segregation. Irrespective of races, all of the average marginal effects are positive and double the average linear effects in Table 13.

Table 13 Main results—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−2.833***	0.234	−2.608***	0.445***
	(0.168)	(0.120)	(0.163)	(0.114)
Asian	−4.489***	0.472***	−4.088***	0.784***
	(0.174)	(0.124)	(0.169)	(0.118)
Hispanic	−2.784***	−0.194	−2.509***	0.081
	(0.169)	(0.121)	(0.163)	(0.114)
Other race	−4.096***	0.668***	−3.785***	0.954***
	(0.175)	(0.118)	(0.169)	(0.111)
White × Block racial SI	7.604***	3.733***	7.367***	3.509***
	(0.200)	(0.172)	(0.194)	(0.164)
Black × Block racial SI	19.950***	10.680***	19.070***	9.711***
	(0.381)	(0.355)	(0.372)	(0.345)
Asian × Block racial SI	17.190***	2.116***	16.380***	1.536***
	(0.433)	(0.376)	(0.424)	(0.365)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	18.680***	8.019***	17.790***	7.227***
	(0.288)	(0.278)	(0.280)	(0.268)
Other race × Block racial SI	12.400***	2.651***	11.950***	1.904***
	(1.108)	(0.691)	(1.086)	(0.572)
No. of new neighbors	0.287***		0.280***	
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.653***		0.635***
		(0.013)		(0.013)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	8.702	5.563	8.146	5.146
Adjusted R^2	0.147	0.181	0.144	0.180
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	906,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE 11 Main results—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

(a) Panel A: All new neighbors (b) Panel B: All same-race new neighbors (c) Panel C: New neighbors, not former coworkers (d) Panel D: Same-race new neighbors, not former coworkers

Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × race in Table 13. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

TABLE 14 Main results—**BS-R** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−36.960***	−5.632	−35.790***	−1.537
	(2.999)	(4.370)	(3.100)	(4.604)
Asian	−84.850***	−53.550***	−81.970***	−45.020***
	(3.503)	(5.266)	(3.607)	(5.498)
Hispanic	−42.760***	−29.820***	−40.870***	−22.370***
	(3.134)	(4.571)	(3.231)	(4.773)
Other race	−83.460***	−139.300***	−82.490***	−136.300***
	(3.795)	(8.092)	(3.916)	(8.649)
White × Block racial SI	130.900***	155.900***	133.900***	164.800***
	(3.512)	(4.894)	(3.625)	(5.102)
Black × Block racial SI	282.700***	295.300***	286.100***	300.400***
	(5.003)	(6.559)	(5.157)	(6.873)
Asian × Block racial SI	308 ***	258.400***	308.100***	255.900***
	(6.994)	(9.888)	(7.198)	(10.290)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	273.700***	279.300***	275.600***	281.400***
	(4.210)	(5.853)	(4.324)	(6.066)
Other race × Block racial SI	239.400***	359 ***	246.600***	356.300***
	(23.130)	(28)	(23.550)	(25.770)
No. of new neighbors	2.728***		2.726***	
	(0.035)		(0.036)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		6.743***		6.669***
		(0.078)		(0.079)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	8.702	5.563	8.146	5.146
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	23.760	27.320	24.110	28.350
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	42.990	40.550	42.980	40.300
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	52.020	43.400	51.590	42.320
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	43.320	42.600	43.120	41.820
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	45.780	56.850	46.390	56.530
Pseudo R^2	0.147	0.264	0.150	0.269
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	906,000			

continued . . .

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 (“All new neighbors”) vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before (“New neighbors, not former coworkers”), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer’s block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Education. Table 15 (Figure 12) replicates for education what Table 13 (Figure 11) does for race. As seen in Column 1, across all educational groups, higher segregation at the block level unambiguously boosts the probability that any incumbent member will occupy a job in a new neighbor's firm. The impact is the starkest for the lowest level of schooling. A one-unit elevation in block segregation for Below High School leads to a 15 pp increase in the binary outcome *Group Has* CW_1. The same impact shrinks to 6-10 pp for the higher levels of educational attainment. Given that the average value of the dependent variable in the sample is 8 pp, these coefficients are economically large. Moreover, the estimates are virtually unchanged when former coworker ties are excluded, as in columns 3 and 4. Lastly, specifying Equation 4 for block × education as conditional logit instead continues to yield positive and large average marginal effects across all levels of schooling (see Table 16).

Other robustness checks. The usual supplemental sensitivity tests—varying the restriction on firm locations used to define coworkership (see appendix tables A12-A15) and the level of cluster for standard errors[29]—attest to the robustness of the estimates shown in the main text.

29. Results available upon request.

Table 15 Main results—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	1.576***	0.148*	1.514***	0.163**
	(0.106)	(0.060)	(0.102)	(0.058)
Some college	2.031***	0.346***	1.897***	0.280***
	(0.118)	(0.070)	(0.114)	(0.067)
College and above	−0.185	−0.193**	−0.241*	−0.184**
	(0.112)	(0.067)	(0.108)	(0.064)
Below high school × Block educ SI	14.600***	3.937***	13.540***	3.241***
	(0.390)	(0.286)	(0.376)	(0.271)
High school × Block educ SI	7.488***	2.167***	6.850***	1.646***
	(0.306)	(0.206)	(0.295)	(0.196)
Some college × Block educ SI	6.026***	1.172***	5.591***	0.900***
	(0.288)	(0.193)	(0.277)	(0.185)
College and above × Block educ SI	10.390***	2.560***	9.664***	1.902***
	(0.260)	(0.185)	(0.249)	(0.174)
No. of new neighbors	0.311***		0.303***	
	(0.004)		(0.004)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.656***		0.628***
		(0.009)		(0.009)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	7.094	2.842	6.619	2.615
Adjusted R^2	0.160	0.139	0.157	0.134
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE 12 Main results—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × education in Table 15. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 (“All new neighbors”) vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before (“New neighbors, not former coworkers”), and (2) same vs. different education.

Table 16 Main results—**BS-E** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	27.080***	21.740***	27.420***	24.460***
	(2.510)	(4.026)	(2.579)	(4.179)
Some college	34.130***	36.410***	33.070***	35.320***
	(2.799)	(4.470)	(2.881)	(4.639)
College and above	−4.606	13.540**	−6.443*	12.920**
	(2.580)	(4.142)	(2.660)	(4.301)
Below high school × Block educ SI	269.600***	333.800***	266.100***	326.900***
	(6.437)	(9.869)	(6.593)	(10.250)
High school × Block educ SI	166.700***	251.200***	163.400***	238.400***
	(6.405)	(9.498)	(6.592)	(9.832)
Some college × Block educ SI	141.200***	190 ***	141.300***	187.400***
	(6.442)	(9.978)	(6.649)	(10.350)
College and above × Block educ SI	214.400***	221.400***	214.100***	212 ***
	(5.289)	(8.165)	(5.484)	(8.572)
No. of new neighbors	3.007***		2.982***	
	(0.034)		(0.035)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		8.375***		8.224***
		(0.111)		(0.112)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	7.094	2.842	6.619	2.615
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	46.670	55.910	46.280	55.310
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	29.120	42.360	28.620	40.410
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	24.660	32.390	24.810	32.270
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	40.490	40.210	40.740	39.070
Pseudo R^2	0.126	0.169	0.128	0.169
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

5.4 Discussion

Heterogeneity. I briefly summarize the results of regressions similar to those discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3. The key difference lies in the "novelty" of the mover's firm to their new block of residence. Does the mover introduce a new employer to the block or prior to their arrival, has their firm already employed some stayer on the block? In what follows, I exclude existing employers and only consider "first firms" (firms introduced by movers) to redefine the coworkership outcomes. Figures 13-16 are analogous to figures 9-12, respectively, but for these new dependent variables. The estimates for "first firms" only are unsurprisingly smaller than those for "all firms." Nevertheless, the two sets of results agree in signs. This affirms that movers do play a role in connecting incumbent residents to employers, although they may have shared this role with other stayers.

Summary. Taken together, both the main results and the auxiliary estimates paint a consistent picture: residential segregation has subtle effects on employment via neighbor networks. On the one hand, the more segregated an individual stayer is, the less likely that they will join a new neighbor's firm. The magnitude of the impact varies across races (levels of schooling), with the most disadvantaged group—Blacks (Below High School)—experiencing the largest decrease. This is congruous with the stylized fact documented in Chetty et al. 2022b that low-SES individuals make a larger share of their friendships at their places of residence whereas high-SES individuals tend to make more friends outside their residential communities. However, the negative effects flip signs when segregation is measured with respect to the group as whole. At the block level, segregation raises the probability that any given racial (educational) *group* has at least an incumbent member join the same firm as a new neighbor on the block. This contrast—homogeneously positive at the group level, but negative at the individual level—suggests that both homophily and in-group competition coexist. More important, it hints that the second factor drives the net negative effects for the individual.

