



Security Council

Distr.: General
9 October 2024

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

Fortieth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General

I. Background

1. The present report is the fortieth semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It provides a review and an assessment of the implementation of the resolution since the issuance of my previous report on the subject (S/2024/319), on 18 April 2024, and covers developments until 16 September 2024. Most recent developments on the ground, occurring after the reporting period cycle, will be covered in the next report.

2. The reporting period was characterized by intensified, daily exchanges of fire between Hizbullah and other Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the Israel Defense Forces across the Blue Line, with breaches of sovereignty and territorial integrity exacerbating regional tensions. The period was also marked by the significant presence of increasingly advanced weaponry outside the control of the Government of Lebanon. Those developments have undermined security and stability, highlighting the importance of fully implementing resolution 1559 (2004).

II. Implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)

3. Since the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004), limited progress has been made in its implementation. A number of provisions, including with respect to the existence and activities of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, remain pending.

A. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon

4. Through the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council sought to help strengthen the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the country, in accordance with the Taif Accords of 1989, to which all the political parties in Lebanon had committed themselves. That objective has remained the priority of my efforts.

5. The Parliament of Lebanon did not convene to elect a new president, and the country remained without an executive authority. In an effort to help resolve the



presidential vacuum, the Quintet, comprising the Ambassadors to Lebanon of Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United States of America, held a meeting on 14 September in Beirut. In a joint statement issued on 16 May, the Quintet underlined that, “after more than 18 months of presidential void,” Lebanon “needs and deserves a president who unites the nation, prioritizes the well-being of its citizens, and forms a broad and inclusive coalition to restore political stability and implement necessary economic reforms.”

6. The exchanges of fire across the Blue Line between Hizbullah and other Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon, and Israel continued to dominate throughout the reporting period. The intensified exchanges of fire resulted in increased civilian casualties, including women, children and civil defence workers, and displacement of populations on both sides, with strikes also reaching deeper into the territories of Lebanon and Israel.

7. On 2 August, the caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, stated that, “in the face of the systematic and dangerous Israeli escalation, ... we affirm our right to defend our land, sovereignty, and dignity by all available means, without hesitation, regardless of the sacrifices”. On 15 August, the Speaker of the Parliament, Nabih Berri, reiterated “Lebanon’s commitment to the rules of engagement and its right to self-defence in the face of Israeli aggression”. In a letter dated 29 July addressed to the President of the Security Council ([A/78/974-S/2024/578](#)), the caretaker Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Abdallah Bouhabib, wrote, “Lebanon emphasizes that the cessation of hostilities on all fronts and the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) are the only viable paths forward.”

8. On 27 April, a number of opposition parliamentarians appealed to Hizbullah to “withdraw to the interior of the country” and to the Government of Lebanon to “implement [Security Council resolution] 1701 [(2006)] and immediately order the deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani River.” They also stressed that “weapons outside the authority of the State’s security institutions, primarily the army, regardless of who carries them and for what purpose, are a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and a blatant attack on the safety of the Lebanese people, which requires their immediate removal.” On 1 July, parliamentarians representing the Lebanese Forces, the Kata’ib Party and independents proposed a road map in which they called for governmental action to end all non-State military operations launched from Lebanese territory and to enhance the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south. Speaking on behalf of the group, Member of Parliament Ashraf Rifi of the Renewal bloc said “we will not accept that armed groups, whether local or foreign, operating on Lebanese territory, impose the logic of the unity of the arenas, which is rejected by the majority of the Lebanese,” stressing “the importance of implementing [Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#)] in all its aspects by all parties, supporting the Lebanese Army and security institutions to control the international borders in the south, east and north, and implementing [Security Council] resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1680 \(2006\)](#) and other international treaties and related Taif Agreement provisions.” On 25 August, the leader of the Kata’ib Party, Member of Parliament Sami Gemayel, called for an “immediate cessation of military operations on both sides,” which would pave the way “for consolidation of the Armistice agreement and implementation of State decisions related to Lebanon’s security, ... especially resolution [1559 \[\(2004\)\]](#), which stipulates that the State has exclusive control over weapons and extends its sovereignty over all Lebanese territories.”

