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Public Safety Section 2023 Annual Report

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DEBORAH WITZBURG | INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO
TOBARA RICHARDSON | DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR PUBLIC SAFETY

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I | Letter from the Deputy

Pursuant to Municipal Code of Chicago § 2-56-240(b), the Annual Report of the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Public Safety section provides a detailed accounting of work published by the Public Safety section in 2023 and an analysis of 2023 data. The Public Safety section aims to enhance the effectiveness of the Chicago Police Department (CPD or the Department), the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), and the Police Board with the mission of increasing public safety, protecting civil liberties and civil rights, and ensuring the accountability of the police force, building stronger police-community relations. Providing dedicated oversight, transparency, and accountability into and across Chicago's complex public safety system is at the heart of the Public Safety section's work, as well as contributing to the City's ongoing reform effort. By doing so, we strive to create a safer, fairer, and more transparent public safety system for residents and officers committed to serving and protecting.

This work has brought issues within policing and police accountability into view and has created opportunities for improvement. Among others, the Public Safety section's 2023 inquiries and reviews included:

- Enforcement of CPD's rules requiring CPD members to report misconduct in order to break down the code of silence, where a mechanism for anonymous reports is required by law but anonymous reports purportedly do not satisfy members' reporting obligations;
- Enforcement of CPD's rule against false reports, where the credibility of CPD members is crucial to the efficacy of the criminal justice system; and
- The police-community mediation pilot program and its potential to include the community in the police accountability process.

Additionally, the Public Safety section's video release policy report follow-up found that improvements were made in COPA's compliance with the timely release of video footage, but without the development of binding directives, it remains to be seen whether these improvements will outlast a particular administration.

Opportunities for improvement will go unrealized if officials do not cooperate or respond with the appropriate sense of urgency. Chicago is not faced with a choice between police reform and keeping people safe; rather, the City is faced with the pressing reality that it can best keep people—in uniform and out—safe only by implementing long-term, systemic reform of its police and police accountability systems.

In addition to inspections of closed disciplinary cases and its inquiries and reviews, the Public Safety section engaged with community groups throughout the year. Community engagement included National Night Out events hosted by CPD, where the Public Safety section interacted with community members at six locations covering eight CPD Districts. National Night Out represented the figurative bridge to build stronger police-community relations in a literal format. It represented a night of community-building and resource-sharing between community members, in uniform and out. It represented a night where there was no "us" nor "them," but simply Chicagoans. It represented a night demonstrating how all stakeholders must work together to accomplish the shared goal of improving public safety. To achieve this, the Public Safety section will continue to

facilitate a culture of productive relationships among communities, the Chicago Police Department, Chicago's police accountability agencies, and other entities in the public safety landscape.

This continues to be a pivotal time in Chicago, and improving the relationships between communities and police is critical to improving public safety. Transparency is key to that goal, as policing, public safety, and police accountability are all interconnected. The Public Safety section's work focuses on rendering Chicago's policing and police accountability systems more transparent, both to members of the public and members of the Department. OIG's data dashboards, ongoing review and analysis of disciplinary outcomes, and regular follow-ups on recommendations made to City agencies are all crucial elements of this effort. Additionally, a significant portion of the Public Safety section's work is devoted to improving and demystifying the police disciplinary system, including the section's review of individual closed disciplinary investigations to ensure that they are complete, thorough, objective, and fair.

In 2023, the federal court overseeing the City of Chicago's compliance with the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago* found that OIG and the Public Safety section were in full and effective compliance with all applicable material requirements, making OIG the first and only component of City government to be released from its consent decree obligations. I am pleased to be leading a section of dedicated OIG staff working to increase public safety and enhance the effectiveness of the public safety system. The Public Safety section and I are grateful to have the opportunity to contribute during this crucial moment in history. We also want to express gratitude to the City employees who support and assist the Public Safety section's work and look forward to continuing those efforts with the stakeholders who share OIG's mission to make our City's government more closely resemble the one Chicagoans deserve, not just in words or on paper, but on the streets and in the ways that impact residents' day-to-day lives.

Thank you for allowing me this great honor and privilege to serve.



Tobara Richardson
Deputy Inspector General for Public Safety

II | Public Safety: The Section

OIG is an independent, nonpartisan oversight agency whose mission is to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the administration of programs and operation of City government. OIG's Public Safety section, specifically enabled by the MCC, provides focus and dedicated resources to the oversight of CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies. By ordinance, the Public Safety section's inquiries are focused on the policies, practices, programs, procedures, and training of CPD, COPA, and the Police Board, with respect to constitutional policing, discipline, use of force, and CPD's integrity, transparency, and relationship with City residents. Additionally, the Public Safety section is charged with studying police disciplinary investigations and hearings, including examining the fairness and consistency of discipline and whether individual misconduct investigations are complete, thorough, objective, and fair. MCC § 2-56-230.

The Public Safety section works to improve the effectiveness, accountability, and transparency of CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies, and to transform the critical relationship between CPD and the communities it serves. Its distinctive value within the City of Chicago's public safety oversight system derives from its long-term, systemic perspective on necessary reforms, direct access to and utilization of City data systems, deep institutional knowledge of City operations, and position of independence from all other components of City government. Based on robust community and agency engagement, along with a focus on the appropriate use of data and technology, the Public Safety section identifies long-term, systemic reform opportunities, thereby improving the fairness and effectiveness with which public safety services are delivered and the safety of all of the City's neighborhoods.

III | Priorities and Approach

Informed by specific obligations derived from its ordinance, the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, coordination with stakeholders, input from CPD members and members of the public, and long-standing institutional knowledge of the core public safety challenges in Chicago, the Public Safety section has adopted the following strategic priorities to guide its work:

- 1 | Improving CPD's administrative, managerial, and operational competencies to render it more effective in the performance of its critical public safety functions and more efficient in its administration.
- 2 | Ensuring transparency, diligence, fairness, consistency, and timeliness in the police discipline and accountability system.
- 3 | Ensuring that Chicagoans' constitutional and civil rights are sufficiently and equitably protected in all aspects of public safety operations.

The Public Safety section serves these priorities through three mechanisms: programmatic, audit-based inquiries and reviews; inspection of individual closed disciplinary cases; and collection and analysis of data from CPD and City sources on many aspects of policing, public safety operations, and the police disciplinary system.

IV | Inquiries and Reviews

The Public Safety section conducts program and system-focused inquiries and reviews of CPD, COPA, the Police Board, and other agencies involved in the public safety operations of the City. Based on these inquiries, OIG makes recommendations to improve the policies, procedures, and practices of those entities. Below are summaries of the OIG Public Safety section reports released in 2023.

Enforcement of the Chicago Police Department's Rule Against False Reports (May 2023)

As mandated by the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, OIG conducted an inquiry into the enforcement of CPD's Rule 14, which prohibits CPD members from "[m]aking a false report, written or oral."¹ Alleged violations of CPD's Rules and Regulations are usually investigated by CPD's Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) and COPA, and until recently, the most serious of police disciplinary cases were adjudicated by the Chicago Police Board.² All of these entities come within the scope of OIG's inquiry into the enforcement of CPD's rule against false reports.

The truthfulness and credibility of police officers is foundational to the fair administration of justice, and CPD's effectiveness as a law enforcement agency. CPD, COPA, and the Police Board have each publicly expressed the view that these qualities in CPD members are integral to their ability to perform their duties and that a member's violation of Rule 14 poses important risks, including undermining their ability to offer testimony in criminal prosecutions arising from CPD's arrests. Due to the severity of the impact that stems from a CPD member making a false statement or report, CPD and COPA have reported the position that separation (i.e., termination of employment) is the appropriate disciplinary penalty when a member is found to have violated Rule 14.

The objectives of OIG's inquiry were to determine whether:

- BIA and COPA consistently allege Rule 14 violations when a CPD member makes a false statement or a material omission;

¹ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Enforcement of the Chicago Police Department's Rule Against False Reports," May 25, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/enforcement-of-the-chicago-police-departments-rule-against-false-reports/>.

² On March 21, 2024, in the Cook County Circuit Court case, *Chicago John Dineen Lodge #7 v. City of Chicago, et al.*, Judge Michael Mullen ruled that the City of Chicago is required to offer police officers, contesting suspensions for more than 365 days or separation, the option of grieving before a private arbitrator in a public hearing or, as has previously been the case, before the Chicago Police Board. This ruling applies to any pending disciplinary cases brought up against any police officer since Sept. 14, 2022. Todd Feurer, "Judge's split decision allows arbitration of major CPD disciplinary cases, but in public," *CBS2 News*, March 21, 2024, accessed June 5, 2024, <https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/judge-ruling-cpd-discipline-cases-misconduct-arbitration-fop/>.

- Sustained allegations involving false statements consistently result in separation of the accused member from CPD; and
- Relevant agencies share information about Rule 14 violations and adverse credibility findings or negative credibility determinations.

OIG found the following:

1. Structural failures in Chicago's police accountability system allow CPD members with Rule 14 histories to remain in positions with duties that depend upon their truthfulness and credibility. CPD, COPA, and the Police Board each state a Department member's honesty is integral to their duties and that a Rule 14 violation can erode public trust and create risks for CPD. However, CPD, COPA, and Police Board practices allow for Department members with Rule 14 histories to remain employed, often assigned to positions such as Beat Officer or Detective.
 - ii. CPD's processes for identifying members with Rule 14 histories and sharing this information as required lack rigor and controls, and therefore pose risk to the Department and compromise the legal and constitutional rights of defendants and litigants. CPD does not accurately maintain records pertaining to members' Rule 14 histories. Members with Rule 14 histories were missing from the list CPD provided to OIG and additional records were inconclusive or could not be located. Further, CPD will only produce a member's disciplinary history if a prosecutor explicitly requests the disciplinary history, which does not appear to be a consistent practice.
 - iii. Gaps in current BIA and COPA policies and practices contribute to the underenforcement of Rule 14. BIA policies do not instruct investigators to consider all forms of evidence when evaluating inconsistencies during their investigations. COPA policies do not instruct investigators to specifically consider Rule 14 violations when making credibility determinations. And finally, BIA and COPA Summary Reports do not consistently reflect consideration and analysis of potential Rule 14 violations.

To improve the enforcement of Rule 14, OIG recommended the following:

1. BIA and COPA should recommend separation of CPD members found to have violated Rule 14, consistent with the agencies' respective stated policy positions.
2. CPD should consistently separate members who have violated Rule 14, given the risks—including legal and reputational ones—posed by continuing to employ such members.
3. The Police Board should uphold separations for members who have violated Rule 14, consistent with the Board's language in its decisions about the impact of Rule 14 violations.
4. If members who have violated Rule 14 remain employed with the Department, CPD should ensure they are assigned or detailed to positions that do not require them to write reports or testify in court. CPD should also periodically review the assignments and details of its members with Rule 14 histories, as applicable, to ensure they are not in positions that require them to write reports or testify in court.

5. CPD should maintain accurate records which permit the identification of all members with Rule 14 histories.
6. CPD should consistently and timely inform prosecutorial bodies when a Department member's Rule 14 violation is finalized and all available review and appeal pathways—including any grievance procedures and Police Board review—have been exhausted and/or waived.
7. CPD should document which records the Department produces pursuant to its disclosure obligations, so that it may confirm or verify that it has met these obligations.
8. CPD should revise its “Requirements of a Complete Log Number Investigative File” directive to further clarify that BIA investigators should consider all types of evidence when conducting credibility assessments and subsequent analyses of potential Rule 14 violations.
9. COPA should revise its “Final Summary Report” policy to instruct investigators to consider Rule 14 violations specifically when conducting credibility assessments.
10. BIA and COPA should update their Summary Reports to include a standardized mechanism, such as an affirmation or certification, where investigators indicate they have considered all evidence, including original statements and any subsequent statements and amended or modified statements, to determine whether a CPD member who is the subject of a disciplinary investigation has violated Rule 14. As needed, Summary Reports should capture the investigating agency's thorough consideration and analysis of the applicability of Rule 14. To help ensure consistency, fairness, and thoroughness of investigations, and the rigorous and thorough enforcement of Rule 14, investigators should be required to make this affirmation or certification in each disciplinary matter which is investigated to a finding.

Investigations of Sexual Misconduct Allegations Against Chicago Police Department Members 2022 (May 2023)

Pursuant to Paragraph 444 of the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, OIG was required to “review and analyze” closed sexual misconduct investigations involving complaints “against a [Chicago Police Department] member alleging conduct against a non-CPD member.” The consent decree required OIG to publish an annual report “assessing the quality of the sexual misconduct administrative investigations reviewed, “recommending changes in policies and practices to better prevent, detect, or investigate sexual misconduct,” and “providing aggregate data on the administrative investigations reviewed” by OIG.³

³ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, “Report on Investigations of Sexual Misconduct Allegations Against CPD Members 2022,” May 31, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/report-on-investigations-of-sexual-misconduct-allegations-against-chicago-police-department-members-2022/>.

In 2021, OIG reported that BIA created in the Case Management System (CMS) it shares with COPA a designation for investigators to flag CPD sexual misconduct cases that would alert OIG via email of the completion. In 2022, OIG reviewed 33 qualifying sexual misconduct cases but only received email notifications on 11 of those cases. OIG recognizes the efforts put forth by BIA and COPA to improve on processes that meet the requirements of the consent decree; however, there is an ongoing need to improve on operational and case management enhancements. OIG also found inadequate documentation of explanations for extended lengths of investigative inactivity in some investigative case files.

OIG recommended that BIA and COPA: (1) ensure that the automatic notification process through CMS created to notify OIG of qualifying investigations that have reached a final disciplinary status is working as designed and that the notification process is internally audited for compliance; and (2) adequately document explanations for the lack of investigative activity within the investigative file. Additionally, BIA and COPA should prioritize these investigations over less serious allegations.

In its response to OIG's recommendations, BIA agreed to continue its automatic notification to OIG through CMS and to audit its notification process, and requested that OIG "participate[] in the terms of the audit." BIA concurred with OIG's recommendation to adequately document explanations for lack of investigative activity, and that explanations will be documented in extension reports. BIA stated that it currently prioritizes sexual misconduct cases over less serious allegations.

In its response to OIG's recommendations, COPA outlined steps taken over the past two years to ensure thorough investigations of sexual misconduct cases. COPA acknowledged its compliance with Paragraph 444's mandate that OIG be provided with the administrative file "within 10 days of the final disciplinary decision of each complaint of sexual misconduct" and pointed out that OIG has access to these files prior to the final disciplinary decision via the city's CMS. COPA expressed that "some complaints of inappropriate physical contact may - or may not - rise to the level of sexual misconduct as defined by the Consent Decree...but may depict another form of misconduct." COPA further stated that it is creating operational and case management enhancements to "allow cases to be investigated in a more timely and efficient manner."

Final Report – Chicago Police Department's Search Warrant Process (June 2023)

OIG conducted an inquiry into search warrant processes by CPD.⁴ In recent years, CPD and its search warrant practices have been the focus of a great deal of public attention, fueling local debate, and as part of a national conversation about police search warrant practices and reform. Since 2018, local media outlets have identified and reported on instances of problematic service

⁴ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Final Report – Chicago Police Department's Search Warrant Process," June 28, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/final-report-chicago-police-departments-search-warrant-process/>.

tactics used during CPD's service of residential search warrants, including instances in which CPD members pointed firearms at children and/or warrants were served at incorrect locations. Arising from its long-term, programmatic inquiry into this topic, OIG published two interim reports in advance of this final report: first, in January 2021, OIG published recommendations to CPD recommending urgent changes to the Department's search warrants policy; and second, in May 2021, OIG published an analysis of data on CPD's residential search warrants.⁵

In January 2023, CPD posted draft revisions to its search warrants policy and forms on the Department's Policy Review Forum webpage for public review and comment. These changes included additions to its search warrant forms and a new electronic data application that holds the potential to vastly improve the Department's tracking of wrong raids and its ability to use that data to inform improvements to its search warrant service. Public comment on these proposed changes closed July 10, 2023; the policies and forms, therefore, may have changed prior to the publication of OIG's report.

In this final report, OIG described various dimensions of CPD's search warrant practices over the last several years and assessed the extent to which CPD's draft policy revisions may address some of the shortcomings observed. In offering a thorough assessment of gaps in and risks posed by CPD's past policies, trainings, etc., OIG hoped to provide stakeholders and decision-makers with appropriate context for measuring improvements brought about by new policies and improved controls, and to highlight those areas most in need of remediation.