FIGURE 13   Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × race in Table A16. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

FIGURE 14   Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × education in Table A19. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.

FIGURE 15 Main results—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × race in Table A22. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

FIGURE 16 Main results—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × education in Table A24. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.

6 Conclusion

This paper lies at the intersection of two literatures: informal hiring and neighborhood effects. I embed job search via neighbor networks in the broader context of residential segregation to examine how segregation by race and by education mediates networking with neighbors for employment. To this end, I combine administrative data from the Census Bureau that provide rich information on both the place of work and the place of residence at the individual level. Considering data availability, data quality, and computational costs, I restrict attention to 20 large metropolitan areas in the year 2010. My identification strategy blends a stayer-mover design into a spatial grid. On a block of residence, the first component distinguishes between incumbent residents and movers and zeroes in on the former as potential recipients of job referrals from the latter. The second component then compares hyperlocal neighborhoods (blocks) within a sufficiently small reference area (a block group). The underlying identifying assumptions are that conditioning on the block group, there is no further sorting of individuals at the block level that influences an stayer's choice of workplace following a mover's arrival and that neighbor interactions are hyperlocal in nature. These assumptions are corroborated in the data.

My empirical framework interlocks several building blocks. In a dyadic analysis on a random subset of the main data, I first confirm that within a block group, coworkership is more likely between stayer-mover pairs who live on the same block than between pairs who live on different blocks. This gap is economically substantial, being one-fifth as large as the average coworkership rate among stayer-mover pairs in the same block group. More important, there is evidence of homophily, particularly in terms of race: within a block group, the observed rate of coworkership is higher among pairs of the same race than across races. Homophily, both in race and in education, is similar on- and off-blocks. These observations from the dyadic sample suggest that residential segregation can affect neighbor-based job search.

The remainder of my analysis tests this hypothesis directly. Using the SSI developed by Echenique and Fryer 2007, I measure racial and educational segregation at two levels: block and individual. Starting with the more disaggregate index, I find that within a block group, individual segregation lowers the probability of coworkership with new neighbors among stayers who take up new jobs. Regardless of race and educational attainment, segregated incumbents are less likely to join a new neighbor's firm. Conditional on joining a mover's firm, segregated incumbents are also coworkers of fewer movers. These impacts are the most negative for the most disadvantaged demographics: Blacks and those with less than a high school education. Since my conservative definitions of coworkership permit the interpretation of coworkership as the result of a neighbor-based referral, these findings imply that insofar as gaining employment through new neighbors is concerned, both racial and educational segregation hurt the individual.

At first blush, the presence of homophily, as documented in the dyadic analysis, would suggest that segregation is beneficial to workers. The individual results, however, clearly demonstrate otherwise. What could have given rise to this apparent paradox? It should be noted that segregation stems not only from the connection of similar persons, but from the connection of *many* such persons. While the former ferments homophily, the latter can foment in-group competition for job openings—a scarce resource. To explore the second possibility, I change gears from the *individual* to their racial or educational *group* on the block and relate segregation to coworkership at this higher level. Starkly, the opposite patterns emerge: within a block group, coworkership with new block neighbors is more common on segregated blocks than on more integrated ones. This is true for all races and levels of schooling. The conspicuous contrast in the results at the block level versus those at the individual level hints that internal competition for job opportunities is also at play. A more thorough treatment of this divergence from both theoretical and empirical perspectives is left for future work.

The variegated findings add nuances to policy-making. First, in terms of direction, this paper unveils positive impacts of residential segregation on the employment prospects of at least *someone* in a racial or educational group. Residential segregation creates both "winners" and "losers" notwithstanding: when there are not enough jobs to go round on the block, some stayers receive job referrals from the new neighbors whereas most others do not. The upshot is that the average impacts are negative. This is consistent with the negative relationship between racial segregation and employment found in previous observational studies and with the absence of effects of neighborhood poverty on economic self-sufficiency among adults in the Moving to Opportunity experiments. Compared to this previous literature, my paper makes two points of departure. First, I measure segregation at fine-grained levels and offer a more microscopic look at its effects on individuals. Second, my decision to zoom in on neighbor ties is deliberate: the purpose is to shed light on one probable mechanism through which a worker's neighborhood influences their employment. Nevertheless, my results at the individual level largely agree with the negative estimates in the prior studies. As such, my work enriches and complements the extant literature to further inform policy-making.

In terms of magnitude, the estimated effects of segregation vary significantly with the level of segregation (individual or block) and across races or levels of schooling. This implies that even if one set out to "calibrate" the extent of segregation to promote job search via neighbor networks—a specific, even narrow goal—there would still be no one-size-fits-all solutions. Moreover, this goal may conflict with other socially desirable objectives. While my study focuses on the quantity of jobs obtainable through neighbor contacts, the quality of such jobs also merits investigation. For example, if higher-earning workers pass along higher-paying jobs but only to neighbors similar to themselves, then increasing neighbor-based job search may exacerbate between-group inequality. Such equity implications are beyond the scope of this paper, but appear to be a fruitful avenue for future research.

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Appendices

A Additional tables

TABLE A1 **MS**: Sorting within block groups, R^2 method

Control for block groups	Adjusted R^2 No (1)	Adjusted R^2 Yes (2)
Female	0.000	0.000
Age	0.020	0.004
Native	0.124	0.005
Real earnings (2018$)	0.013	0.000
Race		
White	0.295	0.012
Black	0.323	0.021
Asian	0.136	0.009
Hispanic	0.240	0.008
Education		
Below high school	0.024	0.000
High school	0.004	0.000
Some college	0.000	0.000
College and above	0.036	0.001
N	513,000	

Notes: This table illustrates the extent of sorting within block groups. From the **MS** that satisfies the geographical restrictions described in the main text, one worker is selected randomly from each block. Each entry is the adjusted R^2 from a regression of the randomly selected individual's characteristic on the fraction of same-block new neighbors (incumbent residents) who share this characteristic or the average of this characteristic across all same-block new neighbors (incumbent residents). Column 2 controls for block group-specific effects so that the reported R^2 in this column are the adjusted within-R^2 from the relevant regressions.

Table A2 **RS**: Summary statistics

	Mean	SD	"Q1"	"Q2"	"Q3"
Female	0.49	0.50	0	0	1
Age	40.51	14.44	28	40	52
Native	0.77	0.42	1	1	1
Real earnings (2018$)	38,800	151,000	9941	25,490	48,470
Race					
White	0.58	0.49	0	1	1
Black	0.10	0.30	0	0	0
Asian	0.09	0.29	0	0	0
Hispanic	0.21	0.41	0	0	0
Education					
Below high school	0.16	0.36	0	0	0
High school	0.24	0.43	0	0	0
Some college	0.31	0.46	0	0	1
College and above	0.29	0.46	0	0	1
Residential Segregation					
No. of racial groups/block	3.90	1.18	3	4	5
No. of educational groups/block	3.96	0.22	4	4	4
Individual racial SI	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.05
Individual educ SI	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.04
N	25,560,000				

Notes: This table summarizes the characteristics of the workers in the **RS**. "Q1," "Q2," and "Q3," are the pseudo first quartile, pseudo median, and pseudo third quartile, respectively. The pseudo statistics are close to the true statistics and calculated according to the US Census Bureau's disclosure avoidance rules. All counts and estimates are rounded for the same reason. Except for age, real earnings, numbers of racial/educational groups per block, and segregation indices, all other variables are binary.