9. On 31 August, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, Member of Parliament Gebran Bassil, said “we stand by Hezbollah when it defends Lebanon and when Israel attacks us, but we do not stand by them when they start a war against Israel. ... This does not mean that we want Israel to win, but Lebanon alone cannot wage war on Israel or liberate Palestine.”

10. Parliament convened twice in its legislative capacity during the reporting period. On 25 April, Parliament extended the mandates of locally elected bodies for another year, until May 2025, owing to “the complex security, military and political circumstances in light of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon”, effectively postponing municipal elections for the third consecutive year. Opposition parliamentarians boycotted the session. Three separate appeals against the postponement filed before the Constitutional Council by opposition parties were rejected on 28 May.

11. On 15 May, Parliament convened to discuss the €1 billion aid package for Lebanon that the European Union had announced on 2 May. The caretaker Prime Minister informed Parliament that “[w]e insisted that this aid be aimed at encouraging the Syrian displaced to return to their country and not to stay in Lebanon”. Parliament recommended, inter alia, the formation of a ministerial committee, led by the caretaker Prime Minister, to liaise with international and regional partners, including the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to develop a detailed time frame for repatriating Syrian refugees.

12. More than two years after the signing of the staff-level agreement between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Lebanon ([S/2022/556](#), para. 50), most prerequisite actions for a board-level agreement remain outstanding. After its visit to Beirut on 23 May, an IMF team stated that “the negative spillovers from the conflict in Gaza” and from the exchanges of fire across the Blue Line “are further exacerbating an already weak economic situation.” While the team noted that “[s]ome progress has been made on monetary and fiscal reforms since the last Article IV consultation,” it added that “... these policy measures fall short of what is needed to enable a recovery from the crisis.”

13. The judicial investigation into the Beirut port explosion of 4 August 2020 remains stalled. The prosecution of 68 individuals in the case of the deadly clashes in Tayyounah on 14 October 2021 ([S/2021/953](#), para. 57) remains pending. There was no progress in the investigation into the 4 February 2021 killing of Lokman Slim ([S/2021/240](#), para. 46).

14. In the case of the armed clashes in Khaldah that occurred on 1 August 2021, 9 of the 16 convicted defendants who by the initial ruling in April 2023 had been sentenced to prison appealed the decision ([S/2024/319](#), para. 15). In December 2023, five of the nine appellants were released on bail by the Military Court of Cassation. In addition, the Court has twice postponed sessions at which it was to rule in the appeals, because some of the released appellants failed to attend. The next session is scheduled for 30 September.

15. The Israel Defense Forces continued to enter Lebanese airspace in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). Air violations by Israel continued in a significantly higher volume when compared to before 8 October 2023, in the context of almost daily exchanges of fire since then (see [S/2024/548](#)).

16. During the reporting period, the Israel Defense Forces conducted daily strikes on specific targets in Lebanon (ibid.). The Israel Defense Forces targeted and killed members, including commanders, of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Among those killed were Taleb Abdallah of Hizbullah on 12 June in Juwayya, Mohammed Nasser of Hizbullah on 3 July in Tyre, Samer al-Hajj of Hamas on 9 August in Sidon and Khalil al-Maqqdah of the Aqsa Martyrs Brigades on 21 August in Sidon. The Israel Defense Forces also carried out strikes deep into northern Lebanon, including in Hirmil, some 130 km north of the Blue Line, on 11 June and 2 August, and in the Bekaa, reportedly resulting in several casualties. On 17 August, 11 people, all Syrian nationals, were killed in Wadi al-Kufur, in Nabatiyah District. On 7 September, three emergency responders from the Lebanese Civil Defence were killed and two others wounded, one of them critically, in an Israeli strike near Frun in southern Lebanon.