Specifically, with respect to past practices, OIG sought to determine whether CPD has:

- tracked and evaluated search warrants that resulted in so-called "wrong raids" to identify and remediate risks and contributing factors;
- developed search warrants in such a manner as to ensure they are based on accurate information and served at the correct location; and
- tailored the content of its search warrants policy and related trainings to address risks associated with wrong raids.

In pursuit of these objectives, OIG:

- analyzed electronic search warrant records for residential search warrants served from 2017 through 2021;
- reviewed a sample of search warrant files for negative residential search warrants from 2017 to 2020, training on search warrants dating back to 2015, and revisions made to CPD's search warrants policy since January 2020; and
- conducted process interviews with experienced search team supervisors and warrant affiants, search warrant training instructors, and personnel from CPD's Risk Management and Confidential Matters units.

First, OIG found that CPD's approach to tracking wrong raids has not captured all incidents of wrong raids and has prevented CPD and other stakeholders from quantifying the extent of the

⁵ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Urgent Recommendations on the Chicago Police Department's Search Warrant Policies," January 22, 2021, <https://igchicago.org/2021/01/22/oig-public-safety-section-issues-urgent-recommendations-on-the-chicago-police-departments-search-warrant-policies/>.

City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Second Interim Report: Search Warrants Executed by the Chicago Police Department," May 6, 2021, <https://igchicago.org/2021/05/06/oig-public-safety-section-issues-second-interim-report-on-the-chicago-police-departments-execution-of-search-warrants/>.

problem and identifying process failures. CPD has used CMS, intended to track complaints of officer misconduct, to track wrong raid incidents. However, the categories into which allegations of misconduct may be divided are broad and lack instruction on how incidents with multiple allegations of misconduct should be categorized. Tracking wrong raid incidents in CMS also relies on an additional administrative step to the post-service reporting procedure by CPD members. Combined with the widely varying classification of these incidents in CMS, CPD's use of complaint records as its primary method of tracking wrong raid incidents has hindered CPD and the public's ability to measure and understand the issue of wrong raids in Chicago.

Further, OIG analyzed a sample of search warrant files for negative residential search warrants, search warrants that did not result in an arrest or the seizure of any evidence. OIG found that the documented investigations completed prior to the service of the search warrant for these negative search warrants did not demonstrate sufficient steps taken to ensure service of the warrant at the correct location. Most notably, these files lacked records of investigative steps taken to connect the subject—the individual who is named in the warrant—to the location specified on the warrant, including evidence of a failure to conduct pre-service surveillance of the location where the warrant was to be served. CPD's revised Search Warrant Development form posted in January 2023 included checkboxes for specific investigative steps to be taken and law enforcement-specific investigative tools to be used to verify information on the subject and target location of a search warrant. The introduction of this form has the potential to help the Department ensure that affiants take sufficient investigative steps prior to the service of a search warrant.

OIG also found that CPD's pre-service investigations have been hindered by units' varying access to investigative tools, resources to register confidential informants, and levels of experience in developing search warrants. For example, for all residential search warrants served from 2017 to 2021, OIG found that the Narcotics Division, the unit that has served the most search warrants, had a relatively low negative search warrant service rate of 7%, lower than that of the Department-wide negative rate of 10%. Experienced affiants—CPD members tasked with the preparation of the warrant—and search team supervisors—CPD members of the rank of Sergeant or above who oversee search warrant service—reported that access to investigative databases and resources varies widely by unit and member, and members from the Confidential Matters Unit, which is responsible for processing the registration of confidential informants, reported that CPD Districts do not tend to register sources with the Department, unlike specialized units such as the Narcotics Division. As the Department implements changes such as introducing the Search Warrant Development form to guide pre-service investigations, it should be mindful of the limitations that exist in its operations, particularly the inconsistent access to investigative tools across members and units.

Lastly, OIG found that CPD maintained search warrant documentation such as copies of the Complaint for Search Warrant (CSW) and the search warrant in paper search warrant files, and that storage of these files has been decentralized and housed by individual units or individual members. Additionally, within the sample search warrant files for negative residential search warrants analyzed, OIG found that files were incomplete, lacking documentation of pre-service investigations, supervisory approvals, and operational plans. For example, only 14% of the files analyzed contained documentation of pre-service investigative results establishing the identity of the subject named in the warrant. As indicated by the draft search warrants policy and forms the Department posted in January 2023, CPD's anticipated new electronic data application holds the potential to improve search warrant record maintenance with improvements to documentation of

pre-service investigations and operational planning, and documentation of CPD supervisory review and approval.

Community-Police Mediation Pilot Program (July 2023)

Pursuant to MCC §§ 2-56-030 and -230 and as required by paragraph 558(f) of the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, OIG conducted an inquiry into the City's pilot non-disciplinary, complainant-involved mediation program for misconduct complaints against members of CPD made by members of the public.⁶ The pilot program began in October 2022 in response to a consent decree requirement, which mandates that the City "develop a new mediation policy governing the resolution of disciplinary actions by the agreement of the CPD member and non-CPD member complainant."⁷ The non-disciplinary, complainant-involved mediation pilot program, known as the community-police mediation program, as outlined in the consent decree is distinct from a historical process referred to as "mediation," in which a CPD member accused of misconduct and the involved investigating agency might have reached an agreement as to the member's acknowledged violation of rules or policies and the discipline to be imposed. OIG did not examine the previously existing disciplinary mediation process, and instead examined the new community-police mediation program, which existed only in the form of a pilot as of May 2023.

The objectives of OIG's inquiry were to review and analyze the City's policies, practices, outcomes, and data, and to identify areas for further consideration in finalizing a program for the mediation of misconduct complaints involving non-CPD member complainants.

OIG identified several challenges with the community-police mediation pilot program. Those were:

- In general, more community members and CPD members did not proceed with mediation than did, where only eight mediation sessions were held during the pilot.
- CPD members' work shifts and community members' availability were an obstacle to scheduling timely community-police mediation sessions.
- Future resources for the community-police mediation program, including staffing and funding, have not been identified.
- Tracking and documentation of mediation referrals and outcomes in CMS is inconsistent.

OIG's analysis of the community-police mediation pilot program raised questions for further consideration as the program is modified and implemented after the conclusion of the pilot. Those were:

- how the City plans to ensure long-term solutions for budgetary concerns, including both funding for the mediation provider(s) and funding to support COPA's increase in workload and staffing;

⁶ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Community-Police Mediation Pilot Program," July 25, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/community-police-mediation-pilot-program/>.

⁷ Consent Decree at ¶1510-12, *State of Illinois v. City of Chicago*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 31, 2019).

- in its development of City policies, how the City will ensure clear guidelines for which City entity has ownership over the community-police mediation program, including the roles and responsibilities of all entities involved;
- how COPA and CPD will ensure that the information on the execution of the community-police mediation program in their internal guidance and/or policy aligns with the City's interagency policy and each other;
- how the City will ensure that the mediation provider(s) consider the location and time limitations of community members when scheduling mediations, for example by offering alternatives such as virtual mediation sessions;
- how COPA, CPD, and the Center for Conflict Resolution will coordinate to ensure that cases referred to community-police mediation are tracked and that the complaints are being addressed, either through mediation or through standard investigative practices; and
- how COPA and CPD will engage community members to inform them that non-disciplinary, complainant-involved mediation is an available option to resolve conflicts with CPD members through the community-police mediation program.

Enforcement of the Chicago Police Department's Rules Requiring Members to Report Misconduct (August 2023)

As mandated by the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, OIG conducted an inquiry into the enforcement of CPD's Rules 21 and 22, which prohibit CPD members from "[f]ail[ing] to report promptly to the Department any information concerning any crime or other unlawful action," and from "[f]ail[ing] to report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the Department," respectively.⁸ Alleged violations of CPD's Rules and Regulations are usually investigated by BIA and COPA, both of which come within the scope of OIG's inquiry into the enforcement of CPD's rules imposing a duty to report misconduct.

Requirements which mandate CPD members to report misconduct by other members are in tension with the cultural "code of silence" which City leadership has acknowledged throughout the last decade. In order to overcome reticence to report misconduct and the fear of retaliation, policy experts suggest that members of law enforcement agencies should have multiple ways to report peer misconduct, including anonymously. Although requirements in the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago* and CPD's directives aim to encourage and improve CPD members' reporting of misconduct, OIG found that CPD members are currently operating under two sets of policies at

⁸ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Enforcement of the Chicago Police Department's Rules Requiring Members to Report Misconduct," August 3, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/enforcement-of-cpds-requiring-members-to-report-misconduct/>. Chicago Police Department, "Rules and Regulation of the Chicago Police Department," April 16, 2015, accessed April 17, 2023, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6412>. Consent Decree, *State of Illinois v. City of Chicago*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 31, 2019).

odds with one another—one that ostensibly allows them to report misconduct in a myriad of ways, and another that invalidates any reporting done outside the Department’s chain of command.⁹

The objectives of OIG’s inquiry were to determine whether:

- CPD’s current training accurately and thoroughly educates members on expectations of compliance with Rules 21 and 22;
- the methods currently available to Department members to report misconduct align with the purpose of Rules 21 and 22;
- the available complaint data from COPA and BIA demonstrates compliance with and enforcement of Rules 21 and 22; and
- any structural obstacles exist that prevent the effective compliance with or enforcement of Rules 21 and 22.

OIG found the following:

- 1 | CPD informs members of their duty to report misconduct during recruit training but does not formally reinforce this requirement through ongoing training or messaging.
- 2 | Consent decree provisions and CPD directives inhibit effective enforcement of Rules 21 and 22 and contravene best practices by establishing that certain methods of reporting do not satisfy members’ duty to report misconduct.
- 3 | COPA and BIA do not consistently pursue violations of Rule 21 and Rule 22, which compromises enforcement of the rules, and inhibits any thorough analysis of failures to report—on the part of individual members or agency-wide.

To improve the enforcement of Rules 21 and 22, OIG recommended the following:

1. CPD should formally incorporate duty to report requirements into its in-service training program and should issue periodic communications to remind members of and refresh them on their duty to report misconduct.
2. CPD should resolve internal inconsistencies in its own policies which permit and protect anonymous reporting mechanisms but render anonymous reports inadequate to satisfy members’ duty to report. Similarly, CPD should work with other entities as necessary to address the same inconsistency in the terms of the consent decree, in the interest of ensuring that members may discharge their duty to report without fear of, or exposure to, risks of retaliation.
3. CPD should take all necessary steps to enact policies allowing for trackable, verified, anonymous misconduct complaints made through OIG’s CPD Member Hotline—or another, similar system—to satisfy members’ reporting obligations.
4. CPD should regularly inform members of all methods available to report misconduct (i.e., contacting BIA, COPA, or OIG; anonymously reporting to COPA or OIG; and anonymously reporting via OIG’s CPD Member Hotline) and include all methods within its training materials, directives, and on its CPD Employee Services webpage.

⁹ Consent Decree, *State of Illinois v. City of Chicago*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 31, 2019).

5. COPA and BIA should consistently pursue Rule 21 and/or Rule 22 violations when members fail to report misconduct or criminal activity, along with any other applicable rule violations, and should adopt or update policies and trainings as necessary to do so.

Chicago Police Department 911 Response Time Data Collection and Reporting (September 2023)

OIG conducted an inquiry into CPD's data collection and reporting of response times for 911 calls for emergency police service.¹⁰ The objectives of the inquiry were to determine the completeness rates of CPD response times recorded by CPD and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), and to identify factors contributing to missing response time data for 911 calls for CPD service.

As a result of this inquiry, OIG found that CPD's data collection of 911 response times is incomplete; the Department fails to record timestamps for various statuses throughout the dispatch and police response for a substantial number of 911 calls. Calls for high priority emergency events had a higher rate of recorded response times for all statuses that occur during a unit's response (Acknowledge, En-route, and On-scene) compared to calls for events with a lower priority classification. The timepoint in the police response process that is least often recorded is the On-scene time, or the time when the responding CPD unit arrives at the location of service; this remains true regardless of call priority level or geographic location. The On-scene status is the last time point in the sequence of events before responding members engage with an emergency event, which may contribute to the low On-scene time completeness rates. Additionally, the interface of the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which records a timestamp when CPD members enter their response status, displays the response status buttons sequentially, and is dependent on the previous status in the process being entered.

When an individual calls 911 for police service in Chicago, the call goes first to a 911 call taker within OEMC's emergency call center who creates an event in the CAD, selects the appropriate event type, and sends the event to an OEMC dispatcher for assignment to a CPD unit or units. The dispatcher monitors the availability of CPD units in their geographic area and assigns dispatch jobs based on event priority and availability of CPD units. OIG found that in both policy and practice, CPD and OEMC align in assigning the responsibility of recording response statuses to dispatched CPD members. OIG confirmed that when timestamps throughout CPD's response to 911 calls are entered, it is primarily CPD members and not OEMC staff who record the times. OEMC dispatchers have the ability to record times but do so less frequently. OIG also found that CPD lacks monitoring systems to ensure dispatched CPD members adhere to the response status data entry

¹⁰ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Chicago Police Department 911 Response Time Data Collection and Reporting," September 6, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/chicago-police-department-911-response-time-data-collection-and-reporting/>.

requirements laid out in CPD directive “U01-06: Portable Data Terminal,” and overall data entry for response status timestamps remains inconsistent. Highly incomplete response time data impedes any analysis of factors contributing to fast or slow response times; process failures and areas for improvement; and any disparities which might exist across the city in the timeliness of 911 responses.

Further, OIG found that the City’s current public reporting of CPD 911 response times and plans for improvement of the collection of response times focus on the On-scene time but neglect other critical time points in the 911 response process needed for a comprehensive review of how long it actually takes for police to arrive at the scene of an emergency. OEMC and CPD reported that they will be transitioning to a new CAD system recently procured by the City. The new system promises to bring an automated solution for the recording of On-scene times. The new system will not, however, offer technological solutions to automate the collection of other times in the police response process. Similarly, the public dashboard of CPD 911 response time data published by the Office of Public Safety Administration (OPSA) only reports completeness rates for the On-scene timepoint and only calculates the time from Dispatch to On-scene. A complete analysis of police 911 response times must evaluate all critical intervals in the process to assess areas of need for procedural improvements and to identify drivers of delayed response times.

OIG recommended the following:

1. CPD should review the contents of its policy “U01-06: Portable Data Terminal” and provide guidance to members that reinforces their responsibility for the timely entry of PCAD statuses and timestamps throughout the event dispatch process, such as through Academy and field training, job supervision, and clear written guidance.
2. CPD should coordinate with OEMC to audit PMIS data for data completeness to ensure compliance with the response time data entry requirements of CPD policy.
3. CPD should collaborate with OPSA in the development and implementation of any new CAD system to optimize the user interface to reduce barriers to CPD members’ consistent entry of status updates in real time.
4. CPD should ensure that all vehicles that respond to 911 calls are equipped with a PDT device, or equivalent equipment to enable use of the new CAD system.
5. To comprehensively evaluate response time data for operational improvements, CPD should:
 - a. analyze data for each time interval in the dispatch process, not only time from Dispatch to On-scene, and
 - b. evaluate methodological best practices in calculating police response times and consider how methodological decisions will impact the reported results of its analyses, such as:
 - i. how missing data impacts response times analyses,
 - ii. how response times are calculated for a single emergency event that is called into 911 multiple times, and
 - iii. how response times are calculated for jobs where multiple CPD units are dispatched to a single event.

Of the five recommendations OIG made to CPD, the Department agreed with or reported that it had already begun work to implement three of OIG’s recommendations—#1, #3, and #4. CPD agreed

to consider recommendations #2 and #5, citing limited manpower, technology, and bandwidth as potential barriers to implementation.

Understanding the City of Chicago Police Department's Budget 2023 (October 2023)

In its third annual Budget Explainer, OIG provided stakeholders and taxpayers with basic, foundational information about the City's budget and budget process, and how CPD's budget is built. CPD is the City of Chicago's largest department, and a large percentage of the City's overall budget goes to fund CPD and other policing-related costs.¹¹

Recent Developments on Chicago Police Department's Use of Gang Data (November 2023)

In the Community Commission for Public Safety and Accountability's (CCPSA) first exercise of its policy-setting authority, the CCPSA amended CPD General Order "G01-03" to direct CPD's collection and use of gang affiliation data. This development was the latest in a years-long public policy conversation around CPD's collection and use of gang affiliation information. OIG published this product to ensure that Chicagoans and other stakeholders are well-informed as policies and practices continue to evolve.¹²

¹¹ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Understanding the City of Chicago Police Department's Budget 2023," October 12, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/cpd-budget-explainer-2023/>.

¹² City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Recent Developments on Chicago Police Department's Use of Gang Data," November 16, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/developments-on-cpd-gang-data/>.