TABLE A3 Main results—**PS**: Detect referrals

	$NFCW_1$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Same block	0.027***	0.014***	0.045**
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.014)
Same race		0.027***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same race		0.010*	
		(0.004)	
Same educ		0.005***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same educ		−0.001	
		(0.004)	
Same birth country		0.036***	
		(0.002)	
Same block × Same birth country		0.009*	
		(0.004)	
Same gender		0.043***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same gender		0.001	
		(0.004)	
Self: White × Neighbor: Black			−0.041**
			(0.014)
Self: White × Neighbor: Asian			0.013
			(0.011)
Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic			−0.013
			(0.009)
Self: White × Neighbor: Other race			−0.024
			(0.021)
Self: Black × Neighbor: White			−0.005
			(0.024)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Black			0.047
			(0.027)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian			0.035
			(0.026)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic			0.004
			(0.025)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: White			0.016
			(0.024)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black			0.003
			(0.027)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian			0.082**
			(0.025)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic			0.015

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	(0.024)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	0.024
	(0.022)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	0.011
	(0.025)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.042
	(0.023)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.048*
	(0.022)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Black	0.011
	(0.012)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Asian	−0.014
	(0.010)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.001
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Other race	−0.015
	(0.017)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: White	−0.010
	(0.011)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Black	0.011
	(0.013)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian	−0.042
	(0.023)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.006
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Other race	0.048
	(0.049)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: White	0.003
	(0.011)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black	−0.024
	(0.026)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian	0.027
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.017
	(0.013)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Other race	0.035
	(0.043)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	−0.001
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	−0.010
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.026*
	(0.013)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.023**
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Other race	−0.020

continued . . .

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	(0.026)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: White	−0.006
	(0.018)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Black	0.024
	(0.054)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Asian	0.055
	(0.038)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.034
	(0.028)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Other race	0.238*
	(0.110)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	−0.003
	(0.004)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.013***
	(0.004)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.036***
	(0.004)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	0.022***
	(0.004)
Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	0.021***
	(0.003)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	0.012***
	(0.003)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school	0.014***
	(0.004)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school	0.014***
	(0.003)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college	0.010***
	(0.003)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	−0.003
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	0.008
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.005
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	0.006
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	−0.005
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	0.000
	(0.013)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.017
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school	−0.011
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school	−0.009

continued . . .

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			(0.013)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college			−0.021
			(0.013)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: College and above			−0.021
			(0.013)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Below high school			−0.032*
			(0.014)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: High school			−0.022
			(0.013)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Some college			−0.018
			(0.013)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: College and above			−0.011
			(0.013)
Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.042***
			(0.003)
Same block × Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.009
			(0.009)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Native			−0.030***
			(0.009)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.005
			(0.009)
Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			−0.087***
			(0.002)
Same block × Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			0.003
			(0.006)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Female			−0.007
			(0.006)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Male			−0.002
			(0.006)
Block group & individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.171	0.171	0.171
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.028	0.028
N	116,500,000		

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equations 1–2 on the **PS** of workers who reside in the same block group: one worker in the pair is an incumbent resident on their current block as of 2010 and the other is a mover who just relocates to their current block in 2010. The dependent variable, $NFCW_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, the incumbent resident starts working in the firm that has employed the mover in 2010; (2) the two individuals have not been coworkers prior to 2011; and (3) this firm is located outside the pair's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted categories of race, education, gender, nativity status are white, below high school, female, and native, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4 Robustness checks—**PS**: Detect referrals

	CW_2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Same block	0.014***	0.008***	0.026**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Former coworkers		0.061***	0.061***
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Same block × Former coworkers		0.143***	0.142***
		(0.020)	(0.020)
Same race		0.011***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same race		0.002	
		(0.002)	
Same educ		0.002**	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same educ		−0.000	
		(0.003)	
Same birth country		0.011***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same birth country		0.004	
		(0.002)	
Same gender		0.015***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same gender		−0.002	
		(0.002)	
Self: White × Neighbor: Black			−0.008
			(0.007)
Self: White × Neighbor: Asian			0.012*
			(0.006)
Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic			−0.003
			(0.006)
Self: White × Neighbor: Other race			−0.009
			(0.013)
Self: Black × Neighbor: White			−0.005
			(0.014)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Black			0.022
			(0.016)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian			0.015
			(0.016)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic			0.002
			(0.015)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: White			0.004
			(0.014)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black			0.012

continued . . .

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	(0.016)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian	0.035*
	(0.015)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.007
	(0.015)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	0.010
	(0.013)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	0.013
	(0.014)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.025
	(0.014)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.023
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Black	0.001
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Asian	0.002
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.001
	(0.004)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Other race	0.002
	(0.010)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: White	−0.004
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Black	0.003
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian	−0.021*
	(0.010)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.000
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Other race	−0.002
	(0.025)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: White	0.001
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black	0.003
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian	0.013
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.013
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Other race	−0.003
	(0.020)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	0.008
	(0.005)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	0.005
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.011

continued . . .

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	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.013*
	(0.005)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Other race	−0.000
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: White	−0.002
	(0.011)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Black	0.051
	(0.036)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Asian	0.008
	(0.019)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.020
	(0.016)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Other race	0.113
	(0.070)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	0.000
	(0.003)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.004
	(0.002)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.014***
	(0.003)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	0.009***
	(0.002)
Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	0.009***
	(0.002)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	0.006***
	(0.002)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school	0.006**
	(0.002)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school	0.006**
	(0.002)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college	0.003*
	(0.002)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	−0.004
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.014
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.016
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	−0.008
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	−0.015
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.011
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.015

continued . . .

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			(0.008)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school			−0.019*
			(0.009)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school			−0.021*
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college			−0.020*
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: College and above			−0.017*
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Below high school			−0.017
			(0.009)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: High school			−0.025**
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Some college			−0.016*
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: College and above			−0.020*
			(0.008)
Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.012***
			(0.002)
Same block × Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.004
			(0.006)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Native			−0.014*
			(0.005)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.002
			(0.005)
Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			−0.030***
			(0.001)
Same block × Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			0.007*
			(0.003)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Female			−0.001
			(0.003)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Male			0.001
			(0.003)
Block group & individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.059	0.059	0.059
Adjusted R^2	0.024	0.024	0.024
N	116,500,000		

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equations 1–2 on the **PS** of workers who reside in the same block group: one worker in the pair is an incumbent resident on their current block as of 2010 and the other is a mover who just relocates to their current block in 2010. The dependent variable, CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, the incumbent resident starts working in the firm that has employed the mover in 2010; and (2) this firm is located at least 22 km from the pair's residences (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted categories of race, education, gender, nativity status are white, below high school, female, and native, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5 Robustness checks—**PS**: Detect referrals

	$NFCW_2$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Same block	0.010***	0.008***	0.020*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)
Same race		0.009***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same race		0.000	
		(0.002)	
Same educ		0.001**	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same educ		−0.000	
		(0.002)	
Same birth country		0.008***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same birth country		0.004	
		(0.002)	
Same gender		0.013***	
		(0.001)	
Same block × Same gender		−0.002	
		(0.002)	
Self: White × Neighbor: Black			−0.004
			(0.007)
Self: White × Neighbor: Asian			0.014*
			(0.006)
Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic			−0.001
			(0.005)
Self: White × Neighbor: Other race			−0.001
			(0.011)
Self: Black × Neighbor: White			−0.010
			(0.013)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Black			0.014
			(0.015)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian			0.009
			(0.015)
Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic			−0.003
			(0.014)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: White			−0.000
			(0.013)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black			0.009
			(0.015)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian			0.029*
			(0.014)
Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic			0.001

continued . . .

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	(0.014)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	0.002
	(0.012)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	0.007
	(0.013)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.017
	(0.013)
Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.015
	(0.013)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Black	0.004
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Asian	0.001
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.003
	(0.004)
Same block × Self: White × Neighbor: Other race	0.000
	(0.010)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: White	−0.004
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Black	0.007
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Asian	−0.014
	(0.010)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.006
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Black × Neighbor: Other race	−0.006
	(0.024)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: White	0.000
	(0.006)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Black	−0.000
	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Asian	0.008
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.012
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Asian × Neighbor: Other race	−0.001
	(0.020)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: White	0.010*
	(0.004)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Black	0.009
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Asian	0.014
	(0.007)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Hispanic	0.011*
	(0.005)
Same block × Self: Hispanic × Neighbor: Other race	−0.003

continued . . .