On 2 September, an Israeli drone strike killed two individuals on the coastal road near Naqurah; one of those individuals worked for a cleaning company contracted by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

17. On 30 July, a senior Hizbullah leader, Fuad Shukr, was killed in an Israeli air strike in the southern suburbs of Beirut that also resulted in several civilian fatalities and injuries, including women and children. In identical letters dated 30 July addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/78/977-S/2024/587](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations said, "at 1930 hours on 30 July 2024, Israel targeted a residential building near Bahman Hospital, in the Harat Hurayk area in the southern suburbs of Beirut, causing major destruction. Five civilians, including 1 woman and 2 children, were killed and more than 75 other civilians were injured. ... This attack also constitutes a dangerous escalation, because it was carried out in a densely populated residential area in the southern suburbs of the capital of Lebanon, in clear and flagrant violation of international law, international humanitarian law and the Charter of the United Nations." On 30 July, the Israel Defense Forces said that, "in a targeted, intelligence-based elimination, Israeli Air Force fighter jets eliminated the Hezbollah terrorist organization's most senior military commander and the head of its Strategic Unit, Fuad Shukr 'Sayyid Muhsan', in the area of Beirut. ... [H]e was the commander responsible for the murder of the 12 children in Majdal Shams in northern Israel on Saturday evening, as well as the killing of numerous Israelis and foreign nationals over the years." Hizbullah issued a statement on 27 July in which it said that "the Islamic Resistance has absolutely nothing to do with the [Majdal Shams] incident and denies all false allegations in this regard."

18. In a letter dated 29 July addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Israel Katz, said "on 27 July, 2024, Hezbollah launched numerous rockets from Lebanon into Israeli territory, targeting civilians in the Druze village of Majdal Shams" that "resulted in the murder of twelve children and teenagers, ... with approximately thirty other civilians injured. ... The grave consequences of Hezbollah's murderous attack are a direct result of the poor implementation of Security Council resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). ... Hezbollah serves as a proxy of Iran and operates with Iranian support and resources." In a letter dated 29 July addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([A/78/974-S/2024/578](#)), the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon, Abdallah Bouhabib, said "Lebanon expresses great concern over the tragedy of 27 July, in the town of Majdal Shams in the occupied Syrian Golan, which caused the death of [12] children and injured tens of others. The circumstances surrounding this terrible incident remain unclear, and the responsibility of the Israeli occupying forces cannot be ruled out. ... Lebanon has been swift, decisive and firm in condemning all forms of violence against civilians and attacks on their livelihoods. ... It is very clear that the narrative put forth by Israel seeks to divert attention from its own long-standing violations of international law to obscure the reality of its prolonged occupation and the daily suffering inflicted upon the Palestinian people and the Syrian population of the occupied Syrian Golan". In a letter dated 30 July addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2024/582](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran said that "[t]he Islamic Republic of Iran unequivocally condemns and categorically rejects all allegations made against it in the [Israeli] letter. ... The Israeli Foreign Minister's letter appears to be a desperate attempt to divert international attention from the root causes of the current situation and to justify the regime's atrocities and malevolent activities in the region by distorting the narrative and spreading disinformation against Iran and Lebanon."

19. In identical letters dated 25 August addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2024/630), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations said that, on the morning of 25 August, “the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) detected that Hezbollah was in the process of executing a major assault against Israel, including the firing of many hundreds of missiles, rockets, and drones. The IDF conducted precise strikes to thwart and neutralize the threat by targeting terrorist sites in south Lebanon, where Hezbollah was carrying out these attacks against Israeli civilians and other targets. The IDF destroyed rocket launchers that were aimed towards strategic sites and populated areas in the north and central parts of Israel, shortly before rockets were launched. Hezbollah subsequently launched hundreds of rockets and uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAVs) from southern Lebanon towards Israel this morning.” In a statement dated 25 August, Hizbullah said “at the dawn of this Sunday, August 25, 2024, and in response to the Zionist aggression on the southern suburbs of Beirut that resulted in the martyrdom of the great fighting leader Sayyed Fouad Shukr, ... the Islamic Resistance fighters launched an aerial operation with numerous drones targeting deep into Zionist territory and an ‘Israeli’ military objective ... several enemy positions, barracks, and Iron Dome batteries in northern occupied Palestine with a large number of missiles.”