Follow-up to OIG's Review of Compliance with the City of Chicago Video Release Policy for Use of Force Incidents (December 2023)

OIG completed a follow-up to its 2020 review of the City of Chicago Video Release Policy (VRP or the Policy).¹³ Based on the responses of the involved agencies—COPA, OEMC, CPD, and the Mayor's Office—OIG concluded that the departments implemented corrective actions related to the initial findings to varying degrees.

The purpose of OIG's original inquiry was to determine the City's level of compliance with its Video Release Policy, which was first implemented in February 2016 based on a recommendation from the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF). PATF was created by former Mayor Rahm Emanuel following the City's lengthy delay in releasing video footage of the October 2014 fatal shooting of Laquan McDonald by a CPD member. Video of the incident was not publicly released until November 2015, and then only by a court order following multiple attempts by local journalists to obtain the footage. Among its findings, PATF determined that releasing video, audio, and police documents of certain police use of force incidents—firearm discharges, taser discharges, and great bodily harm or death in custody—promotes transparency, which is essential for fostering trust between police and the community.¹⁴

The City's Video Release Policy now mandates that these materials be released within 60 days or sooner. Under the Policy, COPA is responsible for identifying all use of force incidents to which the Policy applies and publicly releasing the related materials. CPD's Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC) is responsible for notifying COPA of all relevant incidents. COPA relies on other agencies, notably CPD and OEMC, to provide it with video and audio files subject to disclosure under the Policy.

In 2020, OIG found that COPA was not in compliance with the Policy's requirements regarding timely video release, with a significant share of incidents being released after the deadline. This condition was exacerbated by delays in OEMC's provision of materials to COPA and confusion about CPD's responsibility to notify COPA of incidents covered by the Policy.

Based on its original findings, OIG made 11 recommendations addressed to COPA, OEMC, CPD, and the Mayor's Office, suggesting changes aimed at improving the City's compliance with the VRP. Regarding the timeliness of video release, OIG recommended that COPA use the date of an incident, rather than the date upon which COPA was notified of an incident, to calculate release

¹³ City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Follow-up to OIG's Review of Compliance with the City of Chicago Video Release Policy for Use of Force Incidents," December 20, 2023, <https://igchicago.org/publications/follow-up-review-of-compliance-with-the-citys-video-release-policy/>.

¹⁴ Police Accountability Task Force, "Recommendations for Reform: Restoring Trust between the Chicago Police and the Communities they Serve," April 2016, accessed December 14, 2023, https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf.

deadlines; that COPA implement a quality control process to ensure timely release of materials; that COPA and OEMC collaborate to ensure expedited transfer of materials from OEMC to COPA in cases where such materials might be eligible for release; that the Mayor's Office, COPA, and OEMC develop binding directives governing the timeline of the release of OEMC materials to COPA; that the City conduct a needs assessment for OEMC to ensure timely release of materials; and that, if necessary, COPA personnel be given direct access to OEMC data needed to assess whether an incident is eligible for release.

Further, regarding the finding that CPIC personnel at CPD may not adequately notify COPA of the full universe of relevant use of force incidents, OIG recommended that CPD replace its notification matrix document with binding directives regarding when and how CPD members are to notify COPA of incidents covered by the Policy; that CPIC notify COPA when unsure if a death or injury in police custody resulted from police action; that CPD train CPIC members on their notification duties; and that CPIC and COPA collaboratively develop quality assurance measures to ensure COPA is notified of all eligible incidents.

Finally, after finding that COPA's discretion may be inadequately guided on the question of releasing videos related to incidents not explicitly covered by the Policy, OIG recommended that the Mayor's Office and the Department of Law (DOL) update the Policy to reflect whether discretionary releases by COPA are allowed and, if so, what guidelines should govern the exercise of that discretion.

In their respective responses to the original report, the four agencies described the corrective actions they would take, largely concurring with OIG's recommendations.

In its follow-up, OIG found that COPA significantly improved its on-time posting of relevant incidents, fully addressing the problem of calculating release deadlines; took steps toward implementing an internal process to ensure timely release of all materials, beyond calculating release deadlines correctly; and successfully collaborated with OEMC to ensure COPA's video requests were expedited. However, this inter-agency cooperation did not result in binding directives prescribing a timeline for OEMC production of materials to COPA. Further, COPA did not demonstrate progress toward collaborating with CPIC to develop quality assurance measures to ensure that CPIC notifies COPA of all appropriate incidents.

OEMC addressed most of the concerns raised in OIG's review by working with COPA and OPSA to ensure COPA requests are expedited: COPA adds due dates to its requests, allowing OEMC to appropriately prioritize requests, and OEMC logs the request and its due date into GovQA, a software system that documents and tracks records requests, which then allows OPSA to pull video and deliver it to COPA. Although this process alleviated the agency's backlog of requests from COPA, OEMC did not provide evidence of working with the Mayor's Office to conduct a formal staffing and technology needs assessment nor did it, as noted above, work with COPA to develop binding directives formalizing the timeline for video requests.

CPD fully implemented one OIG recommendation by including a provision in a CPIC directive that requires CPIC personnel to notify COPA of any in-custody death or injury. CPD partially implemented another recommendation by enacting binding directives governing CPIC's process for notifying COPA of Policy-covered incidents. The process details the incidents CPIC must report,

along with the mechanisms by which CPIC should report the information. CPD also reported it was testing out a software solution to further facilitate timely notifications from CPIC to COPA.

CPD, however, did not address the second component of the recommendation, in that the directives still rely on the notification matrix document that OIG recommended replacing. Further, CPD did not implement OIG's two remaining recommendations, related to training CPIC members on their notification duties to COPA and developing quality assurance measures with COPA to ensure reliable notification of all incidents covered by the Policy.

Finally, then-Mayor Lori Lightfoot's Office reported increasing COPA's budget to allow for the hiring and detailing of staff to OEMC if necessary. However, it did not demonstrate progress toward developing binding directives regarding the timeline of OEMC's production of materials to COPA; nor did it provide evidence of having conducted a needs assessment to determine whether OEMC's staffing and budget are sufficient to address the total volume of requests they receive. Lastly, the Mayor's Office did not report that it worked with DOL to update the Policy to reflect how COPA may or may not exercise discretion to release materials related to incidents not specified in the current language of the Policy.

While the steps the four agencies took by the publication of OIG's report were promising and appeared to address the problem of late releases for the short-term, resilient compliance with the City's Video Release Policy will require more substantial process updates, which did not appear to have been implemented as of the publication of OIG's report. OIG urged the City departments involved to fully implement corrective actions.

V | Review of Closed Disciplinary Investigations

The Public Safety section's Investigative Analysis Unit reviews individual closed disciplinary investigations conducted by COPA and BIA. OIG may make recommendations to inform and improve future investigations, and, if it finds a deficiency in a specific investigation that may have materially affected its outcome, may recommend that it be reopened.¹⁵ OIG screens all closed investigations to which it has access and selects certain investigations for in-depth review. Closed investigations are selected for in-depth review based on several criteria, including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the alleged misconduct, and its impact on the quality of police-community relationships; the apparent integrity of the investigation; and the frequency of an occurrence or allegation. Additionally, pursuant to Paragraph 444 of the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, OIG conducted in-depth reviews of all closed investigations involving allegations of sexual misconduct, as defined by the consent decree, against CPD members. Those closed investigations, which are selected for in-depth review, are assessed in a process guided by the standards for peer review of closed cases developed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. OIG assesses sufficiency across several categories, including timeliness, professional standard of care, interviews, evidence collection and analysis, internal oversight, and case disposition. In 2023, the Investigative Analysis Unit screened 1,289 closed disciplinary investigations and opened 82 for in-depth review.

A | Recommendations to Reopen Closed Disciplinary Investigations

Of those closed investigations selected for in-depth review in 2023, OIG recommended that three investigations conducted by BIA and ten investigations conducted by COPA be reopened by the agency to correct deficiencies materially affecting their outcomes. BIA accepted all three recommendations to reopen. COPA declined six recommendations to reopen and reopened four. The results of OIG's 13 recommendations to reopen are outlined below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: OIG Recommendations to Reopen Disciplinary Outcomes, 2023

OIG Case Number	Agency	Response
C2023-000000022	COPA	Accepted recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000074	BIA	Accepted recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000076	COPA	Declined recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000079	COPA	Declined recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000088	COPA	Declined recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000131	COPA	Declined recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000148	COPA	Accepted recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000172	BIA	Accepted recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000209	COPA	Accepted recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000210	COPA	Declined recommendation to reopen

¹⁵ In 2023, these reviews were responsive to Paragraphs 558(d) and 559 of the consent decree and MCC § 2-56-230(c).

C2023-000000233	BIA	Accepted recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000242	COPA	Declined recommendation to reopen
C2023-000000311	COPA	Accepted recommendation to reopen

Detailed below are investigations that OIG recommended be reopened during 2023 that either reached a final disciplinary decision, or which the investigating agency declined to reopen and are in a final status.

Recommendation to Reopen to Investigate All Acts of Potential Misconduct (#C2023-000000076)

OIG reviewed a COPA investigation involving allegations that two CPD Officers and a CPD Sergeant detained, searched, and arrested the complainant without justification. The accused CPD members were containing an active crime scene when the complainant, whose vehicle was within the scene, attempted to access their vehicle despite verbal commands from the members. An additional allegation was brought against the CPD Sergeant that they attempted to strike the complainant with their police vehicle. COPA exonerated the CPD members for the unjustified detainment, search, and arrest allegations, and unfounded the CPD Sergeant's allegation that they attempted to strike the complainant with a police vehicle.

OIG found available evidence that the accused CPD Sergeant committed additional acts of misconduct not addressed by COPA. The investigative file contained body worn camera (BWC) footage from the involved CPD members, which showed the CPD Sergeant interacting with an unknown civilian who was unrelated to the incident involving the complainant. The civilian was seen attempting to walk through an active crime scene despite verbal commands by CPD members. The civilian attempted to walk past the CPD Sergeant and another CPD member, at which point the CPD Sergeant was seen pushing the civilian backward. Another CPD member physically redirects the civilian out of the crime scene as the CPD Sergeant walked toward the complainant. COPA did not bring any allegations against the CPD Sergeant related to this interaction.

During the post-investigative review process, a CPD member assigned to BIA made a note in the case management system that they "noticed several details that do not model appropriate behavior by the accused Sgt. However, COPA deemed exonerated." The note further requested review of the relevant BWC footage, including timestamps of the observed push. Beyond this note, there were no mentions of the CPD Sergeant's additional observed acts of potential misconduct.

OIG recommended that COPA reopen the investigation to investigate all potential acts of misconduct committed by the accused Sergeant and serve allegations as appropriate.

COPA declined OIG's recommendation to reopen, citing section 9.4(C) of the collective bargaining agreement governing the CPD Sergeant's employment which requires COPA's investigation of a sergeant be completed within 18 months of opening. COPA closed its investigation shortly before the 18-month deadline. COPA wrote in their declination letter, "Reopening the case at this time

would be futile because COPA believes an arbitrator would likely reverse or reduce any proposed penalty under the circumstances of this case.”

Recommendation to Reopen to Address False Statement Allegations (#C2023-000000088)

OIG reviewed an investigation conducted by the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), the predecessor agency to COPA, concerning allegations against a then-CPD Commander (still an active CPD member, now at a lower rank) related to an incident that occurred in 2011 at a district station lockup facility. The complainant alleged that the CPD Commander forcibly pressed their hand against the complainant’s nose and face for an extended period of time, threatened them by stating, “I’m gonna push your nose through your brains,” and forcibly pressed their fingers against the complainant’s neck. In addition to allegations of improper use of force, IPRA brought three other allegations including that the Commander failed to properly document their physical contact with the complainant by failing to complete a Tactical Response Report, failed to document that the complainant had been uncooperative and refused to be fingerprinted, and failed to provide medical treatment for the complainant while they were in police custody.

During the Commander’s IPRA interview, they stated that they were requested to the lockup area by two CPD members because the complainant was “acting crazy” and would not stand up and cooperate with processing. The Commander stated that because the complainant was going from being cooperative to uncooperative, they grabbed them in the “escort position” and walked them to the photographing and fingerprinting machines. During this time, the complainant was allegedly screaming, and saliva flew from their mouth with some of it striking the Commander on their face. The Commander stated that, to prevent saliva from hitting them in the face, they placed one hand on the right side of the complainant’s face while grabbing between their arm and shoulder and pushing their head so the complainant faced away from the Commander. The complainant reportedly calmed down and began cooperating with the CPD members involved in processing them.

IPRA requested and received the complainant’s medical records documenting their treatment following this incident. A Preliminary Radiology Report stated that “there is a medially displaced fracture of the medial wall of the left orbit with some medial displacement of the intraorbital fat.” One of the doctors involved in the complainant’s treatment, when interviewed, stated that the type of injuries sustained by the complainant would be caused by a forceful blow.

IPRA sustained allegations that the Commander forcibly pressed their hand against the complainant’s nose/face for an extended period of time and that they threatened the complainant by stating, “I’m gonna push your nose through your brains,” based on witness statements and medical records detailing the complainant’s injuries. IPRA also sustained an allegation that the Commander failed to provide the complainant with medical attention while the complainant was in police custody. IPRA recommended a 15-day suspension for the Commander; then-Superintendent

Eddie Johnson wrote a non-concurrence letter to IPRA stating his belief that “an increased penalty of a thirty-day suspension is more appropriate.”

Following its investigation into the original allegations of misconduct, IPRA served the Commander with four additional allegations. Specifically, IPRA served allegations that the Commander made false statements when they stated that they only put their hand on the right side of the complainant’s face and the side of their head, that they did not forcibly strike the complainant and only used a control technique, that they simply deflected and did not push the complainant’s head, and that they did not forcibly press their hand against the complainant’s nose.

The day after the Commander was served with the additional allegations that they had lied, an attorney faxed a letter to IPRA informing IPRA that the Commander had retained them to assist them in connection with the investigation; the attorney requested that IPRA’s interview of the Commander on the additional allegations be rescheduled. Shortly thereafter, an IPRA investigator contacted the attorney, who refused to schedule an interview before a specified date. According to documents in the investigative file, the IPRA investigator spoke with IPRA’s General Counsel and Chief Administrator and was instructed to reschedule the Commander’s interview and to add an additional allegation that the Commander was impeding IPRA’s investigation. The IPRA investigator rescheduled the interview and sent new documents to the Commander. There was no indication, however, that that interview ever took place. That is, IPRA served the Commander with allegations that he had lied, but never actually interviewed the Commander on those allegations or reached any finding on them.

In September 2017, around the time that COPA was formed and empowered as IPRA’s successor agency, a new COPA investigator was assigned to this matter. There was, however, no documented investigative activity after the Commander was served with allegations of false statements. It appeared that the CPD Commander was served with a notice of 30-day suspension for the original allegations multiple years later, and the Commander elected to file a grievance. As of OIG’s review of the matter, that grievance had apparently not been resolved. It was unclear from the investigative file what, if anything, transpired between the years of the rescheduled interview and the filing of a grievance, including whether COPA undertook any investigative activity during the multiple-year period during which, even as distinct from IPRA, it had the case opened and assigned to an investigator.

OIG recommended that COPA take any necessary and available steps to address the false statement allegations with which the Commander had been served, but about which they were apparently never interviewed.

COPA declined OIG’s recommendation and stated that “a twelve-year-old case with a limited chance of success would not be an efficient use of COPA’s limited resources” and that “the Police Board is likely to dismiss some if not all of the Rule 14 charges in this case.”

Recommendation to Reopen to Address the Conduct of All Involved CPD Members (#C2023-000000079)

OIG reviewed a COPA investigation against an unknown CPD member for making unnecessary physical contact while on duty, and a CPD member for displaying their middle finger at a member of the public. A CPD Lieutenant initiated a complaint against the unknown CPD member after observing their on BWC video grabbing, pulling, and pushing an unidentified youth during an incident involving the recovery of a firearm. COPA's electronic file in CMS contained a note dated March 31, 2022, which stated that a CPD member was captured on BWC displaying their middle finger; the note is accompanied by a screenshot of the BWC footage that shows the CPD member holding up their middle finger.