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	(0.014)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: White	−0.002
	(0.010)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Black	0.005
	(0.026)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Asian	0.012
	(0.019)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Hispanic	−0.013
	(0.015)
Same block × Self: Other race × Neighbor: Other race	0.093
	(0.060)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	0.001
	(0.002)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.003
	(0.002)
Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.011***
	(0.002)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	0.008***
	(0.002)
Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	0.008***
	(0.002)
Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	0.006**
	(0.002)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school	0.006**
	(0.002)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school	0.005**
	(0.002)
Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college	0.003
	(0.002)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: High school	−0.000
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.010
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Below high school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.010
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Below high school	−0.004
	(0.009)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: High school	−0.010
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: Some college	−0.007
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: High school × Neighbor: College and above	−0.011
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Below high school	−0.013
	(0.008)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: High school	−0.016*

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			(0.008)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: Some college			−0.015*
			(0.007)
Same block × Self: Some college × Neighbor: College and above			−0.009
			(0.007)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Below high school			−0.012
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: High school			−0.018*
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: Some college			−0.011
			(0.008)
Same block × Self: College and above × Neighbor: College and above			−0.012
			(0.008)
Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.009***
			(0.002)
Same block × Self: Native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.004
			(0.005)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Native			−0.012*
			(0.005)
Same block × Self: Non-native × Neighbor: Non-native			−0.001
			(0.005)
Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			−0.026***
			(0.001)
Same block × Self: Female × Neighbor: Male			0.005
			(0.003)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Female			−0.002
			(0.003)
Same block × Self: Male × Neighbor: Male			−0.001
			(0.003)
Block group & individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.055	0.055	0.055
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.022	0.022
N	116,500,000		