20. In its resolution 1680 (2006), the Security Council strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border. This remains critical to enabling proper border control and management, including the movement of people and the potential movement of arms.

21. The delineation and demarcation of the boundaries of Lebanon also remain elements essential to guaranteeing national sovereignty and territorial integrity. While border delineation is a bilateral matter, progress on the issue remains an obligation for Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with resolution 1680 (2006).

22. Israel continued to occupy the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006).

23. There was no progress in relation to the issue of the Shab‘a Farms area. Furthermore, neither the Syrian Arab Republic nor Israel has responded to the provisional definition of the area contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) of 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641).

B. Extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory

24. The Government of Lebanon continued its efforts to extend the authority of the State over all the Lebanese territory, as called for in the Taif Accords and in resolution 1559 (2004).

25. The Lebanese Armed Forces did not engage in the breaches of the cessation of hostilities across the Blue Line, despite coming under fire, including on 21 June when their position in Alma al-Sha‘b was fired upon by the Israel Defense Forces, resulting in the wounding of two soldiers.

26. In identical letters dated 19 April addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2024/324), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that, “simultaneously to the direct Iranian attack on Israel [on 13 April], Hezbollah fired 164 rockets from Lebanon. ... This latest attack by Hezbollah supplements thousands of rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars and drones fired by the terrorist organization towards Israel since 8 October 2023,

and numerous other attacks it has made in recent years against Israel – while demonstrating Lebanon’s unwillingness or inability to restrain Hezbollah’s hostile activities. ... The attacks conducted by Hezbollah as well as the support Iran provided to the terrorist organization, are a clear violation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and reflects yet again the need for a full implementation of this resolution.” The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 7 May addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2024/366](#)), said “the Islamic Republic of Iran rejects unequivocally and strongly all unfounded accusations in the aforementioned letter”, and reiterated that “the action taken on 13 April 2024 was conducted directly and officially from Iran in response to the Israeli recurring military aggressions, particularly its armed attack on 1 April 2024 against Iranian diplomatic premises in Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic.” He also said that “Iran does not have proxies in the region, and no individual, group or nation operates under Iran’s directive.”

27. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued their operations to maintain security and stability in the country, including through counter-terrorism and anti-trafficking activities. During four counter-terrorism operations between 18 April and 16 September, Lebanese security forces arrested 20 individuals on terrorism-related charges, 6 of whom were allegedly affiliated with Da’esh.

28. From 18 April until 16 September, Lebanese State security forces arrested 109 individuals in at least 40 counter-narcotics operations. On 12 May, the General Security Directorate apprehended 460 Syrian nationals, of whom approximately 450 were deported to the Syrian Arab Republic, for violating residency and entry regulations. The Lebanese Armed Forces announced on 11 June that they had prevented the attempted irregular entry of 1,100 Syrian nationals into Lebanon in May. Lebanese State security forces also apprehended at least 18 alleged smugglers, to combat the smuggling of people.

29. The trial hearing in the case of the fatal attack against a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Mazra’at al-Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 was again postponed, from 7 June to 12 February 2025, owing to the absence of the indictee for medical reasons.

30. Member States continued to provide bilateral support to the Lebanese Armed Forces and State security institutions, given the ongoing economic crisis in the country. The Military Technical Committee for Lebanon held a meeting with the commanders of the armies of France and Italy on 19 April in Paris, with a view to coordinating activities aimed at strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces in line with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The Committee also held meetings on 21 May in Beirut and on 6 August in London. In addition, on 14 August, the caretaker Cabinet agreed to enlist 1,500 additional soldiers into the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to strengthening their deployment, including in southern Lebanon. Increased coordination and combined donor efforts have begun to support the build-up of those 1,500 troops.