On March 25, 2022, a CPD member conducted an investigatory stop of a subject after learning from another CPD member watching police observation device (POD) camera surveillance footage that a subject possessed a firearm. During a protective pat down, the CPD member felt an "L-Shape object" consistent with the shape of a firearm in the front waistline of the subject's pants. The CPD member attempted to handcuff the subject who began to resist. Multiple officers converged on the scene in response to a call for emergency assistance. As CPD members were attempting to place the subject into custody, a bystander was heard screaming "fucking assholes" on a CPD member's BWC video, to which the accused CPD member responded by looking back toward the bystander and muttering, "Shut the fuck up bitch," while putting up the middle finger of their left hand. A CPD member physically stopped the accused CPD member from engaging further with the bystander by pushing the accused CPD member's arm down and telling them to stop. It was unclear whether the CPD member who stopped the accused CPD member from further engagement with the bystander reported the accused CPD member's conduct pursuant to CPD's Rule 22, which requires members to "report to the Department any violation of Rules and Regulations or any other improper conduct which is contrary to the policy, orders or directives of the Department."

To identify the unknown CPD member, COPA reviewed the OEMC data from the incident and determined that all CPD personnel whose presence on the scene could be verified were designated as male. COPA also reviewed CPD Attendance and Assignment Sheets; however, according to COPA's review, the female officers "either failed to match the description of the unknown officer or were not on scene." COPA did not attempt to interview any of the CPD members on scene to identify the unknown female officer.

COPA administratively closed the investigation after an unsuccessful identification of the unknown female officer and "[d]ue to lack of clearly objective evidence of misconduct."

COPA failed to investigate the allegation its agency made against the accused CPD member who displayed their middle finger toward a civilian or their use of profanity. Specifically, COPA offered no analysis of whether the accused CPD member's conduct may have violated CPD's Rule 8, which prohibits "disrespect to or maltreatment of any person, while on or off duty." It is imperative that CPD members conduct themselves in a manner that promotes public trust and fosters positive

relationships with members of the community. Further, the expectation is that officers exhibit professionalism, integrity, and respect, as outlined in “General Order G01-01: Vision, Mission Statement, and Core Values.” CPD members are to demonstrate professionalism both on and off duty, hold themselves and others accountable, and endeavor to gain the trust and respect of the public. To earn the trust and respect of the public, and maintain it, officers must demonstrate sound judgment. “General Order G01-01” states that Department members must “recognize that the respect ... owe[d] to ...[community members] is not conditional, and ...recognize that respect as a value must permeate every police action ... [undertaken].”

OIG recommended that COPA reopen this investigation to interview the CPD members on scene to identify the unknown female officer. OIG further recommended that COPA investigate to a finding the allegation that the accused CPD member displayed their middle finger toward a civilian, and their use of profanity as captured on BWC video. Lastly, OIG recommended that COPA conduct an analysis to determine whether the CPD member who physically stopped the accused CPD member from further engagement with the bystander reported the accused CPD member’s conduct, and if not, whether their failure to do so constituted a violation of Rule 22 and other applicable rules and directives.

COPA declined to reopen the investigation stating that “the likelihood to obtain evidence through witness interviews at this time would be small” and “given the age of the case...COPA does not believe that an investigation would result in a material discipline.”

Recommendation to Reopen to Address Improper Use of Force (#C2023-000000131)

OIG reviewed a COPA investigation against a CPD member related to the arrests of two individuals who were on the scene of a homicide investigation. The allegations were initiated by a CPD Lieutenant following video of the arrests posted on social media that showed the accused CPD member “punching or attempting to punch” an arrestee.

According to COPA’s investigative file, on October 3, 2021, a relative of an individual who was arrested was found on a street with a gunshot wound to their head around 3:00 p.m. The accused CPD member and several other Department members responded to the scene and began cordoning off the crime scene with crime scene tape. At the same time, several individuals gathered near the shooting scene. Around the corner from the scene, the accused CPD member and other Department members repeatedly told an arrestee (“Arrestee A”) and other individuals to stay behind the crime scene tape. The accused CPD member’s BWC captured Arrestee A initially not complying with verbal directions and subsequently showed Department members pushing Arrestee A and two other individuals toward the crime scene tape.

After all three individuals present were on the other side of the crime scene tape, the accused CPD member continued to exchange words with the arrestees and directed profanities toward them. The CPD member’s BWC video showed the CPD member going under the crime scene tape and

approaching an unidentified man while Arrestee A stepped between the two of them. A Tactical Response Report (TRR) completed by the CPD member and Arrestee A's Arrest Report stated that the CPD member approached the unidentified man "to conduct an investigation for drinking on the public way" and Arrestee A "immediately got into [the CPD's member's] path blocking [them] from reaching the other subject." According to the incident narrative in the Arrest Report, Arrestee A "then wrapped [their] arms around [the CPD member's] waist, brushing past [the CPD member's] holstered firearm and maintaining control of the [CPD member's] body." The CPD member's TRR described [their] response as pushing back against Arrestee A's left arm with both hands while turning away from Arrestee A to maintain distance. The CPD member's TRR further stated that Arrestee A then "swung [their] left hand towards [the CPD member's] face" and the CPD member moved to avoid this attack and then "delivered a direct mechanical strike" to Arrestee A's face.

The social media video referenced by the CPD Lieutenant in their initiation report captured the interaction between the CPD member and Arrestee A from above and was likely filmed from an upper floor of an apartment building. COPA's summary of the social media video described the physical altercation as follows:

[The CPD member] pushing at [Arrestee A], who put [their] right hand on the left side of [the CPD member's] waist. [Arrestee A] assumed a boxer's stance, and [their] left fist is at one point near [the CPD member's] face. [The CPD member] punched at [Arrestee A] three times, [their] fist seeming to make contact twice. [Arrestee A] backed up, but [Arrestee A's] left arm and hand were raised toward [the CPD member] before the fight ended. [The CPD member] and other officers put [Arrestee A] onto the parkway grass, where [they were] handcuffed.

COPA brought two allegations against the CPD member. COPA sustained an allegation of profanity use as the CPD member admitted to using profanity while speaking to Arrestee A in their statement to COPA. COPA did not sustain on its second allegation, that the CPD member failed to use de-escalation techniques, including distance, to prevent or reduce the need for force when he encountered Arrestee A. COPA recommended a reprimand for the CPD member.

COPA did not bring an allegation or provide any analysis on the CPD's member use of force, despite the fact that the Lieutenant's initiation report which served as the basis of the investigation stated they were "submitting this report in regards to a use of force investigations [sic] involving the [arrest of Arrestee A]." The accused CPD member was captured on multiple videos approaching and punching, or attempting to punch, Arrestee A multiple times. The CPD member's TRR narrative stated [they] "delivered a direct mechanical strike to the subject's face," a "direct mechanical strike that did not connect," and a "third direct mechanical strike to [Arrestee A]." Additionally, in its final summary report, COPA wrote that "after [the CPD member] went under the tape and was confronted by [Arrestee A], the fight that ensued was seemingly one-sided, given the height and weight advantage [the CPD member] had over [Arrestee A] and the perception by [the CPD member] that [Arrestee A] was under the influence of a substance." OIG recommended COPA reopen Log #2019-0003934 to address whether the CPD member's use of force against the arrestee was within Department policy.

COPA declined OIG's recommendation to reopen and stated that "re-opening the case...would not be an efficient use of COPA's resources because the officer's collective bargaining agreement would likely prohibit imposition of discipline at this time." COPA additionally declined OIG's

recommendation based on its assessment that “it was more likely than not that the use of force was authorized under CPD policy given the circumstances the officer faced at the time.”

Recommendation to Reopen to Address All Potential Violations (#C2023-000000172)

OIG reviewed an investigation concerning allegations made by the reporting party that three CPD members improperly arrested and planted a handgun on an arrestee. COPA conducted a preliminary investigation of the alleged improper arrest, which COPA subsequently unfounded. COPA referred the investigation to BIA for the CPD member’s failure to generate an Investigatory Stop Report (ISR).

Three CPD members were on routine patrol when they observed two young men in an alley “huddled closely obstructing the flow of traffic.” Following this observation, the CPD members made a U-turn to ensure the men did not need police assistance and to warn them about being in the flow of traffic. The narrative of the ISR completed for the arrestee states that, as CPD members approached the alleyway, their patrol car’s headlights illuminated the area and the arrestee was seen with a “satchel style bag that contained an outline of an ‘L’ shaped object.” The arrestee reportedly looked at the CPD members, grabbed the satchel, and jumped over a fence. A foot pursuit ensued, and shortly after fleeing, the CPD members detained both the arrestee and the unknown subject. BWC footage captured one of the three CPD members recovering a handgun from the other side of the fence where the arrestee was detained as well as the search of the arrestee’s satchel, which was empty. Throughout this incident, the CPD member who recovered the weapon was heard on their BWC footage questioning whose “pipe” or handgun was recovered, the age of the young men, and who was going to “take” the criminal charge for possession of the weapon. On the BWC recording, the CPD member stated “Ay, now is the last chance for a deal, 50/50, okay? One person is going to come with us, one we don’t give a fuck about, you decide. I’ll let you talk amongst yourselves.” From the 8:50 to 9:03 mark of their BWC footage, the CPD member stated, “Ay, two minutes, we’re leaving, one of you is coming and then I’m going to decide. Just be straight, whose is it? How old are you both, 18? Alright, whose got any cases? Ay, scene secure,” as the CPD member deactivated their BWC. The other two CPD members also abruptly deactivated their BWC.

BIA’s initial investigation only addressed the misconduct of one of the three CPD members. The accused CPD member was issued a summary punishment (SPAR) for their failure to generate an ISR.

OIG’s review of the investigation found that BIA did not investigate or conduct any analysis regarding the improper BWC deactivation by all involved CPD members. In BIA’s Investigative Closing Report, BIA provided a summation of all involved CPD members’ BWC footage and stated that shortly after the CPD member recovered the handgun and said, “The scene is secure,” all three officers terminated their BWC recordings. As outlined in “Special Order S03-14: Body Worn Cameras,” CPD requires that Department members activate their BWC and “record the entire incident for all law-enforcement-related activities” including investigatory stops, foot pursuits, arrests, and statements from individuals during an investigation. BIA did not address the early

deactivation of the BWC in the Notification of Charges/Allegations; therefore, it is unclear why the decision was made to stop recording in the midst of the preliminary investigation.

BIA also did not address two of the CPD members' failures to generate an ISR for the unknown subject detained with the arrestee. During the investigation, all three CPD members were questioned about their completion of an ISR, and none of them could recall who on the team was delegated to submit ISRs that shift. There was only one ISR in the investigative file that was completed for the arrestee. The Accountability Sergeant conducted a search of completed ISRs but could not locate an ISR for the unknown subject. Only one CPD member received a SPAR for failing to generate an ISR for this incident, however, there was no mention of any discipline for the other two CPD members despite there being no ISR documented for the unknown subject. "Special Order S04-13-09: Investigatory Stop System" requires CPD members to complete an ISR any time an investigatory stop is conducted "no later than the end of their tours of duty," as well as provide the subject with a completed Investigatory Stop Receipt.

OIG recommended that BIA reopen the investigation to address the two CPD members who also failed to generate an ISR for the unknown subject, to determine whether the three CPD members prematurely deactivated their BWC recordings while conducting an investigation, and to determine whether their conduct was in violation of any applicable rules and directives.

BIA concurred with OIG's finding and reopened the investigation. BIA issued a reprimand via a SPAR to one CPD member for prematurely deactivating their BWC and a reprimand via a SPAR to one CPD member for failure to generate an ISR and prematurely deactivating their BWC. According to BIA's investigative file, the third CPD member is in an inactive duty status, and it is unclear whether this CPD member received any discipline.

Recommendation to Reopen to Address All Potential Violations (#C2023-000000210)

OIG reviewed a COPA investigation involving a Taser deployment by a CPD member and subsequent arrest of an individual. The investigation was initiated by COPA after receiving a notification of a Taser deployment that occurred on August 22, 2021.

The incident involved two CPD members who responded to a battery call and encountered the arrestee asleep in front of a hotel. CPD Member A apparently attempted to get the arrestee's attention by kicking the bottom of the arrestee's foot and telling the arrestee they needed to leave and could not be in front of the hotel. When the arrestee did not comply with the orders to leave the hotel premises, Member A tried to handcuff them, but was only able to handcuff the arrestee's left wrist, as they attempted to leave. As the arrestee lay on their back, Member A threatened to tase them three times if they did not turn over. The arrestee continuously asked what they did wrong, as they lay on the ground with hands in clear view, and Member A told them four times to turn over. Member A then discharged their Taser at the arrestee for five seconds after they remained on their back and failed to comply with Member A's orders. After the first Taser discharge, Member A asked the arrestee if they were "ready for another one" and then immediately discharged their Taser a second time. After the arrestee continued to lay on their back on the ground, CPD Member B told

Member A to “tase [them] again” and Member A discharged their Taser at the arrestee for a third time. Member A continued to tell the arrestee to give the officers their hands and then discharged their Taser for a fourth time as the arrestee repeatedly yelled, “What did I do?” After Member A told Member B, “Back up, I’m going to tase [them] again,” the arrestee yelled out, “No” and swung at Member A’s Taser but did not make contact. Member A immediately discharged their Taser for a fifth time, telling the arrestee to put their hands behind their back as they screamed out that they wanted to go to the hospital. As the arrestee stood up, Member A discharged their Taser for a sixth time. Additional CPD members responded and assisted in handcuffing and placing the arrestee for transport to Mercy Hospital. Member A’s Taser Download Report showed that the arrestee was “exposed to six reenergized Taser cycles for a cumulative 28 seconds of energy.”

COPA sustained an allegation against Member A for discharging their Taser without justification and sustained an allegation against Member B for failing to intervene when they observed Member A use excessive force. COPA recommended a minimum suspension of 120 days for Member A and 90 days for Member B.

Despite COPA’s findings with respect to CPD Member A, COPA did not investigate or conduct any analysis regarding potential violations of Rule 14 of CPD’s Rules of Conduct, which prohibits making false reports. In COPA’s Final Summary Report, COPA determined the arrestee to be a passive resister, yet Member A told COPA that the arrestee “was an assailant each of the six times” they discharged their Taser. COPA found that Member A’s statement “is wholly refuted by the video evidence,” which showed that the arrestee was lying on their back with their hands in the air in front of them the first time Member A discharged their Taser. In the TRR, Member A detailed that the “offender became verbally and passively resistant” and “I used de-escalation techniques,” but COPA found that “neither [Member A] nor [their] partner attempted to use de-escalation techniques or principles of force mitigation, as required by CPD policy [‘General Order G03-02-01: Response to Resistance and Force Options’].”

While Appendix C of COPA’s Final Summary Report demonstrated that COPA identified this investigation to involve “Failure to Report Misconduct,” COPA did not include or conduct any analysis regarding whether Member B had violated Rules 21 or 22 of CPD’s Rules of Conduct, which require members to report misconduct.

The TRR was completed by Member A for this event and subsequently reviewed and approved by a CPD Lieutenant on August 25, 2021. The CPD Lieutenant found that “[Member A] justifies each use of Taser to gain compliance and/or end further harm to others,” and concluded that “given the totality of the circumstances, specifically the ineffectiveness of the TASER, *R/L believes [Member A] could have used a greater amount of force to affect this arrest.*” (Emphasis added.) The CPD Lieutenant’s examination and approval of Member A’s Taser use in the TRR was in contradiction with COPA’s findings that excessive force was used by Member A in this incident, where COPA concluded that “[Member A’s] Taser discharges were both an egregious violation of CPD’s use of force policy and were retaliatory in nature.” CPD General Orders require that supervisors determine whether a use of force by a member under their supervision may constitute misconduct and therefore require notification to COPA.

OIG recommended that COPA reopen this investigation to address potential violations of Rules 14, 21, and 22 by the accused CPD members, and consider whether any allegations were appropriate against the CPD Lieutenant.

COPA declined OIG's recommendation to reopen the investigation. With respect to Member A, COPA stated that since they had "no evidence that [Member A] intended to mislead or fabricate" their account of the incident, "COPA therefore cannot find that re-opening this case on this basis is an efficient use of its resources." For Member B, COPA noted "that it has already recommended significant discipline" and it is "unlikely that COPA's recommendation would change materially based on new allegations." COPA also determined that reopening the case to investigate the CPD Lieutenant would not be an efficient use of resources, given that COPA would have had to complete its investigation by February 2023 since the language in the lieutenant's collective bargaining agreement requires investigations be completed within 18 months.

Recommendation to Reopen to Investigate All Appropriate Allegations (C2023-000000242)

OIG reviewed a COPA investigation alleging that a CPD member used excessive force against the complainant when they tased the complainant during their arrest. The complainant also alleged the inappropriate touching of their genital area by an unidentified CPD member.