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating equations 1–2 on the **PS** of workers who reside in the same block group: one worker in the pair is an incumbent resident on their current block as of 2010 and the other is a mover who just relocates to their current block in 2010. The dependent variable, $NFCW_2$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, the incumbent resident starts working in the firm that has employed the mover in 2010; (2) the two individuals have not been coworkers prior to 2011; and (3) this firm is located at least 22 km from the pair's residences (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted categories of race, education, gender, nativity status are white, below high school, female, and native, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	0.505***	0.311***	0.479***	0.290***
	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.029)
Asian	0.069*	0.008	0.075*	0.021
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)
Hispanic	0.171***	0.118***	0.181***	0.130***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Other race	0.128**	−0.155***	0.121**	−0.131***
	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.039)
White × Individual racial SI	−0.759***	−0.332*	−0.649***	−0.293*
	(0.126)	(0.133)	(0.120)	(0.126)
Black × Individual racial SI	−2.742***	−1.807***	−2.689***	−1.791***
	(0.428)	(0.346)	(0.405)	(0.323)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−0.315	0.015	−0.137	0.078
	(0.521)	(0.337)	(0.510)	(0.328)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−0.989**	−0.886***	−1.135***	−0.995***
	(0.324)	(0.251)	(0.307)	(0.235)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−2.717**	−0.923**	−2.503**	−0.965**
	(0.934)	(0.337)	(0.901)	(0.329)
No. of new neighbors	0.021***		0.020***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.025***		0.024***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.104	0.700	1.011	0.631
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.015	0.018	0.014
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A7 Robustness checks—**IS** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	36.710***	29.290***	37.970***	29.370***
	(2.365)	(3.509)	(2.471)	(3.728)
Asian	9.442**	−20.110***	10.830**	−20.420***
	(3.312)	(5.588)	(3.414)	(5.908)
Hispanic	15.050***	9.337**	17.350***	12.510***
	(2.022)	(2.884)	(2.117)	(3.060)
Other race	11.850**	−154.800***	12.190**	−159 ***
	(4.345)	(13.290)	(4.526)	(14.390)
White × Individual racial SI	−153.300***	−98.660***	−152.700***	−101.200***
	(17.050)	(17.200)	(17.950)	(18.230)
Black × Individual racial SI	−250.100***	−235.100***	−275.800***	−271.500***
	(53.300)	(66.870)	(58.150)	(75.190)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−273.300**	−285	−249 *	−235.600
	(100.500)	(173.500)	(104.500)	(180.600)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−173.800***	−210.300***	−204.100***	−252 ***
	(39.570)	(51.640)	(42.830)	(57.350)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−390.800*	121.900	−376.600*	147.200
	(154.100)	(148.700)	(157.500)	(150.100)
No. of new neighbors	1.062***		1.073***	
	(0.040)		(0.042)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		1.718***		1.739***
		(0.069)		(0.071)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.104	0.700	1.011	0.631
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−25.680	−16.120	−22.710	−14.500
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−48.150	−42.940	−48.220	−43.940
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−46.820	−40.300	−38.470	−29.100
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−31.060	−35.240	−32.850	−37.520
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−66.360	7.560	−57.260	7.422
Pseudo R^2	0.034	0.040	0.037	0.043
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8 Robustness checks—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	No. $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$	No. $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$	No. $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$	No. $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	0.349***	0.335***	0.349***	0.324***
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.045)
Asian	0.194***	−0.019	0.209***	−0.042
	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.077)
Hispanic	0.161***	0.115**	0.174***	0.143***
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.043)
Other race	0.096	−1.664***	0.101	−1.717***
	(0.053)	(0.136)	(0.056)	(0.147)
White × Individual racial SI	−1.422***	−0.944***	−1.353***	−0.922***
	(0.218)	(0.209)	(0.228)	(0.221)
Black × Individual racial SI	−2.802***	−3.385***	−2.922***	−3.628***
	(0.673)	(0.780)	(0.724)	(0.853)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−2.919*	−5.029*	−2.532	−3.946
	(1.337)	(2.123)	(1.349)	(2.111)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−2.055***	−2.909***	−2.163***	−3.219***
	(0.566)	(0.629)	(0.616)	(0.702)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−2.807	1.114	−2.628	1.291
	(1.625)	(1.505)	(1.667)	(1.568)
No. of new neighbors	0.012***		0.012***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.019***		0.019***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.016	0.009	0.015	0.008
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.041	−0.021	−0.036	−0.020
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.109	−0.099	−0.107	−0.098
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.097	−0.099	−0.081	−0.074
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.068	−0.069	−0.068	−0.074
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−0.085	0.005	−0.075	0.005
Pseudo R^2	0.151	0.132	0.149	0.130
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, No. $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−0.039	−0.010	−0.037	−0.000
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.015)
Some college	−0.104***	−0.034*	−0.100***	−0.021
	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.015)
College and above	−0.074**	−0.056***	−0.078**	−0.063***
	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−2.403***	−0.761**	−2.328***	−0.853***
	(0.451)	(0.242)	(0.433)	(0.221)
High school × Individual educ SI	−1.572***	−0.181	−1.506***	−0.273
	(0.291)	(0.186)	(0.276)	(0.174)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−1.147***	−0.188	−1.080***	−0.246
	(0.234)	(0.150)	(0.220)	(0.141)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−0.699**	0.182	−0.534*	0.235
	(0.233)	(0.150)	(0.222)	(0.136)
No. of new neighbors	0.021***		0.020***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.032***		0.029***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.104	0.398	1.011	0.359
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.011	0.018	0.009
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10 Robustness checks—**IS** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−2.372	−0.388	−2.369	0.793
	(2.138)	(4.076)	(2.234)	(4.299)
Some college	−6.845**	−0.772	−6.938**	0.685
	(2.137)	(4.098)	(2.232)	(4.271)
College and above	−3.957	−6.419	−4.751	−9.944*
	(2.338)	(4.365)	(2.452)	(4.634)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−295.600***	−317.100***	−312.500***	−399 ***
	(53.580)	(89.250)	(56.840)	(99.260)
High school × Individual educ SI	−219.200***	−113.800*	−230.300***	−138.600*
	(35.120)	(54.190)	(37.090)	(58.140)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−249 ***	−193.600***	−262.700***	−206.100***
	(34.940)	(56.110)	(36.890)	(58.410)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−274.700***	−133.700*	−281 ***	−143.300*
	(43.820)	(64.980)	(47.720)	(72.820)
No. of new neighbors	1.059***		1.070***	
	(0.040)		(0.042)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		3.023***		3.007***
		(0.163)		(0.162)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.104	0.398	1.011	0.359
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−51.750	−61.940	−49.010	−69
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−38.380	−22.730	−36.140	−24.900
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−42.560	−38.270	−40.090	−36.670
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−47.390	−26.080	−43.230	−24.540
Pseudo R^2	0.034	0.036	0.037	0.038
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A11 Robustness checks—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	No. CW_2	No. CW_2	No. CW_2	No. CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−0.039	−0.043	−0.036	−0.027
	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.051)
Some college	−0.058	−0.027	−0.049	−0.004
	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.050)
College and above	−0.035	−0.062	−0.035	−0.096
	(0.033)	(0.052)	(0.035)	(0.055)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−3.147***	−3.779***	−3.247***	−4.477***
	(0.743)	(1.081)	(0.793)	(1.170)
High school × Individual educ SI	−2.299***	−1.454**	−2.280***	−1.632**
	(0.441)	(0.563)	(0.463)	(0.601)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−3.308***	−2.263***	−3.413***	−2.333***
	(0.446)	(0.608)	(0.474)	(0.635)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−3.013***	−1.392	−3.143***	−1.360
	(0.564)	(0.731)	(0.601)	(0.826)
No. of new neighbors	0.012***		0.012***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.031***		0.030***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.016	0.005	0.015	0.004
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.103	−0.066	−0.100	−0.074
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.074	−0.026	−0.069	−0.028
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.102	−0.040	−0.100	−0.040
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.095	−0.024	−0.094	−0.022
Pseudo R^2	0.151	0.107	0.149	0.104
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, No. CW_2, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A12 Robustness checks—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−1.220***	0.394***	−1.126***	0.420***
	(0.105)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.067)
Asian	−1.867***	0.683***	−1.726***	0.718***
	(0.105)	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.066)
Hispanic	−1.277***	0.079	−1.159***	0.144*
	(0.102)	(0.071)	(0.099)	(0.067)
Other race	−1.788***	0.792***	−1.666***	0.821***
	(0.104)	(0.066)	(0.100)	(0.062)
White × Block racial SI	3.020***	0.538***	2.837***	0.444***
	(0.121)	(0.095)	(0.116)	(0.090)
Black × Block racial SI	8.356***	2.998***	7.878***	2.672***
	(0.244)	(0.211)	(0.235)	(0.200)
Asian × Block racial SI	7.058***	−0.851***	6.609***	−0.963***
	(0.263)	(0.215)	(0.256)	(0.207)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	8.582***	2.758***	8.058***	2.447***
	(0.190)	(0.168)	(0.185)	(0.161)
Other race × Block racial SI	4.957***	−0.785*	4.637***	−0.951**
	(0.605)	(0.324)	(0.576)	(0.315)
No. of new neighbors	0.138***		0.133***	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.325***		0.310***
		(0.007)		(0.006)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.133	1.972	2.906	1.804
Adjusted R^2	0.095	0.118	0.093	0.115
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	906,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A13 Robustness checks—**BS-R** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_2$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−35.990***	−10.950	−34.920***	−10.320
	(4.692)	(7.103)	(4.868)	(7.552)
Asian	−86.710***	−61.250***	−85.630***	−59.260***
	(5.484)	(8.737)	(5.682)	(9.295)
Hispanic	−42.300***	−30.260***	−40.270***	−24.760**
	(4.872)	(7.330)	(5.040)	(7.709)
Other race	−86.120***	−144 ***	−85.770***	−144.200***
	(5.936)	(14.310)	(6.141)	(15.490)
White × Block racial SI	136.600***	155.300***	137.900***	159.700***
	(5.512)	(7.776)	(5.711)	(8.208)
Black × Block racial SI	300.600***	315.900***	303.200***	322.300***
	(7.937)	(10.600)	(8.199)	(11.060)
Asian × Block racial SI	317.700***	280.600***	317.200***	281.800***
	(10.910)	(16.640)	(11.360)	(17.590)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	284.600***	297.300***	284.600***	296.500***
	(6.346)	(8.867)	(6.566)	(9.245)
Other race × Block racial SI	234.600***	276.400***	235.800***	268.700***
	(32.960)	(40.850)	(33.400)	(44.610)
No. of new neighbors	2.327***		2.342***	
	(0.045)		(0.047)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		4.935***		4.936***
		(0.087)		(0.090)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.133	1.972	2.906	1.804
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	24.730	28.110	24.820	28.600
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	44.740	43.930	44.590	44.190
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	53.750	47.340	53.460	47.170
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	44.730	45.280	44.280	44.420
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	45.920	50.920	45.910	49.960
Pseudo R^2	0.153	0.258	0.156	0.264
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	906,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A14 Robustness checks—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	0.697***	0.077*	0.640***	0.064
	(0.064)	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.034)
Some college	0.930***	0.057	0.833***	0.028
	(0.071)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.038)
College and above	−0.133	−0.084*	−0.137*	−0.083*
	(0.069)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.037)
Below high school × Block educ SI	6.068***	1.310***	5.529***	1.004***
	(0.255)	(0.179)	(0.244)	(0.165)
High school × Block educ SI	2.838***	0.421***	2.579***	0.302**
	(0.189)	(0.122)	(0.180)	(0.115)
Some college × Block educ SI	1.874***	0.138	1.737***	0.109
	(0.171)	(0.109)	(0.163)	(0.105)
College and above × Block educ SI	3.969***	0.237*	3.587***	0.030
	(0.151)	(0.099)	(0.144)	(0.092)
No. of new neighbors	0.142***		0.137***	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.261***		0.245***
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	2.453	0.912	2.270	0.835
Adjusted R^2	0.100	0.075	0.098	0.072
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A15 Robustness checks—**BS-E** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	25.560***	27.740***	24.530***	28.750***
	(3.954)	(6.564)	(4.088)	(6.874)
Some college	35.980***	29.120***	33.240***	27.870***
	(4.483)	(7.324)	(4.667)	(7.666)
College and above	−9.488*	4.167	−10.380*	5.242
	(4.181)	(7.165)	(4.337)	(7.470)
Below high school × Block educ SI	270.300***	334.500***	265.400***	324 ***
	(9.738)	(15.300)	(10.050)	(15.950)
High school × Block educ SI	172.600***	233 ***	171.300***	225.200***
	(9.938)	(15.100)	(10.310)	(15.620)
Some college × Block educ SI	124.400***	193.200***	127 ***	193.200***
	(10.250)	(16.320)	(10.700)	(17.060)
College and above × Block educ SI	214 ***	210.100***	209.700***	192.800***
	(8.874)	(14.860)	(9.371)	(15.810)
No. of new neighbors	2.363***		2.373***	
	(0.042)		(0.043)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		6.606***		6.571***
		(0.144)		(0.147)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	2.453	0.912	2.270	0.835
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	47.950	57.170	47.250	56.080
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	30.900	39.950	30.780	38.790
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	22.570	34.640	23.190	34.820
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	42.120	40.890	41.490	38.060
Pseudo R^2	0.119	0.156	0.122	0.157
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A16 Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	0.455***	0.131***	0.427***	0.124***
	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Asian	0.002	−0.175***	0.035	−0.122***
	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.023)
Hispanic	0.165***	−0.003	0.180***	0.028
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Other race	0.129*	−0.383***	0.146**	−0.317***
	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.028)
White × Individual racial SI	−0.567***	−0.152	−0.480***	−0.125
	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.113)
Black × Individual racial SI	−2.308***	−1.024**	−2.281***	−1.063***
	(0.431)	(0.348)	(0.399)	(0.318)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−0.415	0.513	−0.579	0.388
	(0.570)	(0.400)	(0.534)	(0.381)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−1.056***	−0.059	−1.227***	−0.313
	(0.319)	(0.253)	(0.296)	(0.231)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−2.484*	−0.090	−2.761**	−0.322
	(1.065)	(0.342)	(1.030)	(0.331)
No. of new neighbors	0.015***		0.014***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.017***		0.016***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.180	0.731	1.047	0.636
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.005
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A17 Main results—**IS** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	30.350***	8.738**	32.400***	9.337**
	(2.237)	(3.014)	(2.372)	(3.249)
Asian	0.672	−45.810***	4.526	−41.370***
	(3.138)	(4.712)	(3.361)	(5.042)
Hispanic	12.520***	−3.868	15.760***	0.909
	(1.949)	(2.505)	(2.066)	(2.684)
Other race	10.370*	−177.300***	13.390**	−180.600***
	(4.121)	(12.380)	(4.409)	(13.660)
White × Individual racial SI	−104.100***	−41.080*	−106.700***	−43.710*
	(16.300)	(16.560)	(17.580)	(17.900)
Black × Individual racial SI	−172.400***	−108.400*	−200.600***	−136.600*
	(40.950)	(47.740)	(44.830)	(53.660)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−153.300	19.680	−189.800*	13.530
	(86.120)	(113.100)	(94.620)	(123.800)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−129 ***	−41.930	−165.100***	−89.580*
	(34.010)	(39.040)	(37.460)	(44.460)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−276.500*	303.400**	−343.500*	297.800**
	(139.200)	(95.910)	(158.300)	(110.700)
No. of new neighbors	0.778***		0.804***	
	(0.029)		(0.030)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		1.396***		1.455***
		(0.054)		(0.057)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.180	0.731	1.047	0.636
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−19.570	−7.605	−17.480	−6.957
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−36.030	−20.600	−37.660	−22.410
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−28.670	2.907	−31.340	1.708
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−25.440	−7.626	−28.950	−14.190
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−52.800	19.050	−57.680	14.380
Pseudo R^2	0.018	0.024	0.021	0.028
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A18 Main results—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	No. $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	No. $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	No. $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	No. $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	0.306***	0.100**	0.322***	0.097**
	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.033)
Asian	0.012	−0.447***	0.048	−0.411***
	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.052)
Hispanic	0.139***	−0.027	0.167***	0.017
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.027)
Other race	0.122**	−1.757***	0.149**	−1.811***
	(0.043)	(0.126)	(0.046)	(0.139)
White × Individual racial SI	−0.888***	−0.331	−0.911***	−0.376*
	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.187)	(0.184)
Black × Individual racial SI	−1.618***	−1.268*	−1.975***	−1.650**
	(0.462)	(0.506)	(0.493)	(0.565)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−0.935	0.220	−1.102	0.316
	(1.017)	(1.238)	(1.122)	(1.331)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−1.200***	−0.324	−1.486***	−0.750
	(0.356)	(0.402)	(0.394)	(0.461)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−2.764	3.042**	−3.549*	2.853*
	(1.485)	(0.953)	(1.711)	(1.143)
No. of new neighbors	0.009***		0.009***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.015***		0.015***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.013	0.008	0.012	0.007
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.018	−0.006	−0.017	−0.006
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.043	−0.024	−0.049	−0.029
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.019	0.003	−0.021	0.004
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.028	−0.006	−0.032	−0.012
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−0.060	0.011	−0.071	0.009
Pseudo R^2	0.070	0.068	0.070	0.068
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, No. $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A19 Main results—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−0.061*	−0.009	−0.053*	0.000
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.013)
Some college	−0.084***	0.024	−0.072**	0.023
	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.013)
College and above	−0.065*	0.013	−0.070**	−0.001
	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.013)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−1.832***	0.125	−1.939***	−0.182
	(0.441)	(0.246)	(0.416)	(0.226)
High school × Individual educ SI	−1.009***	0.441*	−0.943***	0.206
	(0.282)	(0.179)	(0.263)	(0.163)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−1.006***	−0.024	−0.985***	−0.098
	(0.239)	(0.147)	(0.225)	(0.137)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−0.656*	0.094	−0.391	0.156
	(0.267)	(0.167)	(0.255)	(0.155)
No. of new neighbors	0.015***		0.014***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.019***		0.017***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.180	0.374	1.047	0.326
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.003	0.007	0.003
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A20 Main results—**IS** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−4.176*	−1.227	−3.967	1.078