31. As at 31 August, 779,506 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Lebanon, including 768,328 Syrian refugees and 11,178 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities. With new registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR suspended by the Government of Lebanon since 2015, the actual number of refugees remains unknown. As indicated in the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2023, the Government estimates that there are 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

32. In 2024, there have been 75 verified actual or attempted movements by sea from Lebanon, involving 3,931 passengers, the majority of whom were individuals of Syrian nationality. Of those movements, 50 reached Cyprus, with 7 returned to Lebanon and 15 intercepted. UNHCR is aware of at least 16 deportation incidents involving 692 people related to attempted onward boat movements. UNHCR is also

aware of 4,345 individuals deported from Lebanon or pushed back at the border with Syrian Arab Republic in approximately 417 incidents in 2024.

C. Disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

33. In its resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#), the Security Council called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, a key provision of the resolution that has yet to be implemented. The provision reflects and reaffirms a decision to which all Lebanese committed themselves in the Taif Accords.

34. Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias within the country continued to operate outside the control of the Government, in violation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). While several groups across the political spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside government control, Hizbullah is the most heavily armed militia in the country. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups and the use of increasingly advanced weapons by Hizbullah pose a serious challenge to the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and sole and exclusive authority over all its territory.

35. There has been no tangible progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as called for in the Taif Accords and resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). Since the adoption of that resolution, few steps have been taken to tackle that crucial issue, which lies at the heart of the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon. The maintenance by Hizbullah of a military arsenal outside a legal framework, the significant exchanges of fire across the Blue Line and the involvement of Hizbullah in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be denounced by a number of voices in Lebanon, who consider those issues to be destabilizing factors in the country, increasing the risk of war and undermining democracy. Many Lebanese see the continued presence of such arms as an implicit threat that the weapons could be used within Lebanon for political reasons.

36. During the reporting period, Hizbullah and other Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias have repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities in strikes from southern Lebanon into Israel (see [S/2024/548](#)), with increasingly advanced anti-tank guided missiles, artillery, offensive drones, mortars, rockets and surface-to-air missiles used in such strikes.

37. On 31 May, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated that, "on the southern front, we continue operating and we are assuming this responsibility ... The resistance front is stronger than any time before, better than any time before, bigger than any time before, broader and more comprehensive than any time before with the diversity of its affiliations, front, means, methods, groups and tools." On 19 June, Nasrallah said "we have fought with part of our arsenal so far. We obtained new weapons. ... We developed some of our weapons based on field experience. We used some arms we had not used before. We produce our own drones ... We also produce here in Lebanon some kinds of rockets ... In past years, we spoke of 100,000 resistance members. Now we have surpassed that by far." On 10 July, Nasrallah said "at first, they were calling for distancing Hizbullah 3 km from the border because Hizbullah's anti-shield Kornet missiles reach 3 to 5 km. We have Kornet 8 km for times of war. We had to use them in this battle. So, Israel started calling for keeping Hizbullah 8 km from the border. Then the Almas rocket reaches 10 km." On 17 July, he said, "[O]ur front will not stop as long as the aggression on Gaza continues" and warned Israel that "going too far in targeting civilians will lead the resistance to launch rockets and target settlements that were not targeted in the past." On 3 August, Hizbullah published statistics claiming 2,500 military operations

against Israel, including some carried out up to 35 km inside Israeli territory, since 8 October 2023.