According to CPD's case report, on November 21, 2020, CPD members initiated a traffic stop after observing inoperable headlights and no front or back plates on a white Cadillac. The accused CPD member approached the complainant and asked for their information, but the complainant refused. The accused CPD member ordered the complainant out of the vehicle multiple times. A passenger located in the backseat passenger's side of the car suddenly jumped towards the front driver console and attempted to move the vehicle. At the same time, another CPD member observed the passenger manipulate their right hip with their hand. That CPD member yelled "gun" suspecting the passenger may be armed. The accused CPD member fired their Taser and struck the passenger suspected to be armed in their lower left back. The passenger who had been struck with the Taser exited the vehicle and fled on foot. The other occupants of the vehicle, including the complainant, remained at the scene.

During their interview with COPA, the complainant alleged that they were searched by a CPD member at the district station. While in the holding cell, the complainant asked a female CPD member if they could take them to the restroom. The female CPD member entered the holding cell and told the complainant they had to be checked again. The complainant alleged that the female CPD member became aggressive by throwing them against the wall, kicking their legs open, and fondling them in a "sexual harassing manner." The complainant further stated that the female CPD member reached into their bra and inside their pants and underwear, groping them on their breast and genital area. The female CPD member then moved their hands quickly across the complainant's buttocks before moving their hand around the front and placing their hand on the complainant's vagina.

COPA administratively closed this investigation as a non-disciplinary closure under its Timeliness Initiative Project (TIP). According to COPA's Timeliness Initiative Project policy, "[a]ll investigations that will exceed the 18-month timeframe or have no reasonable certainty of concluding within 18 months are eligible for closure under the TIP, unless there are viable allegations..." COPA lists several viable allegations that would disqualify an investigation from a non-disciplinary closure,

including sexual misconduct. COPA made no record of whether it conducted any additional investigation to identify the CPD member who allegedly groped the complainant.

OIG recommended that COPA reopen the investigation, investigate appropriate allegations, and close the matter in accordance with policy; however, COPA declined OIG's recommendation stating that they were "unable to corroborate the complainant's accusations."

B | Notification

Notification to the Chicago Police Department Regarding Possible Work Stoppage (May 2023)

OIG received a complaint that unnamed members of CPD were planning a work stoppage in association with then-Mayor-elect Brandon Johnson's taking office.

Article 5 of the collective bargaining agreements (CBA) governing members of both the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and Police Benevolent Protective Association (PBPA) explicitly prohibits those members from striking. Specifically, Section 5.1 of each CBA states, in part, that no covered member "will call, institute, authorize, participate in, sanction, encourage, or ratify any strike, work stoppage, or other concerted refusal to perform duties by any [member or group of members], or the concerted interference with, in whole or in part, the full, faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment with the employer." Section 5.4 provides that any FOP or PBPA member who violates Section 5.1 "shall be subject to immediate discharge," not subject to the due process protections otherwise granted to a member who is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding.

OIG did not undertake to investigate whether, in fact, officers were planning a work stoppage. However, due to the serious nature of the rumored conduct and the significance of the potential consequences, OIG issued a notification to CPD on May 12, 2023, so that CPD could take whatever action it deemed appropriate. In its response dated June 13, 2023, CPD thanked OIG for raising the concern and noted that it was not aware of any work stoppage that had occurred in association with Mayor Johnson's taking office.

C | Recommendations to Inform and Improve Future Investigations

Recommendations to Inform and Improve Storage and Labeling of Body Worn Camera Footage (May 2023)

Over the course of OIG's review of closed disciplinary investigations, programmatic inquiries, and its own investigations into allegations of police misconduct, OIG encountered instances in which footage captured by CPD members' BWC was mislabeled in the web-based repository in which it is stored. This mislabeling of BWC footage impacts the ability of both CPD and Chicago's police accountability agencies to locate and retrieve all footage from an event, thereby compromising

disciplinary and criminal investigations and jeopardizing the City's ability to meet its legal and constitutional obligations to disclose information.

In order to inform and improve future investigations, OIG recommended that CPD coordinate with OEMC, Axon Enterprises, and any other entities as necessary, to assess the processes in place for tagging BWC footage with event numbers, and take corrective action as appropriate to ensure that all footage of an incident that is recorded with BWC can reliably be retrieved.

CPD agreed with OIG's assessment of the potential consequences that may result from the inability to properly locate BWC footage of an event. In response to OIG's recommendations, CPD published an administrative message, in line with similar messages published previously, reminding members of the importance of following the proper steps to ensure BWC footage is appropriately labeled. CPD also noted it is transitioning from its current BWC system to a new system that is equipped with a GPS-based tracking system, which CPD reported will allow for easier tracking and cataloging of BWC footage. OIG encouraged CPD to continue to take active measures to ensure BWC footage is properly labeled and easily retrievable in the new system.

Recommendations to Inform and Improve Future Investigations Regarding Fatal Motor Vehicle Accidents Conducted by CPD and COPA (May 2023)

During its regular review of closed disciplinary investigations conducted by BIA and COPA, OIG identified a policy that may have caused confusion around investigative jurisdiction for officer-involved fatal motor vehicle accidents where the victim of the accident was not involved in the underlying law enforcement action.

The case reviewed by OIG involved an officer who, while en route to a call for police assistance, fatally struck an individual riding on a motorbike. The individual who was killed in the accident was not involved in the circumstances which gave rise to the call for police assistance.

COPA received a notification of the incident and determined that it was not within the agency's jurisdiction and referred the case to BIA. BIA conducted a preliminary investigation and Administratively Closed the investigation without an explanation.

OIG determined that neither BIA nor COPA investigated the motor vehicle accident to determine whether the officer involved engaged in misconduct that led to the fatal incident.

OIG identified several laws and policies which speak to the investigation of an officer-involved fatal motor vehicle accident, including the Police and Community Relations Improvement Act (PCRIA) 50 ILCS 727/1-5, the MCC § 2-78-120 (d) and (e), COPA's Rules and Regulations Section 3.10.3.1, and CPD's "Special Order S08-03: Traffic Crash/Pursuit Review." According to OIG's review, there was some ambiguity across the sources of authority on the appropriate handling of disciplinary investigations involving fatal motor vehicle accidents.

In order to inform and improve future investigations, OIG recommended that COPA and BIA: (1) confer to address and resolve the apparent confusion regarding which investigating agency has

jurisdiction over officer-involved fatal motor vehicle accidents where the victim of the accident was not involved in the underlying law enforcement action; (2) work with the City Council's Committee on Public Safety to update the MCC to align with PCRIA as relevant here, and to clarify the circumstances under which COPA has jurisdiction to investigate fatal motor vehicle accidents; and, (3) update their written policies regarding officer-involved fatal motor vehicle accidents to align with relevant and applicable law.

In response to OIG's recommendations, COPA conferred with BIA to resolve confusion around jurisdictional issues with officer-involved fatal motor vehicle accidents. COPA updated its written policy for consistency with the statements of COPA's jurisdiction under PCRIA and the MCC and will update its Rules and Regulations. COPA disagreed with OIG's recommendation to work with City Council's Committee on Public Safety to update the MCC to align with PCRIA, reporting its view that such an update would be unnecessary. CPD responded that it was updating its relevant directive but disagreed that an update to the MCC would be required. CPD also advised that BIA reopened the individual investigation the review of which prompted OIG's recommendations.

Recommendations to Inform and Improve Police Board Decisions (October 2023)

Pursuant to the MCC § 2-56-230(b)(f), OIG conducts reviews of policies, procedures, and practices of the Chicago Police Board's (Police Board) disciplinary hearings and decisions to determine whether discipline is "consistently and fairly applied" and to make recommendations to inform and improve its work.

During its review of decisions made by the Police Board, OIG identified an inconsistency concerning the Police Board's Findings and Decisions in 21 PB 2994. At issue in that matter were allegations involving the use of a chokehold by a Chicago Police Department (CPD) member and the failure to report the chokehold by two CPD supervisors.

The Police Board found a CPD member guilty of seven rule violations stemming from their unjustified use of a chokehold. Two CPD supervisors faced allegations that they failed to report that the CPD member used excessive force and that they failed to adequately address the CPD member's incomplete Tactical Response Report. Both supervisors were charged with violating Rule 3 of CPD's Rules of Conduct, which prohibits any failure to promote the Department's efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals, and Rule 22, which prohibits failure to report misconduct.

In the Police Board's decision, the Police Board acknowledged that both supervisors reviewed video footage of the incident on more than one occasion; however, neither CPD supervisor identified the misconduct that the Police Board itself identified in its review of that same video. The Police Board wrote in its decision that the two CPD supervisors had "no reason to suspect an illegal chokehold"—despite themselves finding evidence of an illegal chokehold—and found the two CPD supervisors Not Guilty of all charges.

OIG found the Police Board's decision as related to the CPD supervisor's alleged misconduct was inconsistent with its decision related to the misconduct of the CPD member based on its review of the same video. To inform and improve future decisions, OIG recommended that the Police Board ensure internal factual consistency across findings in a case, and that it thoroughly enforces CPD's rules and policies requiring its members to report misconduct.

In response to OIG's recommendation, the Police Board agreed generally that it should strive "to ensure internal factual consistency across findings in a case, and ensure that it thoroughly enforces CPD's rules and policies requiring its members to report misconduct," but noted that the Police Board's decision was its "best and final reasoning."

D | Investigations of Sexual Misconduct Allegations Against Chicago Police Department Members

Pursuant to Paragraph 444 of the consent decree entered in *Illinois v. Chicago*, BIA and COPA are required to provide OIG its investigative files "[w]ithin ten days of the final disciplinary decision of each complaint of sexual misconduct against a CPD member alleging conduct against a non-CPD member." Paragraph 444 further mandated OIG's Public Safety section to "review and analyze" each of these closed sexual misconduct investigations "to assess[] the quality of" the investigations, to "provide aggregate data on" the reviewed investigations, and to, if necessary, "recommend[] changes in policies and practices."¹⁶ OIG has been released from its consent decree obligations but continues to review closed sexual misconduct cases and will report annually on its findings.

1 | Sexual Misconduct Notifications to OIG

In 2021, BIA created in their CMS, which it shares with COPA, a designation for investigators to flag CPD sexual misconduct cases that would notify OIG via email of the completion of their investigation. In 2023, through its regular screening process of individual closed disciplinary investigations conducted by BIA and COPA pursuant to MCC § 2-56-230(c), OIG reviewed 72 investigations which involved allegations of sexual misconduct by CPD members. Of the cases reviewed, OIG found that 19 which had been flagged as sexual misconduct in CMS did not meet the applicable definition of sexual misconduct in Paragraph 782 of the consent decree.¹⁷ Of the 53 investigations that did satisfy that definition, OIG received notifications from BIA or COPA on 25 cases (47.2%) after the investigation was completed. However, OIG did not receive notifications from the investigating agencies for 28 (52.8%) of the reviewed sexual misconduct cases that met the criteria outlined in Paragraph 782.

¹⁶ Consent Decree at ¶444.

¹⁷ Paragraph 782 of the consent decree defines sexual misconduct as: "any behavior by a CPD member that takes advantage of the member's position in law enforcement to misuse authority and power (including force) in order to commit a sexual act, initiate sexual contact with another person, or respond to a perceived sexually motivated cue (from a subtle suggestion to an overt action) from another person; any sexual communication or behavior by a CPD member that would likely be construed as lewd, lascivious, inappropriate, or conduct unbecoming of a member; any attempted or completed act by a CPD member of nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration, as defined in Section 11-0.1 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 2012; any attempted or completed act by a CPD member of criminal sexual assault, as defined in Sections 11-1.20 through 11-1.40 of the Illinois Criminal Code; any attempted or completed act by a CPD member of criminal sexual abuse, as defined in Sections 11-1.50 and 11-1.60 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 2012." Consent Decree at ¶782, *State of Illinois v. City of Chicago*, No. 17-cv-6260 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 31, 2019).

2 | Final Dispositions of Investigations

In 2023, COPA closed 38 qualifying sexual misconduct investigations, 11 more than in 2022. BIA closed 15 qualifying sexual misconduct investigations, 9 more than in 2022. Of the 53 qualifying sexual misconduct cases reviewed by OIG, a total of 14 cases were investigated to a finding. In 2023, COPA and BIA administratively closed a combined total of 39 cases after a preliminary investigation, short of an investigative finding, 73.6% of all qualifying sexual misconduct investigations reviewed by OIG. Of the seven cases with Sustained findings, four were sustained on allegations unrelated to sexual misconduct. The recommended discipline for the three cases with Sustained sexual misconduct findings ranged from two-day suspension to separation. Figure 2 below outlines the case dispositions by investigative agency.

Figure 2: Investigation Outcomes by Investigating Agency, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023

Investigating Agency	Case Disposition		
	Sustained Findings	Non-Sustained Findings	Administratively Closed ¹⁸
COPA	2	2	34
BIA	5	5	5

Source: OIG Analysis

Of the 53 qualifying sexual misconduct investigations reviewed by POG in 2023, OIG identified material deficiencies in three COPA investigations and made recommendations to reopen. COPA administratively closed all three investigations; two were closed in response to COPA's Timeliness Initiative Project.¹⁹ One investigation OIG recommended to be reopened was to address a non-sexual misconduct allegation. Of the three investigations, COPA accepted OIG's recommendation to reopen one case and declined to reopen two.


¹⁸ In its response to OIG's 2020 advisory on COPA's practice of administratively terminating disciplinary investigations, COPA defined administrative closure as a method used to close an investigation "where, after a preliminary review of the facts, no actionable misconduct is identified, because: the action complained of was not misconduct; the conduct or actors are not within COPA jurisdiction; or the incident occurred more than five years prior to receipt of the complaint and there is insufficient objective and verifiable evidence to support seeking the Superintendent's approval to open an investigation." City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, "Advisory Concerning the Civilian Office of Police Accountability's Practice of Administratively Terminating Disciplinary Investigations," 21, <https://igchicago.org/publications/advisory-concerning-the-civilian-office-of-police-accountabilitys-practice-of-administratively-terminating-disciplinary-investigations/>.

¹⁹ According to COPA's "Special Project Process" policy, the Timeliness Initiative Project is "intended to review open COPA investigations that have, or are likely to, eclipse the 18-month [collective bargaining agreement timeframe for completing an investigation], and to consider each investigation for closure by way of non-disciplinary recommendation." Civilian Office of Police Accountability, "Special Project Process, Timeliness Initiative Project – Phase I," July 17, 2023.

3 | Use of Primary Category Codes

Primary category codes are used within CMS and contain a brief description of the initial allegation with certain categories and subcategories explicitly relating to sexual misconduct or harassment (e.g., “Criminal Sexual Assault,” “Verbal Abuse Unwelcomed Sexual Advances or Requests for Sexual Favors,” etc.).²⁰ Certain incidents may give rise to multiple allegations and the primary category code is assigned based on the first or most serious allegation received at intake by the investigative agency; therefore, allegations of sexual misconduct may be contained within investigations associated with a non-sexual misconduct category code. Figure 3 below depicts the various primary category descriptions assigned to investigations with qualifying sexual misconduct allegations.

Figure 3: Count of Qualifying Sexual Misconduct Cases by Primary Category, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023



Source: OIG Analysis

4 | Criminal Prosecution

Of the 53 qualifying sexual misconduct cases reviewed by OIG in 2023, OIG verified that one case was referred to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (CCSAO) to be reviewed for criminal charges and one case was prosecuted in a jurisdiction outside of Illinois. In some of the investigative files reviewed by OIG, it was not easily discernible whether an investigation had been referred for prosecutorial review. OIG notes that not every allegation of sexual misconduct captured in this analysis rises to the level of a criminal offense. For example, allegations involving lewd or lascivious behavior qualify as sexual misconduct for the purposes of Paragraph 782, but cases with those allegations would be unlikely to be referred for criminal charges.

²⁰ Not every case coded with such category codes have qualifying sexual misconduct allegations. For example, allegations of sexual harassment by a CPD member against another CPD member may be categorized under these codes but do not fall within the definitional parameters of Paragraph 444.

E | Trend Analysis of Closed Disciplinary Investigations

This section was responsive to Paragraphs 558(a) and (b) of the consent decree and is responsive to MCC §2-56-230(a) requiring OIG “[t]o conduct periodic analysis and evaluation” of closed CPD disciplinary investigations to “identify trends and summarize the number and results of such investigations.”²¹ To that end, OIG reports annually on its analysis of trends, including how cases are initiated, the duration of investigations, and complainant demographics.