	(2.056)	(3.725)	(2.201)	(4.071)
Some college	−5.502**	8.985*	−5.109*	9.369*
	(2.035)	(3.627)	(2.184)	(3.981)
College and above	−4.296	6.152	−5.665*	2.462
	(2.245)	(3.949)	(2.413)	(4.362)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−195.100***	−4.207	−234.100***	−104.100
	(46.070)	(68.020)	(50.680)	(81.680)
High school × Individual educ SI	−135.300***	93.110*	−143.600***	41.020
	(32.420)	(47.340)	(34.280)	(53.730)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−168 ***	−44.380	−187.600***	−70.720
	(31.330)	(47.280)	(34.210)	(52.190)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−158.200***	−25.040	−144.600***	−17.330
	(39.950)	(60.030)	(43.060)	(65.780)
No. of new neighbors	0.776***		0.803***	
	(0.029)		(0.030)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		2.758***		2.753***
		(0.114)		(0.117)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.180	0.374	1.047	0.326
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−38	−0.905	−40.020	−19.920
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−26.120	20.150	−24.410	8.030
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−32.120	−9.747	−31.500	−14.090
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−30.440	−5.470	−24.370	−3.385
Pseudo R^2	0.018	0.022	0.021	0.024
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW_1}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A21 Main results—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	No. CW_1 (1)	No. CW_1 (2)	No. CW_1 (3)	No. CW_1 (4)
High school	−0.050*	−0.023	−0.042	−0.001
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.041)
Some college	−0.061**	0.074*	−0.060*	0.082*
	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.041)
College and above	−0.052*	0.049	−0.069**	0.009
	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.044)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−1.858***	−0.162	−2.314***	−1.160
	(0.480)	(0.691)	(0.533)	(0.825)
High school × Individual educ SI	−1.023**	0.993*	−1.355***	0.428
	(0.384)	(0.489)	(0.361)	(0.536)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−1.761***	−0.512	−1.914***	−0.782
	(0.332)	(0.478)	(0.362)	(0.528)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−1.400***	−0.287	−1.243**	−0.171
	(0.408)	(0.599)	(0.433)	(0.653)
No. of new neighbors	0.009***		0.009***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.028***		0.028***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.013	0.004	0.012	0.003
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.042	−0.002	−0.048	−0.014
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.023	0.013	−0.028	0.005
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.038	−0.007	−0.038	−0.010
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.030	−0.004	−0.025	−0.002
Pseudo R^2	0.070	0.058	0.070	0.057
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, No. CW_1, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A22 Main results—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−1.372***	0.314***	−1.079***	0.458***
	(0.114)	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.068)
Asian	−2.126***	0.530***	−1.757***	0.690***
	(0.115)	(0.074)	(0.108)	(0.067)
Hispanic	−1.379***	0.060	−1.109***	0.231***
	(0.115)	(0.076)	(0.107)	(0.070)
Other race	−1.881***	0.729***	−1.545***	0.860***
	(0.113)	(0.068)	(0.107)	(0.062)
White × Block racial SI	3.668***	1.778***	3.477***	1.662***
	(0.133)	(0.101)	(0.125)	(0.093)
Black × Block racial SI	9.459***	4.481***	8.480***	3.765***
	(0.257)	(0.214)	(0.244)	(0.201)
Asian × Block racial SI	7.887***	0.365	7.185***	0.185
	(0.286)	(0.222)	(0.276)	(0.211)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	9.533***	3.994***	8.709***	3.438***
	(0.198)	(0.166)	(0.187)	(0.154)
Other race × Block racial SI	5.453***	0.282	4.772***	0.071
	(0.681)	(0.345)	(0.655)	(0.334)
No. of new neighbors	0.123***		0.116***	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.289***		0.269***
		(0.006)		(0.005)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.729	2.329	3.341	2.048
Adjusted R^2	0.061	0.081	0.058	0.078
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	906,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A23 Main results—**BS-R** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−33.460***	−13.440*	−27.430***	−6.167
	(4.238)	(6.397)	(4.478)	(7.014)
Asian	−84.920***	−77.490***	−78.220***	−66.320***
	(4.957)	(8.055)	(5.207)	(8.649)
Hispanic	−39.170***	−29.990***	−34.120***	−18.700**
	(4.395)	(6.497)	(4.612)	(6.964)
Other race	−79.360***	−161.400***	−73.270***	−155.700***
	(5.364)	(13.430)	(5.639)	(14.780)
White × Block racial SI	126.600***	181.800***	132.200***	196.200***
	(4.921)	(6.889)	(5.186)	(7.427)
Black × Block racial SI	261.700***	307 ***	258.700***	312 ***
	(6.908)	(9.272)	(7.287)	(10.020)
Asian × Block racial SI	292.700***	314.800***	290.600***	318.600***
	(9.598)	(14.410)	(10.130)	(15.340)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	262.800***	314.800***	264.200***	318.600***
	(5.687)	(8.065)	(5.939)	(8.518)
Other race × Block racial SI	211.200***	335.900***	206.500***	347.700***
	(32.690)	(37.780)	(35.530)	(41.670)
No. of new neighbors	1.819***		1.818***	
	(0.037)		(0.039)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		3.825***		3.783***
		(0.071)		(0.073)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	3.729	2.329	3.341	2.048
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	24.680	32.320	25.440	33.810
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	43.790	44.920	42.550	44.060
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	53.520	53.010	52.490	52.150
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	44.760	47.800	44.050	46.370
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	43.920	58.230	42.740	58.950
Pseudo R^2	0.109	0.197	0.111	0.202
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	906,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW}_1$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A24 Main results—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	0.636***	0.008	0.579***	0.013
	(0.072)	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.035)
Some college	0.835***	0.036	0.740***	0.028
	(0.081)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.041)
College and above	−0.093	−0.078	−0.141*	−0.079*
	(0.076)	(0.041)	(0.072)	(0.038)
Below high school × Block educ SI	6.699***	2.171***	5.851***	1.749***
	(0.274)	(0.178)	(0.259)	(0.164)
High school × Block educ SI	3.484***	1.388***	3.021***	1.138***
	(0.214)	(0.130)	(0.202)	(0.121)
Some college × Block educ SI	2.805***	1.167***	2.463***	0.956***
	(0.202)	(0.122)	(0.190)	(0.115)
College and above × Block educ SI	4.315***	1.221***	3.838***	0.917***
	(0.171)	(0.107)	(0.160)	(0.098)
No. of new neighbors	0.122***		0.114***	
	(0.002)		(0.002)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.184***		0.166***
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	2.832	0.919	2.525	0.807
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.035	0.055	0.033
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A25 Main results—**BS-E** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1	Has CW_1
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	19.880***	12.010	19.800***	15.420*
	(3.654)	(6.497)	(3.852)	(6.894)
Some college	26.020***	27.600***	24.990***	29.120***
	(4.069)	(7.002)	(4.278)	(7.477)
College and above	−4.640	4.781	−7.714	3.293
	(3.748)	(6.794)	(3.958)	(7.290)
Below high school × Block educ SI	251.900***	374.400***	245.400***	365.700***
	(9.038)	(15.070)	(9.501)	(16.080)
High school × Block educ SI	168.100***	314.800***	164 ***	302.500***
	(9.375)	(15.240)	(9.876)	(16.080)
Some college × Block educ SI	142.200***	253.500***	140.300***	244.500***
	(9.424)	(14.980)	(9.894)	(16)
College and above × Block educ SI	187 ***	261.600***	186.500***	252.300***
	(7.749)	(13)	(8.288)	(14.030)
No. of new neighbors	1.784***		1.774***	
	(0.033)		(0.034)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		4.931***		4.909***
		(0.130)		(0.131)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	2.832	0.919	2.525	0.807
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	48.330	63.880	47.420	63.090
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	32.830	54.900	32.170	52.760
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	27.900	44.540	27.690	43.150
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	39.140	50.230	39.430	49.240
Pseudo R^2	0.072	0.102	0.073	0.101
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_1, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located outside the stayer's block group of residence. All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A26 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$ (1)	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$ (2)	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$ (3)	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$ (4)
Black	0.136***	0.031*	0.128***	0.028*
	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Asian	0.005	−0.045***	0.006	−0.033**
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Hispanic	0.053***	0.009	0.059***	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Other race	0.074*	−0.103***	0.067*	−0.083***
	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.013)
White × Individual racial SI	−0.268***	−0.080	−0.223**	−0.057
	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.071)
Black × Individual racial SI	−0.536*	−0.154	−0.609**	−0.214
	(0.258)	(0.206)	(0.229)	(0.178)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−0.090	0.155	−0.003	0.174
	(0.364)	(0.248)	(0.358)	(0.244)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−0.003	0.137	−0.157	−0.003
	(0.215)	(0.175)	(0.197)	(0.158)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−1.648***	−0.365	−1.600***	−0.356
	(0.478)	(0.196)	(0.432)	(0.193)
No. of new neighbors	0.006***		0.005***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.006***		0.006***
		(0.001)		(0.000)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.405	0.251	0.359	0.218
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A27 Robustness checks—**IS** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	29.590***	4.603	31.750***	4.287
	(3.970)	(5.573)	(4.235)	(6.060)
Asian	2.033	−41.470***	2.645	−40.800***
	(5.462)	(8.032)	(5.819)	(8.539)
Hispanic	11.910***	−1.684	14.680***	2.820
	(3.228)	(4.130)	(3.447)	(4.495)
Other race	19.630**	−159.100***	20.400**	−160.300***
	(6.703)	(20.320)	(7.144)	(22.020)
White × Individual racial SI	−106.300***	−51.160*	−106.200***	−49.260
	(24.920)	(25.510)	(26.800)	(27.510)
Black × Individual racial SI	−143.700	−58.150	−198.200*	−106.800
	(76.250)	(90.440)	(84.700)	(102.200)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−141.300	4.369	−118.700	45.380
	(152)	(197)	(163.200)	(204.500)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−28.050	28.450	−71.700	−23.240
	(48.530)	(56.660)	(54.450)	(65.300)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−618.200**	87.220	−684.600**	116.500
	(227.500)	(236.300)	(240.100)	(243.900)
No. of new neighbors	0.828***		0.850***	
	(0.042)		(0.044)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		1.408***		1.454***
		(0.080)		(0.089)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.405	0.251	0.359	0.218
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−21.270	−10.230	−18.700	−8.515
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−31.370	−11.810	−39.160	−18.640
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−28.340	0.734	−21.100	6.433
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−5.910	5.724	−13.530	−4.092
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−123	7	−120	7.297
Pseudo R^2	0.019	0.023	0.022	0.027
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A28 Robustness checks—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	No. CW_2	No. CW_2	No. CW_2	No. CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	0.296***	0.095	0.315***	0.082
	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.063)
Asian	0.009	−0.383***	0.013	−0.385***
	(0.057)	(0.080)	(0.060)	(0.084)
Hispanic	0.125***	−0.000	0.147***	0.037
	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.046)
Other race	0.228**	−1.590***	0.235**	−1.634***
	(0.071)	(0.205)	(0.077)	(0.221)
White × Individual racial SI	−0.972***	−0.437	−0.928**	−0.383
	(0.273)	(0.270)	(0.292)	(0.288)
Black × Individual racial SI	−1.154	−1.235	−1.772	−1.703
	(0.927)	(1.029)	(1.034)	(1.191)
Asian × Individual racial SI	−0.305	0.217	0.022	0.833
	(1.854)	(1.989)	(1.938)	(1.970)
Hispanic × Individual racial SI	−0.240	0.178	−0.559	−0.238
	(0.499)	(0.560)	(0.563)	(0.647)
Other race × Individual racial SI	−6.321**	1.030	−6.932**	1.104
	(2.426)	(2.214)	(2.619)	(2.459)
No. of new neighbors	0.009***		0.009***	
	(0.000)		(0.001)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.015***		0.015***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.002
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.013	−0.006	−0.012	−0.005
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.021	−0.017	−0.031	−0.022
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.004	0.002	0.000	0.008
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.004	0.002	−0.009	−0.003
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	−0.093	0.003	−0.096	0.003
Pseudo R^2	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.066
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, No. $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). The omitted category of race is White. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and education. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A29 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2 (1)	Has CW_2 (2)	Has CW_2 (3)	Has CW_2 (4)
High school	−0.031	−0.010	−0.028	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Some college	−0.037*	0.008	−0.036*	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)
College and above	−0.027	−0.004	−0.026	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−0.783**	0.093	−0.785**	−0.039
	(0.276)	(0.148)	(0.260)	(0.127)
High school × Individual educ SI	−0.191	0.231	−0.165	0.165
	(0.189)	(0.118)	(0.176)	(0.110)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−0.422**	−0.039	−0.371**	−0.023
	(0.150)	(0.089)	(0.141)	(0.085)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−0.235	0.145	−0.173	0.150
	(0.157)	(0.103)	(0.149)	(0.096)
No. of new neighbors	0.006***		0.005***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.007***		0.006***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.405	0.126	0.359	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.001
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A30 Robustness checks—**IS** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−6.296	−3.747	−6.363	−1.294
	(3.424)	(6.131)	(3.659)	(6.692)
Some college	−7.078*	10.470	−7.488*	11.370
	(3.423)	(5.954)	(3.662)	(6.457)
College and above	−4.920	0.431	−5.414	−2.048
	(3.721)	(6.327)	(4.001)	(6.951)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−217.600**	43.280	−247.700**	−53.630
	(75.480)	(94.120)	(82.530)	(111.800)
High school × Individual educ SI	−79.260	115.500	−82.270	92.130
	(48.180)	(75.220)	(51.020)	(84.900)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−179.400***	−86.140	−187.200***	−65.250
	(51.240)	(80.070)	(55.440)	(83.420)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−160.200*	60.660	−160.300*	77.550
	(62.810)	(85.160)	(68.880)	(94.930)
No. of new neighbors	0.825***		0.848***	
	(0.042)		(0.044)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		2.849***		2.801***
		(0.174)		(0.184)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.405	0.126	0.359	0.110
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−44.890	9.976	−45.340	−11.340
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−16.270	26.580	−14.990	19.690
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−36.300	−19.980	−33.460	−14.210
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−32.730	14.010	−29.020	16.510
Pseudo R^2	0.019	0.024	0.022	0.024
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, a stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A31 Robustness checks—**IS** (Poisson): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the intensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	No. CW_2	No. CW_2	No. CW_2	No. CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	−0.056	−0.033	−0.048	−0.005
	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.039)	(0.068)
Some college	−0.068	0.091	−0.068	0.113
	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.065)
College and above	−0.044	−0.002	−0.048	−0.022
	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.042)	(0.070)
Below high school × Individual educ SI	−1.540*	0.401	−1.884*	−0.518
	(0.769)	(0.946)	(0.859)	(1.125)
High school × Individual educ SI	−0.804	0.959	−0.971	0.750
	(0.524)	(0.778)	(0.543)	(0.871)
Some college × Individual educ SI	−1.936***	−0.880	−1.957**	−0.701
	(0.581)	(0.804)	(0.629)	(0.842)
College and above × Individual educ SI	−1.420*	0.671	−1.424*	0.852
	(0.639)	(0.847)	(0.704)	(0.944)
No. of new neighbors	0.009***		0.009***	
	(0.000)		(0.001)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.030***		0.029***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	0.005	0.001	0.004	0.001
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	−0.024	0.004	−0.028	−0.005
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	−0.012	0.010	−0.014	0.008
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	−0.028	−0.010	−0.027	−0.008
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	−0.021	0.007	−0.020	0.009
Pseudo R^2	0.065	0.057	0.065	0.056
Estimation model	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson	Poisson
N	3,203,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 3 on the **IS** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, No. CW_2, is the number of a stayer's new neighbors in the indicated network: (1) who in 2010, work in a firm that in 2011 starts employing the stayer; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). The omitted category of education is Below high school. Included in the other demographic controls are a dummy for female, a dummy for US nativity status, age (in years), age squared, and race. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A32 Robustness checks—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$	Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−0.466***	0.243***	−0.377***	0.263***
	(0.069)	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.040)
Asian	−0.814***	0.283***	−0.699***	0.310***
	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.041)
Hispanic	−0.538***	0.047	−0.440***	0.099*
	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.065)	(0.042)
Other race	−0.679***	0.385***	−0.584***	0.406***
	(0.067)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.038)
White × Block racial SI	1.370***	0.474***	1.276***	0.432***
	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.054)
Black × Block racial SI	3.051***	0.891***	2.709***	0.710***
	(0.145)	(0.120)	(0.137)	(0.111)
Asian × Block racial SI	3.109***	−0.101	2.790***	−0.158
	(0.179)	(0.137)	(0.172)	(0.130)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	3.807***	1.422***	3.429***	1.193***
	(0.124)	(0.102)	(0.119)	(0.096)
Other race × Block racial SI	2.086***	−0.192	1.917***	−0.200
	(0.389)	(0.229)	(0.366)	(0.225)
No. of new neighbors	0.051***		0.048***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		0.122***		0.113***
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.345	0.832	1.198	0.728
Adjusted R^2	0.034	0.045	0.033	0.043
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	906,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A33 Robustness checks—**BS-R** (Logit): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any race	Same race	Any race	Same race
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Black	−31.160***	−19.710	−27.250***	−19.320
	(6.786)	(10.390)	(7.197)	(11.530)
Asian	−84.290***	−85.700***	−81.160***	−80.950***
	(7.856)	(13.020)	(8.315)	(14.200)
Hispanic	−36.800***	−35.440***	−32.160***	−26.770*
	(7.068)	(10.440)	(7.453)	(11.220)
Other race	−71.850***	−161.600***	−69.880***	−156.600***
	(8.371)	(22.520)	(8.861)	(24.600)
White × Block racial SI	126.100***	174.200***	130.800***	183.800***
	(7.813)	(10.990)	(8.258)	(11.900)
Black × Block racial SI	246.900***	300.100***	246.300***	313.100***
	(11.390)	(15.340)	(12.190)	(16.780)
Asian × Block racial SI	294.700***	325.400***	293.400***	328 ***
	(15.200)	(23.060)	(16.250)	(25.080)
Hispanic × Block racial SI	257.800***	315.700***	256 ***	315.500***
	(8.986)	(12.580)	(9.497)	(13.350)
Other race × Block racial SI	203.500***	315.800***	211.400***	328.200***
	(44.830)	(64.530)	(47.030)	(66.780)
No. of new neighbors	1.680***		1.694***	
	(0.052)		(0.054)	
No. of same-race new neighbors		3.131***		3.202***
		(0.097)		(0.103)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.345	0.832	1.198	0.728
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	24.620	31.810	25.250	32.750
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	42.380	45.720	41.640	46.350
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	53.860	54.910	53.280	54.450
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	44.170	48.980	43.210	47.560
Avg. mar. effect for group 5	42.310	56.870	43.140	57.710
Pseudo R^2	0.107	0.186	0.110	0.194
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	906,000			