38. Hizbullah publicly claimed responsibility for almost daily strikes from Lebanon against Israel Defense Forces positions or personnel south of the Blue Line, including an attack on 15 May against an Israel Defense Forces base near Tiberias located about 30 km south of the Blue Line and another on 13 June against Northern Command Headquarters at the Ramat David Base east of Haifa, 45 km south of the Blue Line. On 12 May, Hizbullah stated that it had introduced the new Imad Mughniyah heavy missile in an attack on Israel Defense Forces soldiers near Zabdin, in the Shab‘a Farms area. On 16 May, Hizbullah claimed to have launched two S5 rockets from an uncrewed aerial vehicle towards an Israel Defense Forces vehicle and position in Metulla. In a statement issued on 21 June, Hizbullah issued a statement in which it said: “[I]n support of our steadfast Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, and in support of their valiant and honourable resistance, the Mujahideen of the Islamic Resistance launched, on Friday, June 21, 2024, an aerial attack using an assault drone that targeted the enemy’s artillery bunker in Al-Zaoura, achieving precise hits.” Hizbullah reportedly unveiled Falaq-2 rockets in an attack against an Israel Defense Forces command centre on 8 June. On 25 August, Nasrallah said that, as part of the retaliation for the killing of Fuad Shukr, “we identified a set of targets based on our specifications near Tel Aviv, and we selected the ‘Gllot’ base ... in the suburbs of Tel Aviv. Our goal in this operation was to launch 300 rockets, and we ended up launching 340 rockets.”

39. Hizbullah claimed to have downed Israel Defense Forces uncrewed aerial vehicles, including on 21 April and on 1 and 10 June. On 7 June, Hizbullah announced it had, for the first time, fired an anti-aircraft missile at an Israeli fighter aircraft that had violated Lebanese airspace.

40. On 18 June and on 9 and 24 July, Hizbullah released footage showing, inter alia, the port of Haifa and Ramat David Airbase in northern Israel that apparently had been shot by a drone that had entered Israeli airspace.

41. The Qassam Brigades of Hamas claimed responsibility for attacks from Lebanon on Israel Defense Forces positions in northern Israel, including on 21 and 29 April, 15 May, 20 July and 11 September, in response to the war in Gaza. The Al-Quds Brigades of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad acknowledged fatalities among their members in Lebanon.

42. On 9 September, Fajr, the military wing of the Lebanese group Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya, claimed that it had fired two barrages of rockets at the Israel Defense Forces position in Bet Hillel “in confirmation of the option of jihad in defense of our land and our people.” The group also announced several fatalities among its members. On 12 July, the Lebanese Resistance Brigades claimed to have attacked an Israel Defense Forces position in the Shab‘a Farms area and then issued statement announcing the start of its military activities against the Israel Defense Forces “in support of the Palestinian people and in defence of Lebanon.” The group claimed additional attacks on 19 July and 7 September. The Eagles of the Hurricane, the military wing of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, announced that one of their members had been killed on 22 July. The Amal Movement announced fatalities among their members.

43. Residential areas and civilian infrastructure on both sides of the Blue Line were increasingly affected by the exchanges of fire, including in the vicinity of hospitals, schools and religious sites. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that, as at 16 September, there were 112,545 people displaced, of whom 52 per cent were women, and at least 143 civilian fatalities in Lebanon, including 34 women and 26 children, 3 journalists and 21 health workers, related to the exchanges

of fire since 8 October 2023. Nearly 150,000 people remain within 10 km of the Blue Line, in areas of South Lebanon that were affected daily by shelling and air strikes. Some 62,500 people displaced and 25 civilian fatalities, including 3 women and 12 children, were also reported in Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan.

44. In identical letters dated 10 June addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2024/450), the Permanent Representative of Israel said that “as a result of Hezbollah’s latest escalation, including numerous rocket barrages directed at Israeli cities and villages, more than a dozen fires have broken out across northern Israel and the Galilee, putting the lives of thousands at risk and causing widespread devastation”.

45. In identical letters dated 3 July addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (A/78/956-S/2024/525), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations said that, “[s]ince 8 October 2023, the Israeli army has bombarded dozens of border villages in the districts of Hasbaya, Marji’yun, Bint Jubayl and Tyre with internationally banned phosphorus bombs, resulting in heavy direct and indirect losses in the agricultural and forestry sectors. ... This despicable humanitarian and environmental crime is part of systematic and successive Israeli attacks on civilians, journalists, aid workers, paramedics, and Lebanese electric company employees.”