1 | Closed Investigations and OIG Recommendations²²

In 2023, the Investigative Analysis Unit of OIG’s Public Safety section screened 1,289 closed disciplinary investigations. Of these investigations, 711 investigations (55.2%) were conducted by or under the auspices of BIA and 578 (44.8%) were conducted by COPA.²³


If the Investigative Analysis Unit finds a deficiency in a specific investigation which materially affects its outcome, it may recommend that the investigation be reopened by the investigating agency. In 2023, OIG recommended 13 investigations (1.0% of the 1,289 screened) be reopened by either BIA or COPA. Figure 4 shows the distribution of those recommendations to reopen between BIA and COPA investigations. The remaining 1,276 closed investigations screened by OIG (99.0%) did not contain deficiencies which OIG found to have materially affected the outcome of the investigation such that a recommendation to reopen would have been appropriate. OIG does not recommend reopening investigations in which there was a deficiency in the investigation that does not appear to have materially affected the outcome. Furthermore, when OIG identifies a deficiency that may have materially affected the outcome of an investigation but that could not be remedied by reopening the case—for example, an excessive delay in interviewing a witness—OIG will also generally not recommend reopening. In these and other situations, pursuant to MCC § 2-56-230(c), OIG may make recommendations “to inform and improve future investigations and ensure that they are complete, thorough, objective, and fair.”

²¹ MCC §2-56-230(a).

²² The Public Safety section analyzes and evaluates the results of closed disciplinary investigations conducted by COPA and CPD. OIG’s own Investigations section is also empowered to conduct misconduct investigations of CPD members. The analysis here is limited to investigations conducted by COPA or CPD and subsequently screened by OIG; it does not extend to investigations of misconduct conducted by OIG.


²³ Although certain allegations of misconduct are investigated in CPD Districts by designated Accountability Sergeants, CPD considers District investigations as a subset of BIA investigations since BIA reviews and signs off on these investigations.

Figure 4: Count of Closed Investigations Recommended for Reopening, by Investigating Agency, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023



Source: OIG Analysis

Figure 5: Agency Responses to OIG Recommendations to be Reopened, 2023



Source: OIG Analysis


2 | Investigation Initiation Processes

In 2023, of the 1,289 closed investigations reviewed by the Investigative Analysis Unit, 493 investigations (38.2%) were initiated based on a complaint from an individual to an investigating agency (e.g., COPA, BIA, or OIG) and 368 investigations (28.5%) arose from a complaint from an

individual made directly to a CPD member (e.g., a supervisor responding to the scene of an incident). Thus, a total of 861 (66.8%) closed investigations were initiated from a complainant.²⁴

The remaining closed investigations were initiated from other sources, as depicted in Figure 6 below. COPA is notified of CPD member firearm discharges, and an investigation is automatically initiated into these incidents, even if a separate complaint is not made by a complainant. In Figure 6 below, these incidents are labeled “OIS Notification.” Other incidents—labeled in Figure 6 as “Other CPD Notification”—such as Taser discharges also trigger an automatic investigation.²⁵ Calls for service to 311 or 911 or requests for the appearance of a supervisor may also result in the initiation of an investigation where the responding CPD member reports potential misconduct as required by CPD rules and directives, without receiving a direct complaint from an individual.

Figure 6: Count of Closed Investigations Based on Initiation Type, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023²⁶



Source: OIG Analysis


²⁴ This proportion may be even greater than 66.8%. An alleged victim may also call for a supervisor (the source of 46 closed investigations that OIG screened in 2023) or call for service-CPD involved (31 investigations). Based on documentation from investigative files, it is unclear if an alleged victim intended to file an administrative complaint in these instances.

²⁵ MCC § 2-78-120(c) provides that COPA shall “conduct investigations into all incidents, including those in which no allegation of misconduct is made, in which a Police Department member discharges: (i) a firearm in a manner that potentially could strike another individual, (ii) a stun gun or Taser in a manner that results in death or serious bodily injury, or (iii) in the Chief Administrator’s discretion, other weapons discharges and other use of Police Department-issued equipment as a weapon that results in death or serious bodily injury.” MCC § 2-78-120(d) provides that COPA shall “conduct investigations into incidents, including those in which no allegation of misconduct is made, where a person dies or sustains a serious bodily injury while detained or in Police Department custody, or as a result of police actions, such as during attempts to apprehend a suspect.”

²⁶ “OIS Notification” stands for “Officer-Involved-Shooting Notification.” “EO Notification” stands for “Extraordinary Occurrence Notification.” A “CPD Operational Notification” can arise out of a violation of CPD policy such as failure to qualify with a service weapon or a lost or stolen weapon. A “Civil Suit Notification” occurs when COPA is notified of a civil suit filed against a CPD member. A “Call For Service CPD-Involved” refers to a call for CPD service to an incident involving a CPD member (e.g., a 911 call reporting domestic violence being committed by an off-duty member). “Force Review Unit Notifications” are notifications of potential violations that come from CPD’s Tactical Review and Evaluation Division, the unit that reviews Tactical Response Reports within CPD.

Figure 7 below shows the types of police interactions that resulted in the investigation of potential misconduct. For example, 378 closed investigations (29.3%) were initiated based on a CPD member responding to a 911 or 311 call. Some investigations were not initiated based on police interaction with a member of the public. For example, 36 closed investigations (2.8%) were related to CPD operational violations.

Figure 7: Count of Police Encounter Types Which Resulted in a Closed Investigation, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023²⁷



Source: OIG Analysis

KEY TAKEAWAYS
ON
INVESTIGATION
INITIATION

Most investigations began with a civilian complaint, but many also arose from other sources, including arising from operational violations, calls for supervisors, and civil litigation claims.

F | Duration and Findings Information

OIG’s analysis concerning the duration of investigations was hampered by data quality limitations. OIG was able to analyze information relating to the time for investigations to reach a status of “Closed/Final.” Investigations reach a “Closed/Final” status when all stages of the investigative process are complete.²⁸ When there are Sustained allegations, the investigation does not reach a “Closed/Final” status until after the completion of the grievance process, arbitration, Police Board


²⁷ “Police Encounter Types” describes the form of interaction between the police and the complainant. A “CPD Internal Complaint” is a complaint that is filed by one CPD member against another, such as an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint or complaint of unprofessional behavior. This is distinguishable from a CPD Operational Violation such as an accidental Taser discharge or failure to activate body worn camera.

²⁸ Chicago Police Department, “General Order G08-01-01: Complaint and Disciplinary Definitions,” December 31, 2022, accessed February 29, 2024, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6764>.

proceeding, or appeal relating to the final disciplinary decision.²⁹ Therefore, the amount of time it takes for an investigation to reach “Closed/Final” status includes additional time not related to investigative activity.

In 2023, of the 1,289 closed investigations OIG screened, 1,032 (80.1%) have data sufficient to determine the amount of time it took for the case to reach a status of “Closed/Final.”³⁰ Of those 1,032 investigations with duration data, 343 (33.2%) reached “Closed/Final” status in one year or less (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Investigation Duration, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023



Source: OIG Analysis


Figure 9 below shows the proportion of investigations screened by OIG, broken down by investigating agency and the amount of time it took for the investigation to reach a final disposition. For example, of the investigations that were “Closed/Final” in one year or less, 230 were conducted by BIA and 113 were conducted by COPA. Most of the longest investigations that OIG screened—those closed in 2023 after three years of investigation or more—were COPA investigations.³¹

²⁹ Chicago Police Department, “General Order G08-01-01: Complaint and Disciplinary Definitions.”

³⁰ Investigations without complete data regarding the duration are in the post investigation portion of the disciplinary process and have not reached a status of “Closed/Final.”

³¹ Previously, CPD was in the process of migrating cases from a prior case management system into the current Column Case Management system which was implemented in 2019. This process restricted OIG’s ability to search for and screen older investigations recently closed by BIA. OIG was notified in April 2023 that CPD completed the migration of investigatory files from its old case management system to the new system, enabling OIG to have access to screen older BIA and COPA cases opened before February 2019. OIG continues to work with BIA and COPA to resolve access issues as they arise, to ensure OIG is able to fulfill its ordinance obligation to screen all closed investigations.

Figure 9: Investigation Duration by Investigating Agency, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023



Source: OIG Analysis

Investigations initiated by a CPD member’s report of misconduct were, on average, completed in less time than investigations initiated by complaints from non-members. That difference was especially pronounced for investigations that resulted in findings.³² Investigations that resulted in findings took longer on average than those that did not reach findings. Whereas, investigations that resulted in Sustained findings took longer on average than those that reached a different finding other than Sustained (Not Sustained, Exonerated, or Unfounded) (see Figure 10 below).³³

Figure 10: Investigation Duration by Source and Outcome, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023

	Reported by CPD Member	Reported by Non-CPD Member
All investigations	133	920
Mean duration of investigation	612 days	650 days
Median duration of investigation	519 days	609 days

	Reported by CPD Member	Reported by Non-CPD Member
Investigations with Findings	127	555
Mean duration of investigation	624 days	595 days
Median duration of investigation	519 days	520 days

³² Investigations may not result in findings if they are resolved through administrative closure (for example, a preliminary investigation does not reveal misconduct and/or does not involve a CPD member) or closure because the investigating agency is unable to acquire a sworn affidavit, affidavit override, or certification, if required to continue the investigation.

³³ Following an investigation by BIA or COPA, an allegation of misconduct may be found to be: Unfounded, when the allegation is false or not factual; Exonerated, when the incident occurred, but the actions of the accused were lawful and proper; Not sustained, when there is insufficient evidence to either prove or disprove the allegation; or Sustained, when the allegation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

	Reported by CPD Member	Reported by Non-CPD Member
Investigations without Findings	6	365
Mean duration of investigation	430 days	712 days
Median duration of investigation	95 days	693 days

Source: OIG Analysis

There were 251 accused members in the 133 investigations that were reported by a CPD member, and 1,877 accused members in the 920 investigations reported by a non-CPD member.

Figure 11: Investigation Outcomes by Source, Closed Investigations Screened, 2023

	Reported by CPD Member	Reported by Non-CPD Member
Number of accused members	251 (100%)	1,877 (100%)
Number of members with findings	240 (95.6%)	1,122 (59.8%)
Number of members without Findings	11 (4.4%)	755 (40.2%)
Number of members with Sustained findings	133 (53.0%)	394 (21.0%)
Number of members recommended for separation	1 (0.4%)	5 (0.3%)

Source: OIG Analysis

**KEY TAKEAWAYS
ON
INVESTIGATION
DURATION AND
FINDINGS**

- For the investigations that OIG screened with available data, 33% reached “Closed/Final” status in less than one year.
- Investigations with findings reached a “Closed/Final” status faster when initiated by a report from a CPD member than investigations with findings that were initiated by another source.
- Investigations initiated by a report from a CPD member were more likely to reach Sustained findings than investigations that were initiated by another source.


G | Disciplinary Recommendations

A total of 2,534 identified members were accused of misconduct in the 1,289 closed investigations reviewed by OIG in 2023.³⁴ BIA investigated 1,301 accused members and COPA investigated 1,233 accused members. BIA and COPA reached Sustained findings for 683 of those members, with BIA sustaining allegations against 409 members and COPA sustaining allegations against 274 members. When either one of these agencies sustains a finding of misconduct, they make a disciplinary recommendation, which can range from a violation noted (the least severe discipline) to separation (i.e., termination of employment). Agency recommendations are not final discipline;

³⁴ There were 175 investigations in which the accused CPD member could not be identified.

depending on the level of discipline recommended and the rank or position of the accused member, various review or appeal pathways may be available to the member.³⁵

Figure 12: Recommended Discipline, Closed and Sustained Investigations Screened, 2023



Source: OIG Analysis

**KEY TAKEAWAYS
ON DISCIPLINARY
RECOMMENDATIONS**

In cases where BIA or COPA reached Sustained findings and recommended discipline, suspensions were the most common type of disciplinary recommendation to come from both investigating agencies.

H | Investigations with an Associated Civil Suit

Out of the 1,289 investigations OIG screened in 2023, in at least 55 instances the conduct investigated by BIA or COPA for disciplinary purposes has also been the basis for a lawsuit filed in court against the City or CPD and/or one or more CPD employees.³⁶

Forty-five of the investigations with an associated civil claim were conducted by COPA. COPA reached findings in 22 of the 45 investigations it conducted with an associated civil suit.

BIA conducted 10 investigations with an associated civil claim. BIA reached findings in nine of those investigations.

³⁵ For further detail on disciplinary processes for all CPD members, see City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, “A Guide to the Disciplinary Process for Chicago Police Department Members,” accessed February 29, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/about-the-office/our-office/public-safety-section/cpd-disciplinary-process-overview/>.

³⁶ Due to the length of the timeframe during which a civil suit may be filed, this number could change as new suits are filed relative to cases screened by OIG in 2023.

KEY TAKEAWAYS ON INVESTIGATIONS WITH AN ASSOCIATED CIVIL SUIT

4.3% of police misconduct investigations screened by OIG has also been the basis for a lawsuit filed in court against the City or CPD and/or one or more CPD employees.

I | Video Footage in Investigations

Of the 1,289 investigations OIG screened in 2023, 689 contained video footage evidence of the underlying incident.³⁷ Of those 689 investigations with video footage of the underlying incident, 438 reached findings and 251 did not reach findings. There were, in total, 1,497 accused members in the 689 investigations with video footage evidence of the underlying incident. Allegations were sustained against 436 (29.1%) of those members.

Of the 1,289 investigations OIG screened, 204 had video footage that captured events related to the incident but did not capture the incident itself. Of those 204 investigations with video footage of events related to the incident, 120 reached findings and 84 did not reach findings. There were 393 accused members in the 204 investigations with video footage of events related to the incident. Allegations were sustained against 77 (19.6%) of those members.

The remaining 396 investigations that OIG screened had no video footage available that captured the underlying incident or that was related to the incident. Of those 396 investigations without any associated video footage, 273 reached findings and 123 did not reach findings. There were 644 accused members in the 396 investigations without any associated video footage; allegations were sustained against 171 (26.6%) of them.

KEY TAKEAWAYS ON VIDEO FOOTAGE IN INVESTIGATIONS

A higher percentage of members in investigations that featured video footage evidence of the underlying incident received Sustained Findings than members in investigations without video footage of the underlying incident.

J | Firearm Discharge Investigations

Of the 1,289 investigations OIG screened, 22 were initiated following an automatic notification of a firearm discharge by a CPD member.³⁸ All of the investigations with a firearm discharge by a CPD member were conducted by COPA. COPA reached findings in 21 of these incidents. Thirty-eight

³⁷ In this context, video footage may be body worn camera footage, dashboard camera footage, cell phone video, or video from another source.

³⁸ Incidents involving firearm discharge by a CPD member automatically initiate a COPA investigation if the firearm was discharged in a manner that potentially could strike another individual—whether or not the discharge was intentional and whether or not any person was actually struck with a bullet.

members were accused of misconduct as part of COPA's firearm discharge investigations. Findings were sustained against 37 of those members, with five recommended for separation by COPA.

K | Complainant Demographics

Of the 944 complainants who stated their gender identity with their complaint, 558 complainants identified as male, 382 identified as female, and 4 identified as non-binary. Of complainants who stated their race/ethnicity with their complaint, 568 identified as Black, 149 identified as White, 119 identified as Hispanic, 11 identified as Asian/Pacific Islander, 7 identified as Middle Eastern/North African, and 2 identified as American Indian/Alaskan Native.³⁹

This data reflects the population of individuals who made complaints. Witnesses or other parties may file complaints; complainants are not necessarily involved in or subjects of the police actions at issue, and therefore demographic data on complainants should not be read to be a direct measure of the demographics of those who were or might have been victims of police misconduct.

³⁹ In dashboards and published reports, OIG reports on demographic data—including race and ethnicity classifications—relying on the categories used in data collection by CPD and other agencies responsible for collecting this data.

VI | Data Collection and Analysis

A | Overview of Information Available on OIG Dashboards

OIG collects and analyzes data from CPD and City sources on many aspects of policing, public safety operations, and Chicago's police accountability system.⁴⁰ A large range of continuously updated data is accessible through dashboards published on OIG's [Information Portal](#). OIG publishes these dashboards for the benefit of several audiences; first and foremost, in the service of its mission with respect to transparency in the operation of City government, the information is made available and accessible so that members of the public can explore the dashboards on their own and improve their understanding of Chicago's public safety operations and public safety reform needs. OIG also regularly engages with elected and appointed City officials, members of City departments, academics, advocates, and journalists about its public safety-focused dashboards. Finally, OIG's dashboards enrich and support work that is responsive to the Public Safety section's duties, pursuant to its enabling ordinance.