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Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-R** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race. The dependent variable, Group Has $\boldsymbol{CW_2}$, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of race is White. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A34 Robustness checks—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	0.280***	0.067**	0.242***	0.053*
	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.021)
Some college	0.341***	0.059*	0.274***	0.040
	(0.049)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.024)
College and above	−0.006	0.010	−0.017	0.002
	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.022)
Below high school × Block educ SI	2.753***	0.991***	2.365***	0.755***
	(0.176)	(0.115)	(0.164)	(0.103)
High school × Block educ SI	1.263***	0.330***	1.098***	0.260***
	(0.132)	(0.076)	(0.122)	(0.069)
Some college × Block educ SI	1.016***	0.347***	0.941***	0.305***
	(0.120)	(0.073)	(0.112)	(0.069)
College and above × Block educ SI	1.608***	0.380***	1.392***	0.278***
	(0.103)	(0.062)	(0.096)	(0.057)
No. of new neighbors	0.048***		0.045***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		0.069***		0.061***
		(0.003)		(0.003)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.004	0.315	0.892	0.276
Adjusted R^2	0.032	0.019	0.030	0.017
Estimation model	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A35 Robustness checks—**BS-E** (Logit): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin

	All new neighbors		New neighbors, not former coworkers	
	Any education	Same education	Any education	Same education
	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2	Has CW_2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High school	21.430***	33.120**	19.600**	34.640**
	(5.862)	(10.640)	(6.162)	(11.360)
Some college	27.150***	45.150***	21.830**	44.760***
	(6.574)	(11.650)	(6.928)	(12.510)
College and above	−2.961	11.220	−4.221	11.960
	(6.080)	(11.570)	(6.420)	(12.350)
Below high school × Block educ SI	260.600***	410.600***	251.300***	395.700***
	(14.060)	(23.540)	(14.740)	(25.440)
High school × Block educ SI	167.200***	271.300***	166.200***	262.500***
	(15)	(24.830)	(15.720)	(25.860)
Some college × Block educ SI	137.400***	227.800***	145.600***	226 ***
	(15.070)	(25.140)	(15.790)	(26.770)
College and above × Block educ SI	185.200***	261.800***	179.500***	248.100***
	(12.950)	(22.600)	(13.930)	(24.310)
No. of new neighbors	1.630***		1.637***	
	(0.049)		(0.051)	
No. of same-educ new neighbors		4.673***		4.653***
		(0.193)		(0.205)
Other demo. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Block group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Depvar. mean	1.004	0.315	0.892	0.276
Avg. mar. effect for group 1	49.590	66.890	48.250	65.700
Avg. mar. effect for group 2	32.530	45.330	32.550	44.040
Avg. mar. effect for group 3	27.020	38.020	28.930	37.870
Avg. mar. effect for group 4	38.680	48.970	37.770	47.010
Pseudo R^2	0.070	0.103	0.072	0.101
Estimation model	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
N	1,249,000			