46. On 27 April, at the funerals of two members of Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya who had been killed in an Israeli strike, supporters of the group fired various projectiles, including rockets and rocket-propelled grenades, into the air, injuring four people, including one child, in Bibnin in the Western Bekaa. Opposition parliamentarians, including the Renewal bloc, categorically rejected the “display and use of weapons,” with the bloc stressing that “only the State with its legitimate forces is responsible for defending Lebanon.”

47. According to the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, a site at Na’imah, south of Beirut, that had been used as a military base by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, was reclaimed and the land returned to the original owners as the result of a joint effort by the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Directorate of General Security and the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee.

48. Hizbullah issued statements on 15 May and 5 July regarding meetings that were held by its Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, with Hamas delegations in Beirut to discuss “the latest security and political developments”. On 15 May, Hizbullah stated that the discussions had covered the “various support fronts, namely Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.” On 27 June, Nasrallah met the Secretary-General of Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, Sheikh Muhammad Taqoush. Following the meeting, Hizbullah issued a statement in which it stressed “the importance of cooperation between the resistance forces in the battle to support the resistance in Gaza and its steadfast and honourable people.”

49. There is continued presence of armed actors in and around five of the eight United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools in Ein El Hilweh Palestine refugee camp (see S/2023/879, para. 45). The security situation in the Palestine refugee camps remained largely calm but highly fragile during the reporting period, with one politically motivated killing of an armed actor.

III. Observations

50. I remain deeply concerned at the blatant violations of and lack of progress towards the implementation of the outstanding provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), undermining security and stability.

51. I am gravely alarmed by the escalating situation along the Blue Line and the increasing effect that it has had on the civilian population, in particular the large number of casualties, including children and women, and the displacement of thousands amid the most intense Israeli bombing campaign since October 2023. I am also gravely alarmed by the continued strikes by Hizbullah into Israel that have resulted in the loss of civilian lives and displacement. The exchanges of fire across the Blue Line between Hizbullah and other Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the Israel Defense Forces have intensified, reaching dangerous levels in recent weeks, notably following the incidents in which communication devices reportedly used by Hizbullah exploded across Lebanon and the large-scale strikes carried out by the Israel Defense Forces deep into Lebanon, including on Beirut, and land incursions by the Israel Defense Forces at different points across the Blue line. I am extremely concerned for the safety of civilians on both sides of the Blue Line, including United Nations personnel.

52. I strongly condemn the loss of lives that has occurred since 8 October 2023, with reports of 2,083 persons having been killed in Lebanon¹ and 49 persons having been killed in Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan.² I remind all concerned actors that, in accordance with international humanitarian law, they must respect and protect civilians, including by refraining from indiscriminate attacks and taking all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. I also remind all actors of their responsibility to ensure the safety and security of all United Nations personnel and assets. The maintenance and use by Hizbullah of sizeable and increasingly advanced military capabilities outside the control of the Government of Lebanon remains a matter of grave concern. The widespread presence of weapons outside the control of the State and the activity of several armed Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continue to undermine security and stability in Lebanon. These developments underscore the urgent need to implement all provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). Calls from sections of the Lebanese population for the full implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) and for the rejection of the possession of arms outside State authority indicate that the maintenance of weapons by Hizbullah remains a divisive issue within Lebanese society. I continue to encourage relevant Lebanese actors to reinvigorate efforts towards an inclusive national dialogue to address the outstanding issues.

53. While I welcome the Cabinet's decision to recruit additional soldiers for the Lebanese Armed Forces in order to consolidate its control over all Lebanese territory, I call upon the Lebanese State to further increase its efforts to achieve a monopoly over the possession of weapons and the use of force throughout its territory. I continue to urge the Government and the armed forces of Lebanon to take all measures necessary to prohibit Hizbullah and other groups from acquiring weapons and building paramilitary capacity outside the authority of the State, in violation of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006).