B | OIG Public Safety Dashboards Analysis

1 | 911 Calls for Service

Calls to 911 for police service are answered by call-takers OEMC.⁴¹ Calls determined to require a police response are then routed to OEMC dispatchers, who in turn assign the call to a CPD unit to respond.⁴² OIG's [Dispatched 911 Calls for CPD Service](#) dashboard presents information on over 3.7 million dispatched 911 calls for police service since January 1, 2021. The dashboards include two displays: one shows the geographic distribution of calls alongside population demographics; the other display shows the volume of calls by event type and priority level.

CPD and OEMC use a list of over 350 distinct event types to classify the nature of an incident. Each incoming call is assigned a single event type based on the information provided by the caller, although the event type may be updated by OEMC personnel as more information becomes available.⁴³ Priority levels are automatically assigned to calls for service based on the event type. For example, calls coded as type "Domestic Disturbance" or "Battery In Progress" are both automatically assigned priority level 1 ("Immediate Dispatch"), whereas calls coded as type "Disturbance" are automatically assigned priority level 3 ("Routine Dispatch").

CPD's "General Order G03-01-01: Radio Communications" defines priority levels. The vast majority of calls resulting in dispatched police service are coded as priority levels: "1 – Immediate Dispatch,"

⁴⁰ This section is responsive to the Public Safety section's obligations pursuant to MCC §2-56-230(a) and draws heavily on the work of OIG's Center for Information Technology & Analytics (CITA).

⁴¹ The formal job title of OEMC call-takers is Police Communications Operator I.


⁴² The formal job title of OEMC dispatchers is Police Communications Operator II.

⁴³ OIG's dashboard data on event types relies on the final event type recorded in OEMC's database in any instances where the final event type is distinct from the initial event type.

“2 – Rapid Dispatch,” or “3 – Routine Dispatch.”⁴⁴ There are also two other numerical priority levels less frequently applied to calls for service and/or other police response incidents recorded in OEMC’s database: “0 – CPD/CFD Call for Emergency Assistance,” and “4 – Administrative Dispatch.

Figure 13 shows the regular season variation in 911 calls for police service from 2021 to 2023. There was a slight reduction in total call volume from 2021 to 2022, and again from 2022 to 2023. OEMC dispatched 2.3% fewer calls in 2022 compared to 2021, and 0.7% fewer calls in 2023 compared to 2022.

Figure 13: Count of 911 Calls for Police Service by Priority Level, 2021-2023




Source: OIG “Dispatched 911 Calls for CPD Service” Dashboard.⁴⁵

Figure 14 shows the trend of 911 calls for police service, by priority level, for the same three-year period. The total calls slightly decreased each year, with the largest reduction in call volume coming from priority level 3. Although total calls are not depicted in Figure 14, the totals were 1,275,796 for 2021; 1,246,620 for 2022; and 1,237,312 for 2023.

⁴⁴ Priority levels 1, 2, and 3 each have sub-level categories: “1 – Immediate Dispatch” is subdivided into priorities 1A, 1B, and 1C; “2 – Rapid Dispatch” is subdivided into priorities 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D; and “3 – Routine Dispatch” is subdivided into priorities 3B, 3C, and 3D. Priority 3A does not exist. These subdivisions within numerical priority levels are not displayed on OIG’s dashboards. “General Order 03-01-01: Radio Communications,” July 13, 2016, accessed February 1, 2024. <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/#/directive/public/6601>.

⁴⁵ Accessed January 23, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/911-calls-for-cpd-service/>.

Figure 14: Calls for Police Service by Priority Level and Year, 2021-2023⁴⁶



Source: OIG “Dispatched 911 Calls for CPD Service” Dashboard.⁴⁷

From 2021 to 2023, most calls were designated as an event type at priority level 1 “Immediate Dispatch” (44.7%), followed by priority level 3 “Routine Dispatch” (37.5%), and priority level 2 “Rapid Dispatch” (17.7%). Priority level 0 “CPD/CFD Call for Emergency Assistance,” and priority level 4 “Admin. Dispatch,” collectively account for the remaining 0.1% of calls. In 2023 specifically, OEMC classified 45.3% of calls as priority level 1 “Immediate Dispatch,” 17.5% as priority level 2 “Rapid Dispatch,” 37.1% as priority level 3 “Routine Dispatch,” and 0.1% for priority levels 0 and 4.

The most frequent final event type in 2023 was “Disturbance,” with 92,909 total calls. The vast majority of these (88,219, or 95.0%) were assigned priority level 3, “Routine Dispatch.” The remaining 5.0% have a different (higher) priority level. This can happen when the initial call is designated with a different event type and automatically assigned a higher priority level, then later changed to a final event type of “Disturbance.”

The top 10 event call types make up 45.1% of the total 911 calls made in 2023, as shown in Figure 15. 911 calls can be categorized as one of over 350 distinct event types.

Figure 15: 911 Calls by Event Type, 2023

Event Type (Top Ten)	Number of Calls	Percent of Total Calls
Disturbance	92,909	7.5%
Domestic Disturbance	86,066	7.0%

⁴⁶ There is one more priority level that can be applied to calls for service: “5 – Alternative Response.” In 2023, no priority level 5 calls were recorded. Therefore, the 2023 total in the final column includes only calls assigned to priority levels 0 and 4.


⁴⁷ Accessed January 23, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/911-calls-for-cpd-service/>. This figure and several others below are produced for purposes of this Annual Report. The source data is available on OIG’s dashboards, but the dashboards do not include the exact visual representation seen in Figure 12.

Check Well Being	61,282	5.0%
Parking Violation 1	59,754	4.8%
Auto Accident PD	54,825	4.4%
Alarm Burglar	47,218	3.8%
EMS	42,172	3.4%
Alarm Commercial	39,354	3.2%
Disturbance - Music/Noise	39,119	3.2%
Suspicious Person	35,947	2.9%
Total	558,646	45.1%

Source: OIG “Dispatched 911 Calls for CPD Service” Dashboard.⁴⁸

Figure 16 shows the geographical concentration of total calls per Chicago Police District in 2023. The 11th District (Harrison) had the most 911 calls for CPD service per capita and the fourth most 911 calls for CPD service overall. The 8th District, 12th, and 25th Districts—with populations nearly or more than two times the size of the 11th District—had more total calls (see Figure 17).

Figure 16: 911 Calls by District, 2023



Source: OIG “Dispatched 911 Calls by Geography” Dashboard.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Accessed January 23, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/911-calls-for-cpd-service/>.

⁴⁹ Accessed January 12, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/911-calls-by-geography/>.

Figure 17: Top Five Districts and Bottom Five Districts of Dispatched 911 Calls, 2023

Top Five Districts		
District	Total Number of 911 Calls	Calls per 100k Population ⁵⁰
08 - Chicago Lawn	88,839	35,983
12 - Near West	73,074	54,440
25 - Grand Central	70,505	35,836
11 - Harrison	69,492	100,757
06 - Gresham	69,357	76,982

Bottom Five Districts		
District	Total Number of 911 Calls	Calls per 100k Population ⁵¹
20 - Lincoln	28,241	30,661
14 - Shakespeare	40,375	33,827
22 - Morgan Park	40,888	40,446
15 - Austin	41,958	72,318
17 - Albany Park	44,041	30,472

Source: OIG “Dispatched 911 Calls by Geography” Dashboard.⁵²

**KEY TAKEAWAYS
ON 911 CALLS
FOR SERVICE**

- Call volume for 2023 decreased slightly (-0.7%) since 2022.
- Calls for service—both in terms of total number and number per capita—are unevenly distributed through the City, with higher concentrations on the South and West Sides.
- Although there are over 350 individual event type designations, nearly half of all 911 calls are categorized as one of ten final event types.
- The 8th District (Chicago Lawn) had the highest total number of calls for service in 2023 and the 20th District (Lincoln) had the lowest.

2 | CPD Arrests

OIG’s [CPD Arrests](#) dashboard shows that arrests have steadily increased year to year from 2021 to 2023.⁵³ The year-over-year change from 2021 to 2022 was 8.0%. The year-over-year change from 2022 to 2023 was 16.3%. There was an increase in arrests from 2022 to 2023 compared to a drop in 911 calls for police service from 2022 to 2023 (-0.7%). CPD made 37,647 arrests in 2021. In 2022, arrest levels rose slightly to 40,652. In 2023, the total number of arrests increased by 6,612 (16.3%) from 2022 to 47,254 in 2023.

Arrests were higher in 2023 than in both 2021 and 2022 in every month except May, where the most arrests for May were made in 2022. Further years of data will be necessary to see if, over the long term, CPD arrest numbers will settle into a “new normal,” or will eventually revert to pre-2020 levels. According to the Public Safety section’s [2020 Annual Report](#), there were 86,389 arrests in 2019, more than double the number of arrests made in 2023.


⁵⁰ The call rate per 100,000 people is the standard practice for displaying a rate for populations and serves as a method to normalize data across geographic areas with different total populations.

⁵¹ The call rate per 100,000 people is the standard practice for displaying a rate for populations and serves as a method to normalize data across geographic areas with different total populations.

⁵² Accessed January 18, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/911-calls-by-geography/>.

⁵³ The data displayed on OIG’s dashboards are derived from CPD’s internal arrest data. Possible explanations for variations in the data include expungements and other data retention or data quality issues.

Figure 18: CPD Arrests by Month, 2021-2023




Source: OIG “CPD Arrests: Trends” Dashboard⁵⁴

Figure 19 shows the seasonal trend in number of arrests for 2021, 2022, and 2023. Arrests in 2021 were at their monthly minimum in December, and August—historically one of the months in which arrests peaked—saw the second fewest arrests of any month. Arrests in 2022 were at their maximum in May. April had the fewest arrests in 2023, followed by February and then May.⁵⁵ July was the month in 2023 with the most arrests, followed by October and then August.

⁵⁴ Accessed January 19, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/cpd-arrests-trends/>

⁵⁵ See OIG’s “CPD Arrests: Seasonality” Dashboard.” Numbers are current as of accessed date. Accessed January 16, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/cpd-arrests-seasonality/>.

Figure 19: Seasonal Trends in Number of Arrests per Month, 2021-2023




Source: OIG Analysis based on “CPD Arrests: Seasonality” Dashboard⁵⁶

Figure 20 shows the geographical concentration of total arrests per Chicago Police District in 2023. During 2023, CPD’s 11th District had, by a wide margin, the highest number of total arrests, with 4,688 (see Figure 21). The 11th District also had the highest arrests per 100,000 residents, with 6,767. Every other District saw 4,956 arrests or fewer per 100,000 residents.

⁵⁶ Accessed January 16, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/cpd-arrests-seasonality/>.

Figure 20: CPD Arrests by District, 2023



Source: OIG “CPD Arrests: Census Map” Dashboard.⁵⁷

Figure 21: Top Five and Bottom Five CPD Arrests by District

District	Total Number of Arrests
11 - Harrison	4,688
01 - Central	3,943
10 - Ogden	3,555
18 - Near North	3,152
06 - Gresham	2,816

District	Total Number of Arrests
20 - Lincoln	977
17 - Albany Park	1,095
14 - Shakespeare	1,171
22 - Morgan Park	1,410
24 - Rogers Park	1,410

Source: OIG “CPD Arrests: Census Map” Dashboard.

⁵⁷ Accessed January 12, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/cpd-arrests-census-map/#dashboard-tabs>.

KEY TAKEAWAYS ON CPD ARRESTS


- Arrests have steadily increased from 2021 to 2023.
- In 2023, just as in 2022, in terms of total numbers and per capita, the 11th District had the most arrests.
- Arrests in 2023 peaked in July, but remained relatively constant through the winter, setting 2023 apart from previous years which saw a significant decrease in arrests during fall and winter months.

3 | Investigatory Stop Reports

As shown on OIG’s [Investigatory Stop Reports Overview](#) dashboard, ISRs are standard reporting forms that are completed when CPD members conduct an investigatory stop, which they are permitted to do when they have “reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”⁵⁸ The purpose of the stop must be limited to “prov[ing] or disprov[ing] these suspicions.”⁵⁹

CPD completed 78,421 ISRs in 2023. Compared to previous years, CPD members completed fewer ISRs in 2021, 2022, and 2023 than in 2019, with a sharp departure downwards in March 2020, coinciding with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 22).⁶⁰ This was a sudden reversal of a previous trend; the total number of reported investigatory stops increased each year between 2016 and 2019. While the number of ISRs saw an increase from 2022 to 2023 by 14.0%, there were 50.1% fewer ISRs completed in 2023 compared to 2019.

Figure 22: Number of ISRs by Month, 2019- 2023



Source: OIG “Investigatory Stop Reports Overview” Dashboard.⁶¹

While the number of investigatory stops reported was fewer in 2021, 2022, and 2023 relative to previous years, the distribution of ISRs by subjects’ race has remained generally consistent from 2019 to 2023 (Figure 23).

⁵⁸ This standard, and the definition of “reasonable articulable suspicion” as “less than probable cause but more substantial than a hunch or general suspicion,” are based in U.S. Supreme Court precedent and Illinois law and are also reflected in relevant CPD policies. Chicago Police Department, “Special Order S04-13-09: Investigatory Stop System,” July 10, 2017, accessed February 5, 2024, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/#/directive/public/6568>.

⁵⁹ Chicago Police Department, “Special Order S04-13-09: Investigatory Stop System.”

⁶⁰ The underlying CPD data source that feeds the dashboards used to collect the investigatory stop report data presented here eliminates some records over time, possibly due to data retention or data quality issues. The calculations regarding investigatory stops relies on the number of investigatory stops reported by OIG’s Public Safety section in its 2021 Annual Report and the number of 2022 investigatory stops reported on OIG’s dashboards as of January 25, 2023.

⁶¹ Accessed January 19, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/investigatory-stop-reports-overview/>.

Figure 23: Proportion of ISR Subjects by Race, 2019-2023

Demographic Group	Proportion of Chicago Population ⁶²	ISR Subjects				
		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
American Indian, Alaskan Native	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Asian/Pacific Islander	6.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.2%	1.1%	1.2%
Black/African American	30.6%	67.6%	66.6%	70.0%	68.7%	66.2%
Hispanic	29.9%	22.6%	23.6%	21.4%	22.6%	25.1%
White	33.2%	8.6%	8.6%	7.3%	7.4%	7.4%

Source: OIG “Investigatory Stop Reports with Census Demographics” Dashboard.⁶³


From 2019 to 2023, people identified as Black or African American were subject to an average of 71.3% of CPD’s investigatory stops. In comparison, people identified as Hispanic were subject to an average of 24.4% of CPD’s investigatory stops, and people identified as White to an average of 8.0% of CPD’s investigatory stops.

In 2023, just as in 2022, the 11th District (Harrison) and the 7th District (Englewood) had the most ISRs with 6,734 and 5,606 reports, respectively. These two Districts also had the highest number of reported investigatory stops relative to District population. The 7th District in particular is noteworthy, as it had the second highest number of ISRs while also being the District with the smallest population. Figures 24 and 25 show the total number of ISRs per District and each District’s total population for the 5 Districts with the highest numbers of ISRs and 5 Districts with the lowest numbers of ISRs.

⁶² The proportion of Chicago population is from the 2017-2021 American Community Survey population estimates from the United States Census. <https://www.census.gov/data/developers/data-sets/acs-5year.html>

⁶³ Accessed January 16, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/investigatory-stop-reports-with-census-demographics/#dashboard-tabs>.

Figure 24: Investigatory Stop Reports by District, 2023



Source: OIG “Investigatory Stop Reports with Census Demographics” Dashboard.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Accessed January 12, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/investigatory-stop-reports-with-census-demographics/#dashboard-tabs>.

Figure 25: Top Five Districts and Bottom Five Districts of Investigatory Stop Reports, 2023

Top Five Districts			Bottom Five Districts		
District	Total Population	ISRs of the Total Population	District	Total Population	ISRs of the Total Population
11 - Harrison	68,970	6,734	22 - Morgan Park	101,093	2,192
07 - Englewood	51,686	5,606	03 - Grand Crossing	73,779	2,439
01 - Central	79,565	5,097	14 - Shakespeare	119,357	2,550
06 - Gresham	90,095	4,566	16 - Jefferson Park	210,757	2,633
05 - Calumet	68,580	4,160	20 - Lincoln	92,107	2,678

Source: OIG “Investigatory Stop Reports with Census Demographics” Dashboard⁶⁵

CPD reported conducting 30,063 pat downs and 35,341 searches during the 78,421 total reported investigatory stops in 2023. In 2023, 26.6% of ISRs resulted in weapons or contraband found.