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 4 on the **BS-E** considering four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education. The dependent variable, Group Has CW_2, is a dummy equal to 1 if: (1) in 2011, any stayer starts working in a firm that in 2010 has employed any of the movers in the indicated network; and (2) the firm is located at least 22 km from the stayer's residence (the median work-home distance across all workers in all of the sampled CBSA). All of the coefficients and standard errors as well as the mean of the dependent variable (taken over the effective estimation sample) are multiplied by 100 to be in pp unit. The omitted category of education is Below high school. Standard errors are clustered at the block group level; * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$.

B Additional figures

FIGURE B1 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × race in Table A6. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

FIGURE B2 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × education in Table A9. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.

Figure B3 Robustness checks—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × race in Table A12. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

Figure B4 Robustness checks—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × education in Table A14. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.

Figure B5 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × race in Table A26. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

Figure B6 Robustness checks—**IS** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SI × education in Table A29. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.

Figure B7 Robustness checks—**BS-R** (Linear): Effects of racial segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × race in Table A32. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different race.

Figure B8 Robustness checks—**BS-E** (Linear): Effects of educational segregation on "first firm" coworkership with new neighbors on the extensive margin



Notes: This figure plots the coefficients and the 95% CI for the interaction terms SSI × education in Table A34. There are four types of network of new neighbors constructed along two dimensions: (1) any former coworkership: all new neighbors who move to the same block in 2010 ("All new neighbors") vs. only those new neighbors that have not worked with the individual before ("New neighbors, not former coworkers"), and (2) same vs. different education.