54. I reiterate my call upon all parties concerned not to engage in any military activity inside or outside Lebanon, consistent with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution 1559 (2004). The Accords must be preserved and implemented by all to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation among Lebanese citizens and to strengthen the institutions of the State. All parties concerned must contribute to efforts to reinforce the institutions of the Lebanese State.

¹ Based on information available as at 6 October 2024.

² Based on information available as at 25 September 2024.

55. I stress the importance of increased international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and other State security institutions, for the security and stability of Lebanon.

56. The continued, self-acknowledged involvement of Hizbullah in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic not only is in breach of the disassociation policy and the principles of the Baabda Declaration of 2012, but also carries a risk of entangling Lebanon in regional conflicts and undermining the stability of Lebanon and of the region. Furthermore, it demonstrates the failure of Hizbullah to disarm and its refusal to be accountable to the very State institutions that the implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) was intended to strengthen. The reported involvement of Hizbullah and that of other Lebanese elements in fighting elsewhere in the region remains of concern.

57. Countries in the region that maintain close ties with Hizbullah should encourage its disarmament and its transformation into a solely civilian political party in accordance with the requirements of the Taif Accords and resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#), and in the best interests of Lebanon and of regional peace and security.

58. I note reports that the Government of Lebanon has reclaimed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command military site in Na'imah. It remains important that decisions taken at the 2006 national dialogue be implemented, specifically, those relating to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

59. I strongly condemn all violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Strikes by the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanese territory have caused the loss of civilian lives, including women and children, and displacement, in addition to undermining security and exacerbating tensions. The repeated alleged use of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Defense Forces to strike targets in the Syrian Arab Republic is deeply concerning, as it challenges State sovereignty and increases the risks for further regional escalation. I renew my urgent calls upon Israel to adhere to its obligations under international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including to withdraw its forces from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, as well as to immediately cease its flights in Lebanese airspace, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty. I also urge the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms contained in my report on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) of 30 October 2007 ([S/2007/641](#), annex).

60. Lebanon has been without a president for almost two years. The country's multi-pronged crisis can only be addressed through the election of a President of the Republic, the formation of a fully empowered government and the implementation of comprehensive reforms that respond to the needs and aspirations of the Lebanese people. I call upon Lebanese leaders to prioritize the national interest and work together to break the protracted political impasse, in the interest of all communities and people in Lebanon. I appeal to Lebanese Members of Parliament to assume their constitutional duty to elect a new president without further delay, in a free and fair presidential election conducted according to Lebanese constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence, in line with resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).

61. The independence of the judiciary in Lebanon must be respected. I, therefore, reiterate my call for a swift, impartial, thorough and transparent investigation, including into the Beirut port explosion, the assassination of Lokman Slim and the clashes in Tayyunah, to deliver justice to the victims and their families, to hold the perpetrators accountable and to restore people's confidence in the judicial system of Lebanon.

62. I acknowledge the enormous challenges for Lebanon that come from hosting large numbers of refugees on its territory. While the hospitality that the Lebanese people have extended to large numbers of refugees for decades is laudable, I call on all in the wider international community to work towards sustainable solutions that meet the needs of refugees and alleviate the burden on Lebanon. A robust, united and well-funded response to the rising needs of the refugees and their host communities remains vital, as does the consistent application of legal and procedural safeguards, including the principle of non-refoulement, to ensure that the protection space does not contract further. In this regard, I call on the leaders of Lebanon to encourage restraint in discourse, in order to avoid amplifying social tensions.

63. It is vital that UNRWA receive adequate and predictable funding to meet the protection needs of the Palestine refugee community. The indispensable role of UNRWA in maintaining stability in the Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon is more critical now than ever and vital to the dignity and security of Palestine refugees. Such efforts are without prejudice to the need for a just resolution of the Palestine refugee question in the context of a comprehensive settlement in the region.

64. I count on the continued commitment of the Government of Lebanon to its international obligations, and I call upon all parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions [1559 \(2004\)](#), [1680 \(2006\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#). The United Nations will continue its efforts towards the full implementation of those and all other resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.