Figure 26 shows the ISR activity CPD reported in 2023 by subject race and results.⁶⁶

Figure 26: Investigatory Stop Activity by Race, 2023

	Black or African American	Hispanic or Latino	White	Asian/Pacific Islander	American Indian/Alaskan Native	Totals
ISRs	52,036	19,629	5,756	900	100	78,421
Pat Downs	21,569	7,063	1,191	190	21	30,063
Pat Downs Resulting in Weapons or Contraband Found	2,606	669	163	31	2	3,471
Searches	24,867	8,652	1,559	240	23	35,341
Searches Resulting in Weapons or Contraband Found	12,318	4,348	618	108	7	17,399
Percent of ISRs Resulting in a Pat Down	41.5%	36.0%	20.7%	21.1%	21.0%	38.3%

⁶⁵ Accessed January 18, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/investigatory-stop-reports-with-census-demographics/#dashboard-tabs>

⁶⁶ CPD’s “Special Order S04-13-09: Investigatory Stop System” defines a “Pat Down” as a “limited search during an Investigatory Stop in which the sworn member conducts a pat down of the outer clothing of a person for weapons for the protection of the sworn member or others in the area.” Chicago Police Department, “Special Order S04-13-09: Investigatory Stop System.”

Percent of ISRs Resulting in a Search	47.8%	44.1%	27.1%	26.7%	23.0%	45.1%
Percent of ISRs with Weapons or Contraband Found	28.7%	25.6%	13.6%	15.4%	9.0%	26.6%

Source: OIG “Investigatory Stop Reports” Dashboard and internal data analysis.⁶⁷

**KEY TAKEAWAYS
ON
INVESTIGATORY
STOP REPORTS**

- Black subjects are the only racial/ethnic group overrepresented in investigatory stops as compared to their proportion of Chicago’s population.
- Total investigatory stops increased by 14.2% from 2022 to 2023.
- Districts 11 (Harrison), 7 (Englewood), and 1 (Central) had the highest numbers of ISRs in 2023.

4 | Tactical Response Reports

As shown on OIG’s [CPD Tactical Response Reports – Overview](#) dashboard, Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) are standard reporting forms that are completed when CPD members use force on a person, up to and including lethal force. According to CPD’s “General Order G03-02-01: Response to Resistance and Force Options” directive, “[d]uring all use of force incidents, when it is safe and feasible to do so, Department members will use the principles of Force Mitigation to ensure effective police-public encounters.”⁶⁸ Force mitigation efforts do not, by themselves, require the completion of a TRR. TRRs are also the standard mechanism used to report injuries to a CPD member, regardless of whether the member also engaged in a reportable use of force. Additionally, TRRs are required whenever a subject is injured or alleges injury by a Department member.


Figure 27 shows the total number of TRR incidents in 2023 by subject race. Figure 28 shows the total number of TRR incidents in 2023 by District. The Districts are ordered on the horizontal axis based on their geographic location, roughly from the north end to the south end of Chicago.⁶⁹ Figures 29 and 30 show the geographical concentration of TRR incidents across the Districts in the City.

⁶⁷ Accessed January 16, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/investigatory-stop-reports-overview/>.

⁶⁸ CPD’s “General Order G03-02-01” states three “principles of force mitigation”: “continual communication,” “tactical positioning,” and “time as a tactic.” On the TRR, CPD members are required to record force mitigation efforts they made before resorting to the use of force. The TRR includes the following checkboxes to indicate force mitigation efforts: “Member Presence,” “Zone of Safety,” “Movement to Avoid Attack,” “Tactical Positioning,” “Verbal Direction/Control Techniques,” “Specialized Units,” “Additional Unit Members,” “Other [write-in],” and “None.” Chicago Police Department, “General Order G03-02-01: Response to Resistance and Force Options,” April 15, 2021, accessed February 5, 2024, <http://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6605>.


⁶⁹ Because TRRs are used to report injuries to CPD members as well as uses of force by CPD members, the counts of incidents displayed in Figures 26–29 do not all involve reportable uses of force against subjects by CPD members. Therefore, OIG refers to these incidents as “TRR incidents” rather than “use of force incidents.” The dashboards also allow filtering for reports that involved specific actions by CPD member or subject. For more information on CPD’s force reporting obligations, see City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, “Report on Race- and Ethnicity-Based Disparities in the Chicago Police Department’s Use of Force,” March 1, 2022, p.18–21, accessed February 5, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Use-of-Force-Disparities-Report.pdf>.

Figure 27: Count of Tactical Response Report Incidents by Subject Race, 2023



Source: OIG “CPD Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) – Overview” Dashboard.⁷⁰

Figure 28: Count of Tactical Response Report Incidents by District, 2023




Source: OIG “CPD Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) – Overview” Dashboard.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Accessed January 18, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/tactical-response-reports-overview/>.

⁷¹ Accessed January 12, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/tactical-response-reports-overview/>.

Figure 29: Tactical Response Report Incidents by District, 2023



Source: OIG “CPD Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) – Map and Census Data” Dashboard.⁷²

Figure 30: Top Five and Bottom Five Tactical Response Report Incidents by District

District	Total Number of TRRs	District	Total Number of TRRs
11 - Harrison	256	20 – Lincoln	37
10 - Ogden	192	14 – Shakespeare	42
06 - Gresham	179	14 - Shakespeare	44
01 - Central	167	16 - Jefferson Park	53
15 - Austin	144	17 - Rogers Park	69


Source: OIG “CPD Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) – Map and Census Data” Dashboard.⁷³

⁷² Accessed January 12, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/trr-map-census-data/#dashboard-tabs>.

⁷³ Accessed January 18, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/trr-map-census-data/#dashboard-tabs>.

Figure 31 shows the longer-term trend in TRR incidents reported by CPD, from January 2019 through January 2024.⁷⁴ As of January 2024, CPD members reported a total of 11,442 TRR incidents involving a total of 13,129 subjects over this period.⁷⁵ From 2019 to 2022, TRR incidents declined. A total of 2,491 TRR incidents were reported in 2023, a 31.9% increase from TRR incidents reported in 2022 (1,888). The number of TRR incidents in 2023 is more similar to the number of incidents in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic. While takedowns, taser discharges, and the use of chemical weapons have declined when compared to 2019, baton use, and firearm discharges were deployed more in 2023 than 2019 (see Figure 32).⁷⁶

Figure 31: Count of Tactical Response Report Incidents, 2019-2023⁷⁷



Source: OIG “CPD Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) – Overview” Dashboard.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ The underlying CPD data source that feeds the dashboards used to collect the TRR data presented here eliminates some records over time, possibly due to data retention or data quality issues. The calculations regarding TRRs relies on the number of TRRs reported on OIG’s dashboards as of February 5, 2024.

⁷⁵ As mentioned, CPD uses the TRR to record injuries to CPD members, regardless of whether the member also engaged in a reportable use of force. CPD began this practice during the period of analysis from January 2015 to January 2023. This change in the nature of incidents captured on the TRR may be reflected in the data reported here.

⁷⁶ OIG has not conducted a comprehensive review of CPD’s compliance with use-of-force reporting obligations. However, OIG did report on evidence of underreporting uses of force during CPD’s response to the George Floyd protests in 2020. See City of Chicago Office of Inspector General, “Report on Chicago’s Response to George Floyd Protests and Unrest,” February 18, 2021, p. 94–117, <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/OIG-Report-on-Chicagos-Response-to-George-Floyd-Protests-and-Unrest.pdf>.

⁷⁷ The information in this figure was captured on January 12, 2024.

⁷⁸ Accessed February 5, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/tactical-response-reports-overview/>

Figure 32: Changes in Level of Force, 2019 and 2023

Force Options Deployed	2019	2023	Percent Difference
Takedown	1,454	1,129	-22.4%
Taser Discharge	183	78	-57.4%
Chemical Weapon Discharge	18	12	-33.3%
Baton Use	36	42	+16.7%
Firearm Discharge	19	22	+15.8%

Source: OIG “CPD Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) – Overview” Dashboard.⁷⁹

Meanwhile, the racial/ethnic breakdown of people subject to uses of force remained consistent from January 2019 to January 2023. Of the reported TRR incidents involving use of force in that period, 8,748 incidents (76%) involved at least one Black subject. This proportion has ranged from an annual high of 79% in 2019 to an annual low of 74% in 2023.

KEY TAKEAWAYS ON TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORTS


- TRRs in 2023, unlike 2022, more closely resemble the counts established in pre-COVID-19 TRR data.
- Subjects identified as Black were overwhelmingly the subjects of TRR incidents involving uses of force in 2023 and the entire period from 2019 through 2023.

5 | Sworn CPD Members

As reported on OIG’s [Sworn Members Overview](#) dashboard, from 2019 to 2023, CPD’s sworn member count was at its maximum at the beginning of 2019, when there were 13,353 sworn members. This number decreased to 11,774 sworn members by the end of 2023, an 11.8% drop. In 2023, unlike in previous years, there was a slight increase in the number of sworn members from January to December. Figure 33 below shows the number of sworn members at the beginning and end of each year, from January 2019 to December 2023.

⁷⁹ Accessed January 17, 2024, <https://informationportal.igchicago.org/tactical-response-reports-overview/>.

Figure 33: Sworn Member Count and Percent Change from Start to End of Year, 2019 to 2023




Source: OIG “Sworn Member Overview” Dashboard.⁸⁰

Figure 34 plots the distribution of sworn members by years of experience and race as of December 2023. In December 2023, a group of approximately 2,000 members had between five and seven years of experience as CPD members. This is the population hired during a hiring surge from 2016 to 2018.⁸¹ Hiring in the years since 2018 has been at lower levels than during the surge. However, over 1,000 officers were hired in the last two years, as there were 1,515 members with less than two years of service as of December 2023. Of those 1,515 members, 794 identified as Hispanic (52.4%), 319 identified as Black (21.1%), 276 identified as White (18.2%), 56 identified as Asian (3.7%), 61 identified as two or more races (4.0%), and 2 identified as Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander (0.13%). There is no available race/ethnicity data for the remaining seven members.

⁸⁰ Accessed January 19, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/sworn-cpd-member-overview/>.

⁸¹ The hiring surge is discussed further on page 10 of OIG’s “Evaluation of the Demographic Impacts of the Chicago Police Department’s Hiring Process,” July 8, 2021, <https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/OIG-Evaluation-of-the-Demographic-Impacts-of-the-Chicago-Police-Departments-Hiring-Process.pdf>.

Figure 34: Distribution of CPD’s Sworn Members by Years of Experience and Race, December 2023



Source: OIG “Sworn Member Overview” Dashboard.⁸²

Figure 35 below shows the distribution of CPD members by years of experience, in December 2019 and December 2023, respectively. The overall number of sworn members decreased by 1,414 from December 2019 to December 2023. While the number of most experienced sworn members—those with more than 20 years of service—decreased by 250 from December 2019 to December 2023, these members made up a larger proportion of the total in December 2023 than in December 2019. This indicates that the decrease in the Department’s sworn ranks is not attributable to a wave of retirements among the Department’s most experienced members. Instead, CPD has seen the largest decrease in the share of sworn members with 11 to 15 years of experience (8.6%). The share of sworn members with 6 to 10 years of experience grew by over 10% between December 2019 and December 2023.

Figure 35: Sworn Member by Years of Experience, December 2019 and December 2023

Years of Experience	2019		2023	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Less than 1	500	3.8%	760	6.5%
1-5	3,404	25.8%	2,554	21.7%
6-10	1,191	9.0%	2,324	19.7%
11-15	1,896	14.4%	684	5.8%
16-20	2,613	19.8%	2,118	18.0%
Greater than 20	3,584	27.2%	3,334	28.3%
Total	13,188	100%	11,774	100%


Source: OIG “Sworn Member Overview” Dashboard.⁸³

⁸² Accessed January 19, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/sworn-cpd-member-overview/>.

⁸³ Accessed January 19, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/sworn-cpd-member-overview/>.

Figure 36 below shows the proportion of sworn members by race/ethnicity in December 2019 and December 2023. Within this four-year period, two groups saw the most substantial changes: the proportion of sworn members who identified as White decreased by 12.9%, and those who identified as Hispanic increased by 6.23%. All other groups, including Black officers, saw changes of less than one percentage point in their share of the total population.

Figure 36: Proportion of Sworn Members by Race/Ethnicity, December 2019 and December 2023⁸⁴



Source: OIG “Sworn Member Overview” Dashboard.⁸⁵

KEY TAKEAWAYS ON SWORN CPD MEMBERS

- The share of sworn members with 11 to 15 years of experience decreased by 8.6% while the share of sworn members with 6 to 10 years of experience increased by 10.7% between December 2019 and December 2023.
- The proportion of Black and White officers in CPD has decreased from 2022 to 2023, whereas the proportion of Hispanic officers has increased.

⁸⁴ In dashboards and published reports, OIG reports on demographic data—including race and ethnicity classifications—relying on the categories used in data collection by CPD and other agencies responsible for collecting this data.

⁸⁵ Accessed January 19, 2024, <https://igchicago.org/information-portal/data-dashboards/sworn-cpd-member-overview/>.

VII | Community Engagement and Outreach

Public Safety section staff, along with OIG's Communications and Outreach team, met and spoke with various stakeholders throughout the year, including community groups, advocacy and policy organizations, police unions, members of City Council and other City officials, academics, and journalists. In 2023, OIG's engagement efforts included attending CPD recruitment and Domestic Violence Month awareness events; conducting outreach throughout the City to hear from Chicagoans on issues that matter most in an effort to help inform OIG's priorities for 2024; and supporting the critical relationship between CPD and the communities it serves by participating in National Night Out events at six locations covering eight CPD Districts, as law enforcement agencies hosted members of the public for community-building and resource-sharing.

OIG's engagement efforts are invaluable to the Public Safety section's work. OIG's ability to conduct impactful oversight and make meaningful contributions to Chicago's public safety reform effort greatly depends upon gathering and integrating the lived experience and subject matter expertise of members of Chicago's communities.

In addition, Public Safety staff regularly and publicly engaged with the leadership and members of the entities over which the Public Safety section has jurisdiction. In 2023, such engagement efforts included:

- Meetings and briefing with members of the Chicago City Council and their constituents;
- Attendance at Police Board meetings;
- Testifying at City Council hearings;
- Attendance at CPD District Council meetings;
- Attendance at Community Commission for Public Safety and Accountability meetings; and
- Attendance at a public hearing regarding the consent decree.

Also, OIG leadership meets with each new class of recruits in the Chicago Police Training Academy, new hires in the COPA Training Academy, and new District Council members to discuss oversight, accountability, and the work of OIG.

OIG's data dashboards displaying public safety data about CPD members, arrests, and 911 dispatches frequently formed the basis of community engagement conversations. Among OIG's published reports, those regarding CPD's use of gang data, search warrants, 911 data quality, and enforcement of CPD's rules against false reports and requiring its members to report misconduct sparked broad public interest and engagement.

VIII | Conclusion

In 2023, the Public Safety section continued to maintain compliance with its ordinance obligations by publishing projects and screening disciplinary investigations closed by BIA and COPA. Additionally, OIG was released from its obligations under the consent decree and is the only component of City government to achieve and maintain full compliance.

There is tremendous work ahead, and the Public Safety section will continue to fulfill its mandate of increasing public safety, protecting civil rights, and ensuring accountability of the police force. The Public Safety section will continue to conduct independent and objective evaluations and reviews of the operations of CPD and the police accountability agencies. As outlined in the [2024 Public Safety Outlook](#), the Public Safety section's work is guided by the following strategic priorities:

1. Improving CPD's administrative, managerial, and operational competencies to render it more effective in the performance of its critical public safety functions and more efficient in its administration.
2. Ensuring transparency, diligence, fairness, consistency, and timeliness in the police discipline and accountability system.
3. Ensuring that Chicagoans' constitutional and civil rights are sufficiently and equitably protected in all aspects of public safety operations.

Recent and current areas of inquiry aligning with the above priorities include CPD's preparedness for mass gatherings, enforcement of CPD's rule against false reports, CPD's search warrant process, CPD members' duty to report misconduct, COPA's Timeliness Initiative, CPD's gun offender registry, homicide investigation processes, consistency and timeliness of discipline implementation, and CPD's recruitment efforts.

Looking ahead, the Public Safety section will continue its work in pursuit of effective, transparent, and accountable public safety operations. OIG is deeply grateful for the partnership of stakeholders across Chicago—in uniform and out.



Jayson Cayanan
Performance Analyst

Janae Nkansah
Performance Analyst

Jacob Diederich
Investigative Analyst

Aubrey Shombert
Investigative Analyst

LaDonna Candia-Flanagan
Chief Investigative Analyst

Kathryn Simon
Chief Performance Analyst

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Talk to Us

(833) TALK-2-IG/(833) 825-5244
talk2ig@igchicago.org
igchicago.org/talk2ig

OIG Business Office

(773) 478-7799

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